Suchergebnisse

The intrusion of the United States into the Middle East has resulted from a long & patient undermining of the power of Great Britain in the region. Since the First World War, the U.S. has been playing a chess game in the Near East & Middle East, a game at which it has gradually become a master. In 1945, lured by its thirst for oil & wanting a partnership with one of the oil-rich nations of the region, the United States entered into a partnership with Saudi Arabia that made the U.S. an important factor in the region. The country solidified this position of power & influence during the first years of the Cold War. Adapted from the source document.

The career of French Admiral Marcel Gensoul collapsed in the virtual
destruction by the Royal Navy of the fleet under his command at Mers
el-K�bir, near Oran, Algeria, on 3 July 1940. Until that tragic
day, Gensoul had been considered one of France's most promising naval
officers. Since then, however, the French have known him only as "the
man of Mers el-K�bir." Gensoul did nothing to shake off this
unfortunate reputation. He never wrote his memoirs and never offered a
public defense of his actions. He left his defense to others, preferring
not to reopen the old Franco-British wound resulting from the events
of
3 July 1940. On the other side of the Channel, actors in the drama and
historians have expressed regret at the horrific consequences of the
circumstances that led to the tragedy and shown sympathy for the difficult
predicament in which the French admiral found himself. Meanwhile, in
France very few people have seriously examined the role Gensoul played
in the affair. For this reason it seems important, in order to understand
the chain of events that took place on that tragic day, to reconsider the
personality of the French admiral and to scrupulously analyze the part
he played as one of the two main protagonists in the events. It will be
particularly interesting in this regard to focus attention on Gensoul's
proposal that the French squadron be disarmed in the port of Oran and
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's refusal of that option, which
the Admiralty and many members of the British Cabinet found acceptable.