This paper presents a game between a fiscal authority, an independent central bank and non‐atomistic wage setters. The effects of fiscal activism and inflation targeting on labour market outcomes are analysed. The results suggest that inflation targeting provides incentive for wage restraint. Moreover, real wages are increasing in the degree of fiscal activism as wage setters exploit the response of a fiscal authority seeking to promote employment. Numerical results suggest that the benefits of targeting inflation are larger when the government pursues an activist policy and therefore that there is some substitutability between fiscal and monetary rules.
In the history of an academic discipline, it takes a while before a textbook production appears. In Sweden, a body of sociological textbooks began to develop in the 1950s. Sociology had become an independent university discipline in 1947 with a chair, given to Torgny T. Segerstedt, and a department at Uppsala University, followed gradually by the universities in Lund, Stockholm, Gothenburg and, somewhat later, Umeå. The participating authors and the areas covered in the first textbook can be read as an image of the state of Swedish sociology by that time. But textbooks can also serve a purpose in the disciplinary formation process itself. This article discusses the role and use of textbooks, course literature and syllabuses in the defining and boundary-work of the new Swedish university discipline of sociology.
In recent international educational policy discussions, the importance of schools and teachers dealing with controversial societal issues has been highlighted as the role of such issues in the liberal democracies has been discussed. However, we do not know much about the present situation in schools; which controversial issues that teachers choose to bring up in teaching, and how these are related to the curriculum. In this article, we present, based on 80 teachers' survey answers, which controversial issues are being dealt with in Swedish social studies subjects in grades 7–9, and we analyse them comparatively between the subjects and in relation to the curriculum. The study shows that teachers in different ways combine topical problems with curriculum objectives in their transformation of contents into classroom teaching. Based on how the findings of this study can be related to previous discussions about controversial issues education, we argue that to be able to explain the teachers' choices, we need to develop the conceptual and educational theories on this matter to more involve what takes place among the students and in everyday classroom realities.
Around 1970, violence among pupils became conceptualised in a radically new way when the concept of "mobbing" was introduced into the Nordic school debate. The concept was immediately embraced by popular discourse with the result that significant attention and discussion followed. It was also soon picked up by researchers and became further developed within Swedish and Norwegian behavioural science. This article concerns how pupil violence in the form of bullying was understood and theorised in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in Sweden and Norway. It shows how certain political and intellectual conditions, and events, in both national contexts were decisive for the development of bullying theory, eventually leading up to a commercialisation of bullying theory. This development is discussed with the help of the concept "psychology-commercial complex," derived from Pickstone's theory of technoscience. ; publishedVersion
Around 1970, violence among pupils became conceptualised in a radically new way when the concept of "mobbing" was introduced into the Nordic school debate. The concept was immediately embraced by popular discourse with the result that significant attention and discussion followed. It was also soon picked up by researchers and became further developed within Swedish and Norwegian behavioural science. This article concerns how pupil violence in the form of bullying was understood and theorised in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in Sweden and Norway. It shows how certain political and intellectual conditions, and events, in both national contexts were decisive for the development of bullying theory, eventually leading up to a commercialisation of bullying theory. This development is discussed with the help of the concept "psychology-commercial complex," derived from Pickstone's theory of technoscience.
This paper studies how comparative advantage and the political elites' endowments shape long-run performance in an economy with imperfect political institutions. In a capital-scarce economy, an autocrat catering to the needs of landowners favours openness to trade at an early stage of development, while an autocrat complying with the preferences of capitalists chooses to shelter the economy from trade. The trade regime interacts with economic institutions, and with policies on capital mobility, to govern capital accumulation. A landed autocrat neglects to improve institutions and blocks foreign capital to maximize extractable rents, leading the economy towards stagnation. By contrast, a capitalist autocrat strengthens institutions, which promotes manufacturing TFP growth, gradually shifts the comparative advantage towards manufacturing and renders the economy attractive to foreign investors. Allowing for trade and foreign capital inflows are thus complementary policies that provide an environment of growth and development in the capital autocracy.
This paper studies how comparative advantage and the political elites' endowments shape long-run performance in an economy with imperfect political institutions. In a capital-scarce economy, an autocrat catering to the needs of landowners favours openness to trade at an early stage of development, while an autocrat complying with the preferences of capitalists chooses to shelter the economy from trade. The trade regime interacts with economic institutions, and with policies on capital mobility, to govern capital accumulation. A landed autocrat neglects to improve institutions and blocks foreign capital to maximize extractable rents, leading the economy towards stagnation. By contrast, a capitalist autocrat strengthens institutions, which promotes manufacturing TFP growth, gradually shifts the comparative advantage towards manufacturing and renders the economy attractive to foreign investors. Allowing for trade and foreign capital inflows are thus complementary policies that provide an environment of growth and development in the capital autocracy.
Data on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a political economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences of the country's political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production owned by the political elites differ across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime. We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a decision to open up to trade and an inflow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are crucial for success upon globalization.