Part I: Introduction and Historical Overview. Chapter 1: The Union Debate -- Chapter 2: Union History -- Part II: Unions in the Charter Sector. Chapter 3: Teacher-Led Unionization in the Charter Sector -- Chapter 4: The Unionized Charter Contract -- Chapter 5: Top-Down Unionization in the Charter Sector -- Part III: Union Work in Context. Chapter 6: The State of the Union -- Chapter 7: You Get what you Pay For: Declines and Revolts -- Chapter 8: The Problem we all Live with: Race and Reform Realities -- Chapter 9: Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don't, Teachers Choose Collective Pursuit.
AbstractOver the past three decades, a reform movement bent on improving schools and educational outcomes through standards-based accountability systems and market-like competitive pressures has dominated policy debates. Many have examined reform policies' effects on academic outcomes, but few have explored these policies' influence on citizens' political orientations. In this study, using data from an original survey, I examine whether and how No Child Left Behind's accountability-based architecture influences parents' attitudes towards the government and federal involvement in education. I find little evidence that diversity in parents' lived policy experiences shapes their political orientations. However, the results of a survey experiment suggest that information linking school experience to policy and government action may increase parents' confidence in their ability to contribute to the political process. Understanding whether and under what conditions parents use public school experiences to inform orientations towards the government can improve the design of future reforms.
I present the results of an original survey experiment designed to understand the complex relationship between policy information, attitudes, and evaluation. Parents of children attending schools identified for improvement under the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) are exposed to basic, context-specific, policy information on a randomized basis and then asked to complete an attitudinal survey. Treatment parents are significantly more likely than control group peers to report familiarity with NCLB and correctly identify the policy status of their child's school. An increased depth of policy understanding enables these parents to bring evaluations of their child's educational experience, policy, and government into alignment. Findings demonstrate the potential for careful policy framing and delivery to encourage enlightened opinion formation and political participation.
Several decades of scholarship suggest that by covering male and female candidates differently, the news media may influence the success of female candidates for higher office. I employ a content analysis to assess gender differences in the local television news coverage of 172U.S. House candidates in the nation's top 50 media markets in 2002. The results of the study suggest that female candidates for theU.S. House were covered with the same frequency as male candidates, and received equitable issue‐based and personal coverage.Related ArticlesBode,Leticia, andValerie M.Hennings.2012. "."Politics & Policy40():221‐257.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00350.x/abstractJalalzai,Farida.2006. "."Politics & Policy34():606‐633.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2006.00030.x/abstractRelated Media.2008. "."http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g‐IrhRSwF9U.2013.http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/
ObjectiveAnalyze achievement trajectories of students who transfer out of their district of residence via Colorado's interdistrict open enrollment policy.MethodsDrawing on a data set containing annual individual‐level records from the universe of students attending Colorado public schools between 2005–2006 and 2009–2010, we estimate the achievement trajectories of open enrollment participants via ordinary least squares (OLS) models containing student fixed effects.Results and ConclusionOur analyses indicate that the achievement of open enrollment participants gradually declines in the years leading up to their transfer. After open enrolling, students whose participation is stable through the duration they are observed in our data exhibit small achievement gains, but those who reenroll in their district of residence exhibit additional small declines. On average, those who use open enrollment as a long‐term education option tend to enroll in districts that are more advantaged on traditional measures of educational quality than their district of residence.
AbstractWe utilize detailed teacher‐level longitudinal data from Washington State to investigate patterns of teacher mobility in districts with different collective bargaining agreement (CBA) transfer provisions. Specifically, we estimate the log odds that teachers of varying experience and effectiveness levels transfer out of their schools to other schools in the district in Washington kindergarten through 12th grade (K‐12) public schools. We find little consistent evidence relating voluntary transfer provisions in CBAs to patterns in teacher mobility, but do find evidence that patterns in within‐district mobility by teacher experience and effectiveness vary between districts that do not use seniority in involuntary transfer decisions and those that use seniority as a tiebreaker or the only factor in these moves. In models that consider teacher experience, the interaction between teacher experience and school disadvantage in teacher transfer decisions is more extreme in districts with strong involuntary seniority transfer protections; novice teachers are even more likely to stay in disadvantaged schools, and veteran teachers are even more likely to leave disadvantaged schools. On the other hand, models that consider value‐added measures of teacher effectiveness suggest that more effective teachers are less likely to leave disadvantaged schools in districts that do use seniority in involuntary transfer decisions, that is, seniority transfer provisions could actually make the distribution of output‐based measures of quality more equitable. Taken together, these results suggest that seniority transfer provisions may have differential impacts on the distributions of teacher experience and effectiveness.
This article identifies two key constructs likely to influence implementation of federal policy. It theorizes that states' institutional capacity and political will may constrain or facilitate application of national initiatives, and offers a way to reorganize implementation analyses. The argument is applied in the education policy arena using several years of data to examine how resources and political will influence state test rigor underNoChildLeftBehind (NCLB). We hypothesize that better resourced and more conservative states are less likely to develop rigorous exams. Using a multilevel model, we find that state‐level capacity and political will (notably state‐level partisanship and preexisting accountability regimes) explain a substantial portion of variance in response toNCLB. These findings suggest in particular that implementation researchers should more often take note of explicitly political factors like state partisanship to anticipate how layers of government interact as they translate policy into practice.Related Articles:Patrick,Barbara.2012. ""Politics & Policy40():592‐627.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00370.x/abstractMcGrath,Robert J.2009. "."Politics & Policy37():309‐336.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00174.x/abstractGrady,Dennis O., andKathleen M.Simon.2002. "."Politics & Policy30():646‐679.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2002.tb00139.x/abstractRelated Media:Film Clip:Hamilton.2012. "." .http://www.rand.org/multimedia/video/2012/01/05/no‐child‐left‐behind.htmlVarious Resources:.2012. ".".http://www.rand.org/topics/nclb.htmlIdentificamos dos factores que posiblemente influencian la implementación de políticas federales. Argumentamos que la capacidad institucional y la voluntad política de los estados puede restringir o facilitar la aplicación de iniciativas nacionales, y ofrecemos una forma de reorganizar los análisis de implementación. Aplicamos nuestro argumento al área de las políticas educativas usando información de muchos años para examinar la influencia de los recursos y la voluntad política estatal en el rigor de las pruebas en la iniciativaNoChildLeftBehind (NCLB). Nuestra hipótesis es que estados con mejores recursos y más conservadores son menos probables a desarrollar exámenes rigurosos. Usando un modelo multinivel, encontramos que la capacidad a nivel estatal y la voluntad política (en particular el nivel de partidismo estatal y niveles pre‐existentes de responsabilidad) pueden explicar una cantidad significativa en la variación de respuesta aNCLB.
