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When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also showthat the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article weinclude these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the culturaltransmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observationand imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed toimplement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supportingfair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that mayaccount for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. Italso explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higherredistribution in their destination country.

When studying attitudes towards redistribution, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also showthat the cultural environment in which people grow up affects their preferences about redistribution. In this article weinclude these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the culturaltransmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observationand imitation of others' choices. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed toimplement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern during adulthood for fairness or the moral cost of not supportingfair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent stationary states that mayaccount for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. Italso explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higherredistribution in their destination country.

Contrastant avec les hypothèses communément admises en économie, les études empiriques montrent que les individus incorporent dans leur demande de redistribution des considérations de justice distributive. Elles montrent aussi que l'environnement dans lequel les individus grandissent affecte leurs préférences pour la redistribution. En incluant ces deux éléments constitutifs de la demande individuelle de redistribution, nous proposons dans cet article un mécanisme de transmission culturelle du souci pour la justice distributive. En accord avec le processus de socialisation, les préférences des plus jeunes sont en partie façonnées par l'observation et l'imitation du comportement des autres. Plus précisément, plus les adultes échouent collectivement à mettre en place des politiques redistributives équitables, moins le souci des jeunes pour la justice distributive sera important. Sur la base de ce mécanisme, le modèle se caractérise par l'existence de plusieurs états stationnaires conditionnés par l'histoire qui permettent d'expliquer la différence importante et persistante de redistribution observée entre l'Europe et les États-Unis.

When studying redistributive attitudes, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also show that the cultural environment in which individuals grow up aspects their preferences about redistribution. In this article we include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observation and imitation of others.choices in a way that is consistent with the so- cialization process. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern for fairness or the moral cost of not supporting fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent steady states that may account for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country.

When studying redistributive attitudes, surveys show that individuals do care about fairness. They also show that the cultural environment in which individuals grow up aspects their preferences about redistribution. In this article we include these two components of the demand for redistribution in order to develop a mechanism for the cultural transmission of the concern for fairness. The preferences of the young are partially shaped through the observation and imitation of others.choices in a way that is consistent with the so- cialization process. More specifically, observing during childhood how adults have collectively failed to implement fair redistributive policies lowers the concern for fairness or the moral cost of not supporting fair taxation. Based on this mechanism, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent steady states that may account for the huge and persistent differences in redistribution observed between Europe and the United States. It also explains why immigrants from countries with a preference for greater redistribution continue to support higher redistribution in their destination country.

In mainstream economics individuals are supposed to be driven only by their self-interest. By contrast, surveys clearly show that people do care about fairness in their demand for redistribution. In this article, in the spirit of the new synthesis in moral psychology (Haidt, 2007: The new synthesis in moral psychology) the author proposes to modelize the voting behavior over redistribution as the interaction between (a) an automatic cognitive process which quickly generates intuitions on the fair level of redistribution, (b) a rational self-oriented reasoning which controls the feeling of guilt associated with fair intuitions. In addition, considering that guilt aversion depends on the cultural context, the author shows that the model exhibits a multiplicity of history-dependent steady states which may account for the huge difference of redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.

In many European countries, due to population aging, the switch from conventional unfunded public pension systems to notional systems character- ized by individual accounts is in debate. In this article, we develop an OLG model in which endogenous growth is based on an accumulation of knowledge driven by the proportion of skilled workers and the time they have spent to be trained. In such a framework, we show that conventional pension systems, contrary to notional systems, can enhance economic growth by linking bene- …ts only to partial earnings history. Thus, considering economic growth, the optimal adjustment to aging could consist in increasing the size of existing retirement systems rather than switching to notional systems.

In many European countries, due to population aging, the switch from conventional unfunded public pension systems to notional systems character- ized by individual accounts is in debate. In this article, we develop an OLG model in which endogenous growth is based on an accumulation of knowledge driven by the proportion of skilled workers and the time they have spent to be trained. In such a framework, we show that conventional pension systems, contrary to notional systems, can enhance economic growth by linking bene- ts only to partial earnings history. Thus, considering economic growth, the optimal adjustment to aging could consist in increasing the size of existing retirement systems rather than switching to notional systems.

Departing from mainstream economics, surveys …rst show that individuals do care about fairness in their demand for redistribution. They also show that the cultural environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects heir preferences about redistribution. Including these two components of the demand for redistribution, we propose in this article a mechanism of cultural transmission of the taste for fairness. Consistently with the process of socialization, the young preferences depend on collective choices through observation and imitation. Observation during childhood of redistributive policies far from what is perceived as fair results then in a lower taste for fairness. As a consequence, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history- dependent steady states which may account for the huge di¤erence of redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.

