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"During the nineteenth century, the Lockean radicals-Thomas Hodgskin, Lysander Spooner, John Bray, and Henry George-picked up the loose ends of Locke's property theory and wove them into two competing strands. Each strand addressed problems of liberty and equality that were emerging with industrial capitalism, but each did so in a different way. In one camp, Hodgskin and Spooner-the libertarian radicals-argued that the world of resources is common to all people only in the negative sense of being originally unowned by anyone. According to them, there are no just grounds for state redistribution except to correct past injustices, and governments are typically little more than thieving and oppressive gangs. In the other camp, Bray and George-the egalitarian radicals-held that all people have a positive claim to share equally in the world's resources. According to them, states should insure, through redistributive taxation and other progressive policies, that our institutions respect this common right. Locke Among the Radicals tells the forgotten story of the Lockean radicals and the role they played in addressing problems latent in Locke's theory. In addition, it argues that some of the radicals' insights can provide a blueprint for a form liberal distributive justice that is applicable today"--

Capitalism in the western world is currently facing a crisis of legitimacy in the face of rampant and growing inequality. In response, people are challenging the status quo and demanding their economic rights. But what economic rights do we have, and why? This text explores how four remarkable thinkers answered these questions during the nineteenth century's industrial revolution and how their ideas can provide a blueprint for economic justice today.

Locke is famous for arguing—by most accounts unsuccessfully—both that many people have political obligations, and that political obligation depends on freely chosen, deliberate acts of individual consent. My aim here is not to resuscitate this feature of Locke's thought. Rather, it is to show how and why Locke develops another, largely unnoticed line of reasoning about political consent. According to this direction of thought, political consent is not a discrete act that precedes consensual political relationships, but rather a dimension of ongoing political activity in cooperation with others. Such consent, which I will call 'participatory consent,' matters not because political life is morally optional, but because it is a necessary condition of freedom from arbitrary power within political society. This alternative picture of political consent, though not without its difficulties, fairs significantly better than the conception of political consent on which most Locke scholars have long focused.

It is traditional to ascribe to Locke the view that every person who acquires natural property rights by labouring on resources is obligated to leave sufficient resources for everyone else. But during the last several decades, a number of authors have contributed to a compelling textual case against this reading. Nevertheless, Locke clearly indicates that there is something wrong with distributions in which some suffer while others thrive. But if he does not endorse the traditional proviso, what exactly is the problem? In this paper, I offer a solution to this puzzle. I argue that according to Locke, once people use their natural rights to acquire large properties, many individuals are unable to enjoy the material and moral wellbeing, or "preservation," that is the end of natural law. For even if such large properties pose no problem for material preservation, they foster arbitrary power that offends against moral preservation.

What gives some people the right to issue commands to everyone else and force everyone else to obey them? And why should people obey the commands of those with political power? These two key questions are the heart of the issue of political authority, and, in this volume, two philosophers debate the answers. Michael Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion and that no one is entitled to rule over anyone. He discusses and rebuts the major theories supporting political authority's rightfulness: implicit social contract theory, hypothetical contract theories, democratic theories of authority, and utilitarian theories. Daniel Layman argues that democratic governments have authority because they are needed to protect our rights and because they are accountable to the people. Each author writes two replies directly addressing the arguments and ideas of the other. Key Features Covers a key foundational problem of political philosophy: the authority of government. Debate format ensures a full hearing of both sides. A Glossary includes key concepts in political philosophy related to the issue of authority. Annotated Further Reading sections point students to additional resources. Clear, concrete examples and arguments help students clearly see both sides of the argument. A Foreword by Matt Zwolinski describes a broader context for political authority and then traces the key points and turns in the authors' debate.