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Monetary sovereignty and its surrender -- Institutional developments to promote monetary stability -- Institutional design of supervision -- Banking crises and stability of the financial system -- Monetary and financial law reform in emerging economies -- History of monetary integration in Europe -- The institutions of monetary union -- Economic policy coordination (Economic Union) -- External aspects of EMU -- Banking supervision and lender of last resort in the EU -- European financial architecture -- History of international monetary cooperation -- The law of the International Monetary Fund -- International financial architecture

El dinero es un bien público y, como tal, requiere la ordenación pública del sistema monetario y de pagos a niveles nacional e internacional. Las categorías jurídicas tradicionales —como la moneda de curso legal (legal tender en inglés)— se están adaptando, a veces con dificultad, al espacio digital, puesto que las leyes de los bancos centrales hablan de monedas, billetes y reservas, pero no de monedas digitales, tókenes o tecnología de contabilidad distribuida (distributed ledger technology o DLT). El artículo presenta la tricotomía del dinero digital: criptomonedas, monedas estables (stablecoins) y monedas digitales de los bancos centrales (central bank digital currencies o CBDC), además de considerar la forma en que esta tricotomía reta la noción tradicional de la soberanía monetaria, lo que reaviva el debate entre la teoría estatal del dinero y la teoría social o de mercado del dinero. El artículo examina en particular cuándo, cómo y por qué la digitalización llegó a la banca central, y cómo responden distintas jurisdicciones a la hora de diseñar las CBDC. Finalmente, analiza también aspectos internacionales, al recordar cómo la idea de una moneda global se remonta al Bancor de John Maynard Keynes, y cómo sería posible crear una criptomoneda global que podría circular junto con las criptomonedas nacionales o regionales.

Greening the European Central Bank (ECB) has been a highly debated subject in the Eurozone/EU, featuring in the ECB monetary policy strategy review and the ECB Climate Change Action Plan. This is part of a worldwide trend towards 'sustainable central banking'. This article focuses on the accountability of the ECB as a European institution, which enjoys a very special position in the EU legal framework, with a defined mandate conferred onto it by the Treaties (TEU and TFEU). The question at heart is, first, whether the existing normative framework allows an interpretation and understanding of the ECB's mandate to incorporate sustainability goals, and second, how sustainability objectives can be operationalized in the actual conduct of monetary policy. Whether and to what extent the ECB objectives and tasks can be 'greened' depends also on the possibility of integrating such an augmented mandate with adequate accountability requirements. Building on the concept of accountability and the framework of 'accountable independence' of the ECB, the article considers the relationship between accountability and greening the ECB, with an emphasis on the monetary policy responsibilities.

Abstract

936The three financial appeal bodies established in the EU (Board of Appeal of the European Supervisory Authorities, Administrative Board of Review of the SSM, and Appeal Panel of the Single Resolution Board) have certainly a number of advantages. Particularly, their technical expertise in matters of financial supervision and resolution makes them well placed to understand the intricacies, complexities and reactions of financial markets. The members of these bodies are individuals of high repute, with a proven record of relevant knowledge and professional experience and are not bound by any instructions, thereby acting independently and in the public interest. Yet, there are also drawbacks as the nature of these financial appeal bodies is hybrid, quasi-judicial, combining features from both advisory committees and courts of justice. Also, the legal regime applicable to these financial appeal bodies is both complex and not uniform. The rationale of the new European financial regulatory regime post GFC, which prompted the creation of the appeal bodies, resides in the primacy of financial stability and public interest considerations. Although there is no doubt that administrative decisions need to be motivated if they are to be reviewed, most of such decisions in the area of banking and finance are very complex and yet timing is crucial for them to be effective. On these grounds, legitimacy and accountability are of utmost importance for any democratic system to properly function; however, the more complex the activity, the more difficult it is to establish clear standards of conduct and specific outcomes.937

"The Research Handbook on Central Banking focuses on global central banks as institutions and not abstractions, providing historical and practical detail about how central banks work and the challenges they face. This Research Handbook offers the most interdisciplinary treatment of global central banks published to date by addressing key questions regarding where they come from, how they have changed, and the challenges they face during uncertain times. Divided into two parts, the Research Handbook firstly takes readers on a global tour, covering central banks in the US, Latin America, Europe, Eastern Europe, Japan, China, Africa, and more. In the second part, authors delve into themes of broad application, including transparency, independence, unconventional monetary policy, payment systems, and crisis response. The interdisciplinary mix of contributors include some of the most prominent names in central banking as well as a new generation of scholars who are shaping the conversation about central banks and their role in global politics, economics, and society at large. Interdisciplinary and innovative, this Research Handbook will prove essential reading for scholars focusing on central banks, financial regulation, global governance, and related areas, as well as for central bankers and employees at central banks."--

Minimising Hold Out Creditors : Carrots / Lee Buchheit & Elena Daly -- Minimising Hold Out Creditors : Sticks / Lee Buchheit and Elena Daly -- Manging Hold-outs : The case of the 2012 Greek Exchange / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and G. Mitu Gulati -- Revisiting the pari passu clause / Georges Affaki -- The Role of the International Monetary Fund / Rosa M. Lastra -- Debt Relief for Low Income Countries / Thomas A. Duvall III -- The Longer Term Consequences of Sovereign Debt Restructuring / Odette Lienau -- Defences / Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr., Michael M. Brennan and Jacob H. Johnston -- Special Immunities : Central Bank Immunity / Thomas C. Baxter, Jr, and David Gross -- Special Immunities : Bank for International Settlements / Diego Devos -- Creditor Remedies / W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Ryan McCarl