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International audience ; In a global context of rising populism, the Front National (which became Rassemblement National in 2018) has obtained very high electoral scores in France in recent years. Many observers conclude that there is a "return of French nationalism". Is this analysis relevant? Our hypothesis is that it deserves to be qualified. To verify this, we propose to break the question down into three successive themes for reflection.First of all, can we designate French nationalism as if it were a single phenomenon? The FN/RN is developing a right-wing identity-based and sovereignist approach, but are there not other forms and political colours of nationalism in France? Secondly, the very notion of nationalism, in general, is far from unambiguous. In addition to the multiplicity of definitions, the dimensions of nationalism are diverse and analytical approaches to it contrasting. Finally, is the notion of return relevant? Saying "return of French nationalism", in fact, implies that it had faded or disappeared. Is that, in fact, correct? Has it not rather been constantly metamorphosed, according to the "political offering" and to the socio-historical context?While it is indisputable that the results of the FN/RN have exploded and that the themes of xenophobia, intolerance of Islam and the demand for authority have recently developed in French public opinion, the idea of a "return of French nationalism" is nevertheless an oversimplification of reality, which borders on error. French nationalism has in fact never disappeared, and it would therefore be more appropriate to reason in terms of a sharp rise of a particular type of nationalism (exclusionist right-wing and far-right nationalism) without, however, other types of French nationalism ceasing to exist (banal nationalism and left-wing nationalism).Perhaps this nuanced approach can be extended to cases other than France? Nationalism could then be seen as a universal and permanent - but constantly evolving - collective phenomenon and not as a sudden ...

International audience ; In a global context of rising populism, the Front National (which became Rassemblement National in 2018) has obtained very high electoral scores in France in recent years. Many observers conclude that there is a "return of French nationalism". Is this analysis relevant? Our hypothesis is that it deserves to be qualified. To verify this, we propose to break the question down into three successive themes for reflection.First of all, can we designate French nationalism as if it were a single phenomenon? The FN/RN is developing a right-wing identity-based and sovereignist approach, but are there not other forms and political colours of nationalism in France? Secondly, the very notion of nationalism, in general, is far from unambiguous. In addition to the multiplicity of definitions, the dimensions of nationalism are diverse and analytical approaches to it contrasting. Finally, is the notion of return relevant? Saying "return of French nationalism", in fact, implies that it had faded or disappeared. Is that, in fact, correct? Has it not rather been constantly metamorphosed, according to the "political offering" and to the socio-historical context?While it is indisputable that the results of the FN/RN have exploded and that the themes of xenophobia, intolerance of Islam and the demand for authority have recently developed in French public opinion, the idea of a "return of French nationalism" is nevertheless an oversimplification of reality, which borders on error. French nationalism has in fact never disappeared, and it would therefore be more appropriate to reason in terms of a sharp rise of a particular type of nationalism (exclusionist right-wing and far-right nationalism) without, however, other types of French nationalism ceasing to exist (banal nationalism and left-wing nationalism).Perhaps this nuanced approach can be extended to cases other than France? Nationalism could then be seen as a universal and permanent - but constantly evolving - collective phenomenon and not as a sudden ...

International audience ; In a global context of rising populism, the Front National (which became Rassemblement National in 2018) has obtained very high electoral scores in France in recent years. Many observers conclude that there is a "return of French nationalism". Is this analysis relevant? Our hypothesis is that it deserves to be qualified. To verify this, we propose to break the question down into three successive themes for reflection.First of all, can we designate French nationalism as if it were a single phenomenon? The FN/RN is developing a right-wing identity-based and sovereignist approach, but are there not other forms and political colours of nationalism in France? Secondly, the very notion of nationalism, in general, is far from unambiguous. In addition to the multiplicity of definitions, the dimensions of nationalism are diverse and analytical approaches to it contrasting. Finally, is the notion of return relevant? Saying "return of French nationalism", in fact, implies that it had faded or disappeared. Is that, in fact, correct? Has it not rather been constantly metamorphosed, according to the "political offering" and to the socio-historical context?While it is indisputable that the results of the FN/RN have exploded and that the themes of xenophobia, intolerance of Islam and the demand for authority have recently developed in French public opinion, the idea of a "return of French nationalism" is nevertheless an oversimplification of reality, which borders on error. French nationalism has in fact never disappeared, and it would therefore be more appropriate to reason in terms of a sharp rise of a particular type of nationalism (exclusionist right-wing and far-right nationalism) without, however, other types of French nationalism ceasing to exist (banal nationalism and left-wing nationalism).Perhaps this nuanced approach can be extended to cases other than France? Nationalism could then be seen as a universal and permanent - but constantly evolving - collective phenomenon and not as a sudden outbreak of fever that supposedly appears from nowhere.

