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In a region where mining, forestry, fish and other primary resources are so basic to income, employment and national prosperity, an understanding of rights to

Introduction -- Institutional transfer in pacific studies -- Cargo, culture and context -- Institutional and policy transfer -- Customary land registration -- Constitutions and representative democracy -- Public sector reform and anti-corruption -- Determinants of transfer -- Explaining transfer -- Evaluating transfer -- Conclusion.

The article puts the work of Barry Hindess in the context of other strands of research on corruption and anticorruption. This work can be found in a chapter of a book on Antipolitics, in a report he wrote for his Department's "Democratic Audit" of Australia, and in an article in Third World Quarterly. It has also been part of his doctoral supervision and teaching and his encouragement of the work of younger scholars. Running through his engagement with the history of the idea of corruption, and with definitions and deployments of the idea of corruption by the anticorruption nongovernmental organization (NGO) Transparency International (TI), were arguments with modern forms of liberalism and democracy as they operate internationally and in Australia.

Aid programs often involve the transfer of policies and institutions to developing countries, yet borrowed or transplanted institutions may not suit local conditions. Institutional transfer has been a persistent issue in the history of the South Pacific, ever since the King of Tonga borrowed ideas about land tenure from colonial New South Wales. This article compares attempts to transfer institutions associated with ?good governance?: land registration, constitutions, representative democracy, public sector reform and anti-corruption. It asks when the transfer took place, who was involved, how it took place, and where it came from, and draws some conclusions about its irrationality.

New ways of measuring corruption are being used to assess the performance of governments in tackling the problem. The Pacific Islands Plan, for example, envisages a 'control of corruption (integrity) indicator' that could be used to assess a government's

The leaders of Fiji's 2006 military coup launched a 'cleanup campaign' and set up an Independent Commission Against Corruption. So far it has brought court cases against about 24 people. Among them is the former Prime Minister, who was charged with corruption for his role in institutions designed to promote the economic interests of indigenous Fijians (who constitute about 56% of the population). The article considers what counts as 'corruption' in these Affirmative Action policies: a so-called 'Agriculture Scam', which distributed farm implements free to Fijian farmers; a company called Fijian Holdings, which received concessional finance from the government; and a Native Land Trust Board, which collects rent on behalf of indigenous landowners. It concludes that army and popular opinion in Fiji hold conceptions of corruption that are much broader than the offences set out in the country's penal code, and which the new ICAC is attempting to enforce.

The article puts the work of Barry Hindess in the context of other strands of research on corruption and anticorruption. This work can be found in a chapter of a book on Antipolitics, in a report he wrote for his Department's "Democratic Audit" of Australia, and in an article in Third World Quarterly. It has also been part of his doctoral supervision and teaching and his encouragement of the work of younger scholars. Running through his engagement with the history of the idea of corruption, and with definitions and deployments of the idea of corruption by the anticorruption nongovernmental organization (NGO) Transparency International (TI), were arguments with modern forms of liberalism and democracy as they operate internationally and in Australia.

The leaders of Fiji's 2006 military coup launched a 'cleanup campaign' and set up an Independent Commission Against Corruption. So far it has brought court cases against about 24 people. Among them is the former Prime Minister, who was charged with corruption for his role in institutions designed to promote the economic interests of indigenous Fijians (who constitute about 56% of the population). The article considers what counts as 'corruption' in these Affirmative Action policies: a so-called 'Agriculture Scam', which distributed farm implements free to Fijian farmers; a company called Fijian Holdings, which received concessional finance from the government; and a Native Land Trust Board, which collects rent on behalf of indigenous landowners. It concludes that army and popular opinion in Fiji hold conceptions of corruption that are much broader than the offences set out in the country's penal code, and which the new ICAC is attempting to enforce.

In a region where mining, forestry, fish and other primary resources are so basic to income, employment and national prosperity, an understanding of rights to