Suchergebnisse

The standard governance theories predict the failure of cooperatives. User-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited organizations, cooperatives possess a unique ownership structure which makes them susceptible to face various governance problems according to the property-rights and agency theories. Paradoxically, cooperatives are not a marginal phenomenon worldwide. They are long-lasting, resilient to crises organizations, in particular in the agricultural sector. This observation suggests some weaknesses in the classical conceptualization of cooperatives' governance and performance. Based on a meta-analysis, a systematic literature review and a stochastic production frontier approaches, our results show that several dimensions of this organizational form deserve more academic attention. The understudied macro-institutional environment, including the existence of a federative network, shapes the effects of cooperatives on their members. Understanding how members collectively build sustainable institutional arrangements calls for an equal consideration of the economic and democratic dimensions of the cooperative through alternative theoretical frameworks. Theses approaches allow for better understanding of the members' ability to overcome and take advantage of institutional and group constrains such as member heterogeneity. ; Les théories classiques de la gouvernance prédisent l'échec des coopératives. Singulières par leur structure de propriété qui repose sur l'exercice collectif et démocratique des droits de propriété et de contrôle, les coopératives sont susceptibles de faire face à de multiples problèmes de gouvernance conduisant à un désavantage institutionnel. Paradoxalement, elles constituent une réalité statistique majeure dans le monde, dont la longévité et la résilience aux crises sont remarquables, en particulier dans le secteur agricole. Ce constat conduit à s'interroger sur l'existence de faiblesses dans la conceptualisation de la gouvernance et de la performance de la coopérative. A travers une méta-analyse, une revue de littérature systématique et une analyse de frontière de production, nos résultats suggèrent que certaines dimensions de la coopérative méritent d'être explorées plus profondément. L'articulation de la coopérative avec son environnement macro-institutionnel, y compris fédératif, façonne ses impacts sur ses membres. Appréhender l'équilibre délicat conduisant à des arrangements institutionnels durables dans l'organisation demande de reconsidérer la dimension démocratique de la coopérative en mobilisant des cadres théoriques alternatifs comme la gestion des Communs. Cet effort est nécessaire pour mieux comprendre la capacité des membres à s'organiser collectivement pour tirer parti de certaines contraintes institutionnelles et de groupe comme l'hétérogénéité du sociétariat.

The standard governance theories predict the failure of cooperatives. User-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited organizations, cooperatives possess a unique ownership structure which makes them susceptible to face various governance problems according to the property-rights and agency theories. Paradoxically, cooperatives are not a marginal phenomenon worldwide. They are long-lasting, resilient to crises organizations, in particular in the agricultural sector. This observation suggests some weaknesses in the classical conceptualization of cooperatives' governance and performance. Based on a meta-analysis, a systematic literature review and a stochastic production frontier approaches, our results show that several dimensions of this organizational form deserve more academic attention. The understudied macro-institutional environment, including the existence of a federative network, shapes the effects of cooperatives on their members. Understanding how members collectively build sustainable institutional arrangements calls for an equal consideration of the economic and democratic dimensions of the cooperative through alternative theoretical frameworks. Theses approaches allow for better understanding of the members' ability to overcome and take advantage of institutional and group constrains such as member heterogeneity. ; Les théories classiques de la gouvernance prédisent l'échec des coopératives. Singulières par leur structure de propriété qui repose sur l'exercice collectif et démocratique des droits de propriété et de contrôle, les coopératives sont susceptibles de faire face à de multiples problèmes de gouvernance conduisant à un désavantage institutionnel. Paradoxalement, elles constituent une réalité statistique majeure dans le monde, dont la longévité et la résilience aux crises sont remarquables, en particulier dans le secteur agricole. Ce constat conduit à s'interroger sur l'existence de faiblesses dans la conceptualisation de la gouvernance et de la performance de la coopérative. A travers une ...

The standard governance theories predict the failure of cooperatives. User-owned, user-controlled and user-benefited organizations, cooperatives possess a unique ownership structure which makes them susceptible to face various governance problems according to the property-rights and agency theories. Paradoxically, cooperatives are not a marginal phenomenon worldwide. They are long-lasting, resilient to crises organizations, in particular in the agricultural sector. This observation suggests some weaknesses in the classical conceptualization of cooperatives' governance and performance. Based on a meta-analysis, a systematic literature review and a stochastic production frontier approaches, our results show that several dimensions of this organizational form deserve more academic attention. The understudied macro-institutional environment, including the existence of a federative network, shapes the effects of cooperatives on their members. Understanding how members collectively build sustainable institutional arrangements calls for an equal consideration of the economic and democratic dimensions of the cooperative through alternative theoretical frameworks. Theses approaches allow for better understanding of the members' ability to overcome and take advantage of institutional and group constrains such as member heterogeneity. ; Les théories classiques de la gouvernance prédisent l'échec des coopératives. Singulières par leur structure de propriété qui repose sur l'exercice collectif et démocratique des droits de propriété et de contrôle, les coopératives sont susceptibles de faire face à de multiples problèmes de gouvernance conduisant à un désavantage institutionnel. Paradoxalement, elles constituent une réalité statistique majeure dans le monde, dont la longévité et la résilience aux crises sont remarquables, en particulier dans le secteur agricole. Ce constat conduit à s'interroger sur l'existence de faiblesses dans la conceptualisation de la gouvernance et de la performance de la coopérative. A travers une méta-analyse, une revue de littérature systématique et une analyse de frontière de production, nos résultats suggèrent que certaines dimensions de la coopérative méritent d'être explorées plus profondément. L'articulation de la coopérative avec son environnement macro-institutionnel, y compris fédératif, façonne ses impacts sur ses membres. Appréhender l'équilibre délicat conduisant à des arrangements institutionnels durables dans l'organisation demande de reconsidérer la dimension démocratique de la coopérative en mobilisant des cadres théoriques alternatifs comme la gestion des Communs. Cet effort est nécessaire pour mieux comprendre la capacité des membres à s'organiser collectivement pour tirer parti de certaines contraintes institutionnelles et de groupe comme l'hétérogénéité du sociétariat.

