Suchergebnisse

Monetary sovereignty and its surrender -- Institutional developments to promote monetary stability -- Institutional design of supervision -- Banking crises and stability of the financial system -- Monetary and financial law reform in emerging economies -- History of monetary integration in Europe -- The institutions of monetary union -- Economic policy coordination (Economic Union) -- External aspects of EMU -- Banking supervision and lender of last resort in the EU -- European financial architecture -- History of international monetary cooperation -- The law of the International Monetary Fund -- International financial architecture

El dinero es un bien público y, como tal, requiere la ordenación pública del sistema monetario y de pagos a niveles nacional e internacional. Las categorías jurídicas tradicionales —como la moneda de curso legal (legal tender en inglés)— se están adaptando, a veces con dificultad, al espacio digital, puesto que las leyes de los bancos centrales hablan de monedas, billetes y reservas, pero no de monedas digitales, tókenes o tecnología de contabilidad distribuida (distributed ledger technology o DLT). El artículo presenta la tricotomía del dinero digital: criptomonedas, monedas estables (stablecoins) y monedas digitales de los bancos centrales (central bank digital currencies o CBDC), además de considerar la forma en que esta tricotomía reta la noción tradicional de la soberanía monetaria, lo que reaviva el debate entre la teoría estatal del dinero y la teoría social o de mercado del dinero. El artículo examina en particular cuándo, cómo y por qué la digitalización llegó a la banca central, y cómo responden distintas jurisdicciones a la hora de diseñar las CBDC. Finalmente, analiza también aspectos internacionales, al recordar cómo la idea de una moneda global se remonta al Bancor de John Maynard Keynes, y cómo sería posible crear una criptomoneda global que podría circular junto con las criptomonedas nacionales o regionales.

The name "lender of last resort" owes its origins to Sir Francis Barings, who in 1797 referred to the Bank of England as the "dernier resort" from which all banks could obtain liquidity in times of crisis.1The lender of last resort ("LOLR") role of the central bank remains a major rationale for most central banks around the world, in both developed and developing countries.2While other central bank functions have recently come under fire (e.g. banking supervision), the importance of having the LOLR under the umbrella of the central bank is seldom contested.3It is the immediacy of the availability of central bank credit (the central bank being the ultimate supplier of high-powered money) that makes the LOLR particularly suitable to confront emergency situations.

Abstract
In this paper, we analyse why the changing and growing roles of independent Central Banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate.

Greening the European Central Bank (ECB) has been a highly debated subject in the Eurozone/EU, featuring in the ECB monetary policy strategy review and the ECB Climate Change Action Plan. This is part of a worldwide trend towards 'sustainable central banking'. This article focuses on the accountability of the ECB as a European institution, which enjoys a very special position in the EU legal framework, with a defined mandate conferred onto it by the Treaties (TEU and TFEU). The question at heart is, first, whether the existing normative framework allows an interpretation and understanding of the ECB's mandate to incorporate sustainability goals, and second, how sustainability objectives can be operationalized in the actual conduct of monetary policy. Whether and to what extent the ECB objectives and tasks can be 'greened' depends also on the possibility of integrating such an augmented mandate with adequate accountability requirements. Building on the concept of accountability and the framework of 'accountable independence' of the ECB, the article considers the relationship between accountability and greening the ECB, with an emphasis on the monetary policy responsibilities.