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AbstractFollowing financialization, there has emerged an understanding of what it implies to be a shareholder based on the shareholder value perception. However, as this shareholder value perception spreads internationally, it clashes with traditional perceptions. In this paper, we apply the language developed by Bourdieu to a Swedish public debate on equal treatment of shareholders in connection with the reform of the Swedish market for corporate control. Using Bourdieu's conceptual framework, we describe how a global development interacts with the persistence of national practices. We conclude that in Sweden, local institutional investors have allied themselves with international institutional investors to enhance their positions in the restricted field of Swedish corporate control. Shareholder value is then used by these local actors as an argument to strengthen their position. At the same time, some of the controlling shareholders depart from their traditional position as industrial entrepreneurs and embrace a more financial approach to ownership, thereby altering both the power constellations and the capital, in Bourdieu's sense, of the field.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueThis paper addresses the issue of whether controlling family shareholders are exposed to market control. The paper advances the theory that the expected performance of controlling shareholders, inferred from their track records, is constantly reflected in the market value of controlled firms.Research Findings/InsightsBy using event‐study methodology, we show that unexpected acts that are detrimental to minority shareholder interests performed by controlling family shareholders lead to short‐term negative abnormal returns in firms that otherwise are completely unaffected by the detrimental acts, but are controlled by the same family‐based business group.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThe results shed new light on the significance of track records in corporate governance that have implications for research on informal corporate governance mechanisms, governance of family firms, and, possibly, comparative corporate governance. The results also have tentative implications for the understanding of the function of family‐controlled business groups consisting of industrially unrelated firms by suggesting a function that has heretofore been neglected.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe results have implications for reform work in corporate governance by showing that practitioners and regulators must consider variability in non‐legal corporate governance mechanisms when analyzing and attempting to change different national corporate governance systems to achieve desired effects.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: The paper examines whether corporate governance differences affect firms' stock repurchasing behavior. Previous hypotheses on stock repurchases, well‐supported by US data, are based on assumptions of managerial autonomy that might not be descriptive in corporate governance systems characterized by influential controlling shareholders such as the Swedish. Firm‐level corporate governance arrangements may also affect firms' incentives to repurchase stock.Research Findings/Insights: Stock‐repurchasing patterns among Swedish firms differ from those previously observed among US firms. The findings indicate that Swedish firms do not repurchase stock to distribute excess cash, signal undervaluation, or fend off takeovers. Stock repurchases are made in addition to dividends and thus do not substitute for them. Firm‐level corporate governance arrangements directly affect stock repurchasing behavior. Firms without a dominant controlling owner seem to use stock repurchases to increase leverage. The existence of a dominant controlling shareholder diminishes the propensity for stock repurchases, while cross listing on a US or UK stock market increases that propensity.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The findings suggest that corporate governance differences affect stock repurchasing behavior. The agency‐theoretical view of the firm, on which the leading hypotheses on stock repurchases are based, accurately predicts stock repurchases only in certain institutional and governance settings.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study suggests that differences in national and firm‐level corporate governance must be taken into account in order to accurately assess outcomes of regulatory reforms and/or harmonization attempts.

Research Question/Issue: The paper examines whether corporate governance differences affect firms' stock repurchasing behaviour. Previous hypotheses on stock repurchases, well-supported by US data, are based on assumptions of managerial autonomy that might not be descriptive in corporate governance systems characterised by influential controlling shareholders such as the Swedish. Firm-level corporate governance arrangements may also affect firms' incentives to repurchase stock. Research Findings/Insights: Stock-repurchasing patterns among Swedish firms differ from those previously observed among US firms. The findings indicate that Swedish firms do not repurchase stock to distribute excess cash, signal undervaluation or fend off takeovers. Stock repurchases are made in addition to dividends and thus do not substitute for them. Firm-level corporate governance arrangements directly affect stock repurchasing behaviour. Firms without a dominant controlling owner seem to use stock repurchases to increase leverage. The existence of a dominant controlling shareholder diminishes the propensity for stock repurchases, while cross listing on a US or UK stock market increases that propensity. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The findings suggest that corporate governance differences affect stock repurchasing behaviour. The agency-theoretical view of the firm, on which the leading hypotheses on stock repurchases are based, accurately predicts stock repurchases only in certain institutional and governance settings. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The study suggests that differences in national and firm-level corporate governance must be taken into account in order to accurately assess outcomes of regulatory reforms and/or harmonisation attempts.