International audience ; In November 2013, tens of thousands of protesters marched twice in cities of western Brittany, wearing a red cap with reference to a large peasant revolt led in Brittany in 1675 and bloodily repressed by the troops of Louis XIV. Beyond their immediate demands, the issues of demonstrations in 2013 were multiple: governance crisis in France, economic crisis, social crisis. However, these events were judged harshly by many French politicians and journalists, who described them as a disparate movement, practicing class alliance and Poujadism (a French populist movement of the 1950s against taxes, industrialization and urbanization), who wrongfully assumed the legacy of the Red Caps of 1675. Our hypothesis is that these harsh judgments are part of a struggle for symbolic domination. To verify this, we conducted two types of searches: a comparison of the revolt of 1675 and of 2013 events; and a comparison of the remarks made by the elites in 2013 and of traditional social representations of the Breton people in France. It shows, first, that, mutatis mutandis, 1675 and 2013 have many similarities, and, secondly, that many of the arguments of the elites are part of the extension of (sometimes centuries-old) stereotypes on the Bretons. This means that the use of the symbolic red cap by protesters is not usurped and, above all, that, beyond a legitimate reserve, the hostility to this popular movement is part of a conservative approach. ; En novembre 2013, des dizaines de milliers de manifestants ont défilé à deux reprises dans des villes de Bretagne occidentale, coiffés d'un bonnet rouge en référence à une grande révolte de paysans bretons menée en 1675 et réprimée dans le sang par les troupes de Louis XIV. Par-delà leurs revendications immédiates, les enjeux des manifestations de 2013 étaient multiples : crise de la gouvernance à la française, crise économique, crise sociale… Or, ces manifestations furent jugées sévèrement par beaucoup d'observateurs du monde politique et médiatique français, qui y virent un mouvement hétéroclite, relevant de l'alliance de classe et du poujadisme (un mouvement populiste français antifiscal, anti-industrialisation et anti-urbanisation des années 1950), indigne, donc, de l'héritage des Bonnets rouges de 1675. Notre hypothèse est que ces jugements sévères relèvent d'une lutte de domination symbolique. Pour le vérifier, nous avons procédé à deux types de recherches : une comparaison de la révolte de 1675 et des manifestations de 2013 ; et une comparaison des propos des élites de 2013 et des représentations sociales traditionnelles de la population bretonne. Il en ressort, d'une part, que, mutatis mutandis, 1675 et 2013 présentent de nombreuses analogies, et, d'autre part, que beaucoup des arguments des élites s'inscrivent dans le prolongement de stéréotypes (parfois pluriséculaires) relatifs aux Bretons. Cela signifie que le recours à la symbolique du bonnet rouge par les manifestants n'est pas usurpé et surtout que (par-delà une légitime réserve) l'hostilité à ce mouvement populaire s'inscrit dans une démarche conservatrice.

International audience ; In November 2013, tens of thousands of protesters marched twice in cities of western Brittany, wearing a red cap with reference to a large peasant revolt led in Brittany in 1675 and bloodily repressed by the troops of Louis XIV. Beyond their immediate demands, the issues of demonstrations in 2013 were multiple: governance crisis in France, economic crisis, social crisis. However, these events were judged harshly by many French politicians and journalists, who described them as a disparate movement, practicing class alliance and Poujadism (a French populist movement of the 1950s against taxes, industrialization and urbanization), who wrongfully assumed the legacy of the Red Caps of 1675. Our hypothesis is that these harsh judgments are part of a struggle for symbolic domination. To verify this, we conducted two types of searches: a comparison of the revolt of 1675 and of 2013 events; and a comparison of the remarks made by the elites in 2013 and of traditional social representations of the Breton people in France. It shows, first, that, mutatis mutandis, 1675 and 2013 have many similarities, and, secondly, that many of the arguments of the elites are part of the extension of (sometimes centuries-old) stereotypes on the Bretons. This means that the use of the symbolic red cap by protesters is not usurped and, above all, that, beyond a legitimate reserve, the hostility to this popular movement is part of a conservative approach. ; En novembre 2013, des dizaines de milliers de manifestants ont défilé à deux reprises dans des villes de Bretagne occidentale, coiffés d'un bonnet rouge en référence à une grande révolte de paysans bretons menée en 1675 et réprimée dans le sang par les troupes de Louis XIV. Par-delà leurs revendications immédiates, les enjeux des manifestations de 2013 étaient multiples : crise de la gouvernance à la française, crise économique, crise sociale… Or, ces manifestations furent jugées sévèrement par beaucoup d'observateurs du monde politique et médiatique français, qui ...