Departing from mainstream economics, surveys rst show that individuals do care about fairness in their demand for redistribution. They also show that the cultural environment in which individuals grow up a¤ects heir preferences about redistribution. Including these two components of the demand for redistribution, we propose in this article a mechanism of cultural transmission of the taste for fairness. Consistently with the process of socialization, the young preferences depend on collective choices through observation and imitation. Observation during childhood of redistributive policies far from what is perceived as fair results then in a lower taste for fairness. As a consequence, the model exhibits a multiplicity of history- dependent steady states which may account for the huge di¤erence of redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.

In mainstream economics individuals are supposed driven only by their self interest. By contrast, in this article, in the line of a "new synthesis" in moral psychology we assert that the voting behavior over redistribution is best characterized by first an automatic cognitive process which generates quicly intuitions on the fair level of redistribution, and second by a rational self oriented reasoning which controls the feeling of guilt associated with the fair intuitions. As a result of this dual-process decision-making, we show that the U-shape between inequality and redistribution supported by the data is a general feature of the model. In addition, assuming that the feeling of guilt is context dependent and is reduced if the previous generation failed in implementing the intuitively fair institution, the model exhibits a multiplic- ity of steady states which can explain the huge difference of redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.

In mainstream economics individuals are supposed driven only by their self interest. By contrast, in this article, in the line of a "new synthesis" in moral psychology we assert that the voting behavior over redistribution is best characterized by first an automatic cognitive process which generates quicly intuitions on the fair level of redistribution, and second by a rational self oriented reasoning which controls the feeling of guilt associated with the fair intuitions. As a result of this dual-process decision-making, we show that the U-shape between inequality and redistribution supported by the data is a general feature of the model. In addition, assuming that the feeling of guilt is context dependent and is reduced if the previous generation failed in implementing the intuitively fair institution, the model exhibits a multiplic- ity of steady states which can explain the huge difference of redistribution observed between Europe and the United States.

According to the standard economic approach, the level of redistribution in a democratic society is growing with the inequality of the income distribution. However, data do not support such a finding. In this article, we assert that the canonical model fails Örst in its basic assumption, the fundamental selÖsh nature of human beings. Following Adam Smith as well as modern cognitive sciences, we then suppose that a moral instinct coexists with a selfish one. It follows that democracy, based on a unanimous agreement and not on a majority of voters as in the standard approach, can be characterized by two different cultures. In the Örst one, in the spirit of Locke, individual property comes before the government. In such a culture, we show that a growing di§erence between median and mean incomes is not necessarily associated with a higher redistribution. In the second culture, in the spirit of Rousseau, the general will comes before particular interests. As a result, we Önd that in such a culture an increase of the top incomes can quite paradoxically reduce redistribution.

Dans lapproche standard en économie dite de "lélecteur médian égoïste", le niveau de redistribution dans une société démocratique est censé croître avec linégalité de la distribution du revenu. Or les nombreuses études empiriques menées sur la question invalident cette relation. Dans cet article, nous soutenons que léchec de "lélecteur médian égoïste" est en premier lieu dû à lhypothèse dune nature humaine exclusivement égoïste. En nous inspirant tant dAdam Smith que des sciences cognitives modernes, nous supposons que lhomme est caractérisé non seulement par un instinct égoïste mais aussi par un instinct moral. Nous caractérisons alors la démocratie par la recherche du consensus (ici autour de la redistribution) et non plus par la volonté dune majorité imposée à une minorité comme dans lapproche standard. Dans cette recherche de consensus, le niveau de redistribution est alors la résultante dune interaction complexe entre inégalité et inéquité dans la distribution du revenu. Nous soutenons également que les différences observées dans la redistribution du revenu aux Etats-Unis et en Europe sont dues à la nature différente de leur régime démocratique.

According to the standard economic approach, the level of redistribution in a democratic society is growing with the inequality of the income distribution. However, data do not support such a finding. In this article, we assert that the canonical model fails Örst in its basic assumption, the fundamental selÖsh nature of human beings. Following Adam Smith as well as modern cognitive sciences, we then suppose that a moral instinct coexists with a selfish one. It follows that democracy, based on a unanimous agreement and not on a majority of voters as in the standard approach, can be characterized by two different cultures. In the Örst one, in the spirit of Locke, individual property comes before the government. In such a culture, we show that a growing di§erence between median and mean incomes is not necessarily associated with a higher redistribution. In the second culture, in the spirit of Rousseau, the general will comes before particular interests. As a result, we Önd that in such a culture an increase of the top incomes can quite paradoxically reduce redistribution.