Suchergebnisse

L'autorité de l'UE a-t-elle une incidence sur le vote sur enjeu européen dans les élections nationales ? Les recherches actuelles suggèrent que la politisation des enjeux européens dépend de l'étendue des compétences de l'UE. Or, la politisation accroît l'importance des enjeux au niveau individuel, ce qui, à son tour, favorise le vote sur enjeu. Ainsi, le vote sur enjeu européen devrait être plus répandu parmi les personnes qui jugent l'UE responsable des décisions politiques. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, j'utilise les données EES de 2009. Les résultats montrent que les individus qui considèrent l'UE comme responsable n'ont pas plus tendance à choisir les partis en fonction de leur positionnement européen. En outre, des analyses complémentaires indiquent la présence d'un vote sur enjeu européen, mais pas d'augmentation entre 2004 et 2009. Dans l'ensemble, peu d'éléments indiquent que l'autorité de l'UE influe sur le vote sur enjeu européen.

L'UE a acquis de nombreuses compétences économiques depuis quelques années. Dans cet article, je fais l'hypothèse qu'en réduisant la marge de manœuvre économique des gouvernements, l'intégration européenne peut réduire 1) la participation électorale et 2) le vote économique, à l'instar de la mondialisation. Ces deux hypothèses sont testées au niveau individuel dans une perspective comparée grâce aux European Election Studies (EES) de 2009 et 2014. Les résultats indiquent que la perception des contraintes économiques de l'UE diminue le vote économique après la crise, mais pas en 2009. En revanche, les données ne montrent pas d'effet sur la participation électorale.

National governments' (economic) margins of maneuver have largely decreased because of intensified pressures coming from international markets and European integration. In this PhD dissertation, I examine how these (economic) transfers of authority affect voting behaviour. To examine voting behavior in national and European elections, I rely on multiple data sources : I test multiple hypotheses linking authority transfers with voting behaviour in a first large comparative perspective using (mainly) individual perceptions which is lacking in the literature. In the first part, I analyze whether economic authority transfers affect different features of the vote, i.e. performance voting, issue voting, electoral turnout and mainstream parties' fortunes. Results indicate that citizens who believe that their national government has little economic margins of maneuver tend to abstain slightly more ; judge parties and incumbents less (conversely, more) on economic (conversely, non-economic) issues ; and favour challenger parties. In the second part, I show that the increase of power of the EU does not affect voting behavior drastically. Citizens who believe that the EU is responsible over the economy do not choose parties more on their stances on the EU issue in domestic elections and are not more prone to hold incumbent European representatives accountable. Yet, individuals who believe the EU to be economically responsible hold incumbents less accountable on their economic records in domestic elections after the sovereign debt crisis, but not before. Chapter 7 finally indicates that citizens appear to hold the European accountable for policies in which it has actual responsibilities however. ; Les marges de manœuvre (économiques) des gouvernements nationaux ont largement diminué en raison des pressions provenant des marchés internationaux et de l'intégration européenne. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, j'examine comment les transferts (économiques) d'autorité affectent le comportement électoral. Pour examiner le ...

National governments' (economic) margins of maneuver have largely decreased because of intensified pressures coming from international markets and European integration. In this PhD dissertation, I examine how these (economic) transfers of authority affect voting behaviour. To examine voting behavior in national and European elections, I rely on multiple data sources : I test multiple hypotheses linking authority transfers with voting behaviour in a first large comparative perspective using (mainly) individual perceptions which is lacking in the literature. In the first part, I analyze whether economic authority transfers affect different features of the vote, i.e. performance voting, issue voting, electoral turnout and mainstream parties' fortunes. Results indicate that citizens who believe that their national government has little economic margins of maneuver tend to abstain slightly more ; judge parties and incumbents less (conversely, more) on economic (conversely, non-economic) issues ; and favour challenger parties. In the second part, I show that the increase of power of the EU does not affect voting behavior drastically. Citizens who believe that the EU is responsible over the economy do not choose parties more on their stances on the EU issue in domestic elections and are not more prone to hold incumbent European representatives accountable. Yet, individuals who believe the EU to be economically responsible hold incumbents less accountable on their economic records in domestic elections after the sovereign debt crisis, but not before. Chapter 7 finally indicates that citizens appear to hold the European accountable for policies in which it has actual responsibilities however. ; Les marges de manœuvre (économiques) des gouvernements nationaux ont largement diminué en raison des pressions provenant des marchés internationaux et de l'intégration européenne. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, j'examine comment les transferts (économiques) d'autorité affectent le comportement électoral. Pour examiner le ...

The EU has gained many economic competences over the years. In this article, I contend that, by reducing governments' economic leeway, European integration has the potential to decrease 1) electoral turnout and 2) the economic vote, like globalization. These two hypotheses are tested on the individual level in a longitudinal cross-sectional setting using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies (EES). Findings indicate that perceptions of EU economic constraints decrease economic voting after the crisis, but not in 2009. By contrast, I find no evidence that EU constraints diminish electoral turnout.