International audience ; This paper introduces a refined approach to conceptualising the commons in order to shed new light on cooperative practices. Specifically, it proposes the novel concept of Common-Property Assets (CPAs). CPAs are exclusively human-made resources owned under common-property ownership regimes. Our CPA model combines quantity (the flow of resource units available to members) and quality (the impact produced on the community by the members' appropriation of the resource flow). While these two dimensions are largely pre-existing in the conventional case of natural common-pool resources, they directly depend on members' collective action in CPAs. We apply this theoretical framework to farm machinery sharing agreements-a widespread grassroots cooperative phenomenon in agriculture-using a systematic literature review to generalise the findings from a sample of 54 studies published from 1950 to 2018. Our findings show that in successful CPAs, members endorse and do not deviate from a quantity-quality equilibrium that is collectively agreed upon. Despite the existence of thresholds for both quantity and quality due to (axiological) membership heterogeneity, qualitative changes in respect of the common good are possible in CPAs that promote democratic practices. Our study has potentially strong implications for developing ethics in cooperatives and the sustainable development of communities worldwide.

International audience ; This paper introduces a refined approach to conceptualising the commons in order to shed new light on cooperative practices. Specifically, it proposes the novel concept of Common-Property Assets (CPAs). CPAs are exclusively human-made resources owned under common-property ownership regimes. Our CPA model combines quantity (the flow of resource units available to members) and quality (the impact produced on the community by the members' appropriation of the resource flow). While these two dimensions are largely pre-existing in the conventional case of natural common-pool resources, they directly depend on members' collective action in CPAs. We apply this theoretical framework to farm machinery sharing agreements-a widespread grassroots cooperative phenomenon in agriculture-using a systematic literature review to generalise the findings from a sample of 54 studies published from 1950 to 2018. Our findings show that in successful CPAs, members endorse and do not deviate from a quantity-quality equilibrium that is collectively agreed upon. Despite the existence of thresholds for both quantity and quality due to (axiological) membership heterogeneity, qualitative changes in respect of the common good are possible in CPAs that promote democratic practices. Our study has potentially strong implications for developing ethics in cooperatives and the sustainable development of communities worldwide.

International audience ; This paper introduces a refined approach to conceptualising the commons in order to shed new light on cooperative practices. Specifically, it proposes the novel concept of Common-Property Assets (CPAs). CPAs are exclusively human-made resources owned under common-property ownership regimes. Our CPA model combines quantity (the flow of resource units available to members) and quality (the impact produced on the community by the members' appropriation of the resource flow). While these two dimensions are largely pre-existing in the conventional case of natural common-pool resources, they directly depend on members' collective action in CPAs. We apply this theoretical framework to farm machinery sharing agreements-a widespread grassroots cooperative phenomenon in agriculture-using a systematic literature review to generalise the findings from a sample of 54 studies published from 1950 to 2018. Our findings show that in successful CPAs, members endorse and do not deviate from a quantity-quality equilibrium that is collectively agreed upon. Despite the existence of thresholds for both quantity and quality due to (axiological) membership heterogeneity, qualitative changes in respect of the common good are possible in CPAs that promote democratic practices. Our study has potentially strong implications for developing ethics in cooperatives and the sustainable development of communities worldwide.

International audience ; This paper introduces a refined approach to conceptualising the commons in order to shed new light on cooperative practices. Specifically, it proposes the novel concept of Common-Property Assets (CPAs). CPAs are exclusively human-made resources owned under common-property ownership regimes. Our CPA model combines quantity (the flow of resource units available to members) and quality (the impact produced on the community by the members' appropriation of the resource flow). While these two dimensions are largely pre-existing in the conventional case of natural common-pool resources, they directly depend on members' collective action in CPAs. We apply this theoretical framework to farm machinery sharing agreements-a widespread grassroots cooperative phenomenon in agriculture-using a systematic literature review to generalise the findings from a sample of 54 studies published from 1950 to 2018. Our findings show that in successful CPAs, members endorse and do not deviate from a quantity-quality equilibrium that is collectively agreed upon. Despite the existence of thresholds for both quantity and quality due to (axiological) membership heterogeneity, qualitative changes in respect of the common good are possible in CPAs that promote democratic practices. Our study has potentially strong implications for developing ethics in cooperatives and the sustainable development of communities worldwide.