Suchergebnisse

Jedes Gericht beansprucht Autorität. Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. Johann Moritz Laux betrachtet diese Aufgabe von einem neuen Blickwinkel, indem er auf Mechanismen der kollektiven Intelligenz zurückgreift und die Verlässlichkeit der Gerichte als Entscheidungsträger mit der anderer Regierungszweige vergleicht.

Jedes Gericht beansprucht Autorität. Normwissenschaftler beurteilen die Legitimität dieser Ansprüche. Johann Moritz Laux betrachtet diese Aufgabe von einem neuen Blickwinkel, indem er auf Mechanismen der kollektiven Intelligenz zurückgreift und die Verlässlichkeit der Gerichte als Entscheidungsträger mit der anderer Regierungszweige vergleicht.

AbstractIn its AI Act, the European Union chose to understand trustworthiness of AI in terms of the acceptability of its risks. Based on a narrative systematic literature review on institutional trust and AI in the public sector, this article argues that the EU adopted a simplistic conceptualization of trust and is overselling its regulatory ambition. The paper begins by reconstructing the conflation of "trustworthiness" with "acceptability" in the AI Act. It continues by developing a prescriptive set of variables for reviewing trust research in the context of AI. The paper then uses those variables for a narrative review of prior research on trust and trustworthiness in AI in the public sector. Finally, it relates the findings of the review to the EU's AI policy. Its prospects to successfully engineer citizen's trust are uncertain. There remains a threat of misalignment between levels of actual trust and the trustworthiness of applied AI.

Online behavioural advertising (OBA) relies on inferential analytics to target consumers based on data about their online behaviour. While the technology can improve the matching of adverts with consumers' preferences, it also poses risks to consumer welfare as consumers face offer discrimination and the exploitation of their cognitive errors. The technology's risks are exacerbated by the market power of ad intermediaries. This article shows how the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) can protect consumers from behavioural exploitation by incorporating market power analysis. Drawing on current research in economic theory, it argues for applying a stricter average consumer test if the market for ad intermediaries is highly concentrated. This stricter test should neutralize negative effects of behavioural targeting on consumer welfare. The article shows how OBA can amount to a misleading action and/or a misleading omission under Articles 6 and 7 UCPD, as well as an aggressive practice under Article 8 UCPD. It further considers how the recent legislative proposals by the European Commission to enact a Digital Markets Act (DMA) and a Digital Services Act (DSA) may interact with the UCPD and the suggested stricter average consumer test.