National governments' (economic) margins of maneuver have largely decreased because of intensified pressures coming from international markets and European integration. In this PhD dissertation, I examine how these (economic) transfers of authority affect voting behaviour. To examine voting behavior in national and European elections, I rely on multiple data sources : I test multiple hypotheses linking authority transfers with voting behaviour in a first large comparative perspective using (mainly) individual perceptions which is lacking in the literature. In the first part, I analyze whether economic authority transfers affect different features of the vote, i.e. performance voting, issue voting, electoral turnout and mainstream parties' fortunes. Results indicate that citizens who believe that their national government has little economic margins of maneuver tend to abstain slightly more ; judge parties and incumbents less (conversely, more) on economic (conversely, non-economic) issues ; and favour challenger parties. In the second part, I show that the increase of power of the EU does not affect voting behavior drastically. Citizens who believe that the EU is responsible over the economy do not choose parties more on their stances on the EU issue in domestic elections and are not more prone to hold incumbent European representatives accountable. Yet, individuals who believe the EU to be economically responsible hold incumbents less accountable on their economic records in domestic elections after the sovereign debt crisis, but not before. Chapter 7 finally indicates that citizens appear to hold the European accountable for policies in which it has actual responsibilities however. ; Les marges de manœuvre (économiques) des gouvernements nationaux ont largement diminué en raison des pressions provenant des marchés internationaux et de l'intégration européenne. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, j'examine comment les transferts (économiques) d'autorité affectent le comportement électoral. Pour examiner le ...

The EU has gained many economic competences over the years. In this article, I contend that, by reducing governments' economic leeway, European integration has the potential to decrease 1) electoral turnout and 2) the economic vote, like globalization. These two hypotheses are tested on the individual level in a longitudinal cross-sectional setting using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies (EES). Findings indicate that perceptions of EU economic constraints decrease economic voting after the crisis, but not in 2009. By contrast, I find no evidence that EU constraints diminish electoral turnout.

Studies scrutinizing the impact of economic integration on electoral politics, although flourishing, are still relatively scarce. This is surprising insofar as the effects of economic globalization and regional economic integration on domestic politics are potentially massive. This article surveys the most recent contributions and proposes a research agenda to improve, both theoretically and empirically, the existing literature on the effects of economic integration on electoral politics.

Studies scrutinizing the impact of economic integration on electoral politics, although flourishing, are still relatively scarce. This is surprising insofar as the effects of economic globalization and regional economic integration on domestic politics are potentially massive. This article surveys the most recent contributions and proposes a research agenda to improve, both theoretically and empirically, the existing literature on the effects of economic integration on electoral politics.

International audience ; Research on the determinants of the issue content of parliamentary activities is recent but offers clear empirical results: opposition status, media salience and party issue ownership are the main predictors of MPs' questioning in the parliament. In this paper, we argue that integration into international markets and into the European Union should also affect issue attention by constraining national governments' abilities to influence the economy. All things being held equal, we thus expect economic integration to provide MPs incentives to deempha-size economic issues, who should then prefer to stress non-economic issues in the Parliament. To test this assumption, we selected the French case because integration within the world markets has significantly increased since the eighties, eventually providing us with a good case study. Using data from the Comparative Agenda Project (CAP) which provides oral questions and interrogations in the French Parliament from 1988 to 2007, we are able to look at the variation over time of parliamentary questioning on both economic and non-economic matters. To measure the degree of (European) economic integration

International audience ; Research on the determinants of the issue content of parliamentary activities is recent but offers clear empirical results: opposition status, media salience and party issue ownership are the main predictors of MPs' questioning in the parliament. In this paper, we argue that integration into international markets and into the European Union should also affect issue attention by constraining national governments' abilities to influence the economy. All things being held equal, we thus expect economic integration to provide MPs incentives to deempha-size economic issues, who should then prefer to stress non-economic issues in the Parliament. To test this assumption, we selected the French case because integration within the world markets has significantly increased since the eighties, eventually providing us with a good case study. Using data from the Comparative Agenda Project (CAP) which provides oral questions and interrogations in the French Parliament from 1988 to 2007, we are able to look at the variation over time of parliamentary questioning on both economic and non-economic matters. To measure the degree of (European) economic integration

AbstractThe EU has become increasingly responsible for the state of national economies over the last decades. Meanwhile, many observers have claimed that this increased responsibility has not translated into more accountability. In this article, we revisit this literature and analyse vote‐popularity functions before and after accession because it provides a situation when the EU is an incumbent and when it is not. Using Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2011, which were carried out in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, we first show that individuals do not hold the EU accountable for macroeconomic performances before accession, but that they do after accession. Using European Election Studies surveys, we also indicate that the incumbent European Peoples' Party is held accountable for the state of the economy in countries that are ruled by the EU, but not in countries that have just become EU members.