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Intro -- Title -- Copyright -- Foreword -- Contents -- Preface -- Mass media -- The Rudd-Gillard civil war -- The politics of smear -- Fixing Labor -- All about Abbott -- Economic policy -- Abstract Australia vs Applied Australia -- Too much sport is never enough -- The wry side.

Labor is not dead yet, but it desperately needs to change. In this book, Mark Latham and several leading young progressive thinkers look to the future.Not Dead Yet shows how Labor became a party of factional warlords. Latham proposes reforms to limit their power and renew the party, and outlines a new way forward - a "light-touch social democracy" which focuses on equality, social mobility, good services and some key policy challenges: education, poverty and climate change. He also examines the rise of the authoritarian right under the wing of Tony Abbott, and what to do about it.Following thi

Corruption by office holders in eighteenth‐century British institutions, from state to local level, played an instrumental role in the emergence of modern bureaucracy, and the development of accountable, professionalized systems of administration. Due to the similarities between the institutional culture of eighteenth‐century Britain and those within many contemporary developing societies, social scientists have also sought to draw lessons from Britain's historical experience of corruption. Yet little is known about the extent, impact, and causes of corruption by eighteenth‐century office holders. This article presents the first detailed research into the topic. It utilises the rich administrative and financial records associated with the institution charged with funding and undertaking the maintenance of London Bridge—the Bridge House—to conduct a systematic qualitative and quantitative study of corruption by office holders. The article identifies an ingrained culture of corruption amongst Bridge House officers, and provides quantitative evidence of the substantial impact corruption had on the organization's finances. However, contrary to existing studies on corruption, this article concludes that, although extensive and significant, corruption did not perform a functional role in the context of this institution. The article also provides a methodology and comparator for future studies into this topic.

ABSTRACT:Between the Glorious Revolution and the mid-eighteenth century the governance of the Corporation of London was transformed from an oligarchy of aldermen to a 'rate payer's democracy'. Previous analyses of this transformation have produced a contradictory picture of how and why this shift in governance occurred. By analysing the Corporation's progress to democracy from an administrative perspective, this article argues that this process was more evolutionary in nature than has previously been suggested.

We can improve our political and economic systems by redesigning our use of informational intermediaries (infomediaries). Examples of infomediaries are political parties, the news media, proxy voting advisory firms and auditors. An infomediary's source of funding influences the information it produces –"follow the money". Political campaign finance reform is one approach to redesigning our infomediary systems. This paper proposes another approach: starting a few companies with a new corporate bylaw structure designed to enhance management accountability to shareowners. Shareowners would vote annually to hire an infomediary (paid with corporate funds) to advise them on proxy voting. If this system proves effective, it can spread to existing corporations and then to the political arena.

Shareholders can gain effective control over their firm's management by voting to choose an outside agency to nominate director candidates. This would give the board and management a greater incentive to serve the owners' interests, resulting in higher productivity of capital, more realistic levels of executive pay, less short‐termism, and a moderation of the corporate bloat that tends to necessitate drastic cuts. Such a system would further improve corporate governance in western countries, and provide a much needed "quick fix" for governance problems in Asia.