International audience ; In November 2013, tens of thousands of protesters marched twice in cities of western Brittany, wearing a red cap with reference to a large peasant revolt led in Brittany in 1675 and bloodily repressed by the troops of Louis XIV. Beyond their immediate demands, the issues of demonstrations in 2013 were multiple: governance crisis in France, economic crisis, social crisis. However, these events were judged harshly by many French politicians and journalists, who described them as a disparate movement, practicing class alliance and Poujadism (a French populist movement of the 1950s against taxes, industrialization and urbanization), who wrongfully assumed the legacy of the Red Caps of 1675. Our hypothesis is that these harsh judgments are part of a struggle for symbolic domination. To verify this, we conducted two types of searches: a comparison of the revolt of 1675 and of 2013 events; and a comparison of the remarks made by the elites in 2013 and of traditional social representations of the Breton people in France. It shows, first, that, mutatis mutandis, 1675 and 2013 have many similarities, and, secondly, that many of the arguments of the elites are part of the extension of (sometimes centuries-old) stereotypes on the Bretons. This means that the use of the symbolic red cap by protesters is not usurped and, above all, that, beyond a legitimate reserve, the hostility to this popular movement is part of a conservative approach. ; En novembre 2013, des dizaines de milliers de manifestants ont défilé à deux reprises dans des villes de Bretagne occidentale, coiffés d'un bonnet rouge en référence à une grande révolte de paysans bretons menée en 1675 et réprimée dans le sang par les troupes de Louis XIV. Par-delà leurs revendications immédiates, les enjeux des manifestations de 2013 étaient multiples : crise de la gouvernance à la française, crise économique, crise sociale… Or, ces manifestations furent jugées sévèrement par beaucoup d'observateurs du monde politique et médiatique français, qui ...

Version de l'auteur, non révisée par l'éditeur. ; International audience ; Breton society of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century is characterized by a strong attachment to the Breton identity, often promoted by the politicians, businessmen and journalists. The Breton language, which is one of the essential symbols of this identity, is the subject of much attention, but its practice continues to crumble. Under these conditions, the relationship between language and identity are crucial : has the language been preempted by a small group of voluntarist neo-speakers ? and native speakers are they indifferent to the Breton identity ? ; La société bretonne de la fin du XXe et du début du XXIe siècle se caractérise, notamment, par un fort attachement à l'identité bretonne, volontiers mise en avant par les acteurs politiques, économiques et médiatiques. La langue bretonne, qui constitue l'un des symboles essentiels de cette identité, fait l'objet de toutes les attentions ; cependant, sa pratique continue à s'effondrer. Dans ces conditions, les relations entre langue et identité sont cruciales : la langue a-t-elle été préemptée par un petit groupe de néolocuteurs volontaristes ? et les locuteurs natifs, quant à eux, sont-ils indifférents à l'identité bretonne ?

Version de l'auteur, non révisée par l'éditeur. ; International audience ; Breton society of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century is characterized by a strong attachment to the Breton identity, often promoted by the politicians, businessmen and journalists. The Breton language, which is one of the essential symbols of this identity, is the subject of much attention, but its practice continues to crumble. Under these conditions, the relationship between language and identity are crucial : has the language been preempted by a small group of voluntarist neo-speakers ? and native speakers are they indifferent to the Breton identity ? ; La société bretonne de la fin du XXe et du début du XXIe siècle se caractérise, notamment, par un fort attachement à l'identité bretonne, volontiers mise en avant par les acteurs politiques, économiques et médiatiques. La langue bretonne, qui constitue l'un des symboles essentiels de cette identité, fait l'objet de toutes les attentions ; cependant, sa pratique continue à s'effondrer. Dans ces conditions, les relations entre langue et identité sont cruciales : la langue a-t-elle été préemptée par un petit groupe de néolocuteurs volontaristes ? et les locuteurs natifs, quant à eux, sont-ils indifférents à l'identité bretonne ?