Suchergebnisse

Regime outcomes and degree of democracy in the post-Soviet states -- Domestic prerequisites for democratization -- Russia, EU and their vulnerable neighbors: Measuring the external leverage in the post-Soviet states -- Between neighborhood and colony: European and Russian strategies in the post-Soviet space -- Direct external influence: Elections in the post-Soviet states

Abstract
Georgia represents an interesting case to study the agency of small states in reshaping their regional identity and external environment. Although much of the world has considered Georgia as politically part of the South Caucasus region, the country's political elites themselves have long attempted to escape the geographic boundaries of the South Caucasus region and relocate their country into Eastern Europe. We argue that Georgian elites were partially successful in their quest for foreign political identity change. Although they did not manage to entirely change the international perception about Georgia's geographic belonging, the country has politically moved closer to Eastern Europe and is considered to be part of "Associated Trio" together with Ukraine and Moldova—and recently became an EU candidate. From a theoretical perspective, we argue that Georgia's quest for foreign policy identity recalibration fits the constructivist paradigm of international relations well. It can be argued that Georgia's political elites were partially driven by ideational factors and were ignorant of the balance of power in their external environment, which cost the country the lost wars and compromised territorial sovereignty.

AbstractBy unpacking major views of and dynamics towards the Black Sea region from the Georgian perspective, this analysis addresses two questions: What are Georgia's key perceptions of the Black Sea region? And which role does the Black Sea play in strengthening Georgia's economic and security resilience in a quickly changing environment marked by geopolitical and geo-economic competition? The article concludes with thoughts on the region's future and the role of the EU, Georgia's closest partner, in it.

This policy paper focuses on impacts of global and diffuse risks on the EU and its neighbourhood regions. It provides a brief overview of six major risk categories that cover majority of global and diffuse risks and suggests their prioritization based on temporality, probability of occurrence and multiplication effect. The empirical evidence dictates that, in order to better cope with the impacts of global and diffuse risks and strengthen the resilience of its neighbourhood countries and with extension - of itself, the EU needs to prioritize the global risks which not only endanger the EU and its surroundings in the long term (climate change) but can also act as major spoilers in the short term (irregular migration & geopolitical rivalries). Finally, the EU should also pay attention to multiple effects of global risks and devise strategies based on regional and country-specific differentiation.

This paper explores the extent to which global and diffuse risks impact the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries of the EU's Eastern neighbourhood and identifies tipping points at which risks can turn into immediate threats for the EaP countries, with implications for the EU. We apply five major risk categories to the EaP area that cover the majority of global and diffuse risks and suggest their prioritization based on temporality, probability of occurrence, and potential multiplication effects. We identify 28 tipping points which may exacerbate the impact of global and diffuse risks in EaP countries and result in governance breakdowns or new violent conflicts. The evidence suggests three global risks ‒ geopolitical rivalry, unconventional security risks and global economic and financial risk ‒ as most probable and with the most destabilizing impact on the EaP area in the short term. Disease outbreaks can be equally destructive, but with less certain probability. In terms of actorness, a majority of global risks seem to be linked to Russia and its assertive agenda, whereas others are diffuse in nature and hard to locate. Finally, in terms of resilience and mitigation of risks, societies in the EaP area seem to possess a basic degree of governance capacity which needs to be further strengthened by the EU to better cope with global and diffuse risks.

This article seeks to explore whether and to what extent the 'resilience turn' in the European Union's (EU) foreign policy-making affected the EU's (lack of) actorness in the South Caucasus region in security-related areas such as conflict and crisis management and geopolitical rivalries. While Brussels has intensified its policies in most policy sectors, the EU and its member states continue turning a blind eye to geopolitical dynamics in the region. Yet, recent empirical evidence from Armenia and Georgia shows that decoupling of sectoral cooperation from security-related issues is not sustainable in the long term since, if left unchecked, geopolitical risks can easily thwart the progress achieved in sectoral policy areas and lead to a lower degree of state and societal resilience. Therefore, the key question remains whether the EU and its member states can sustainably promote state and societal resilience if they continue ignoring geopolitical risks and other security-related issues.