Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe method of reflective equilibrium is typically characterized as a process of two kinds of adjustments: hold fixed one's current set of commitments/intuitions and adjust rules/principles to account for them, then hold fixed those rules while making adjustments to one's set of commitments. Repeat until no further adjustments are required. Such characterizations ignore the role of precedent, i.e., information about the commitments and rules of others and how those might serve as guides in one's own process of deliberation. In this paper we develop a model that narrows in on a local part of a reflective equilibrium process in which a group of peer agents start with identical lists of commitments and work towards finding the rule that captures that set. If successful, we say they reach rest stop interpersonal convergence. The trouble is that, without precedent, reaching this convergence rests on implausible deterministic assumptions. We analyze how far the inclusion of a kind of soft precedent goes towards aiding the group in reaching said convergence when those assumptions are relaxed.