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In this book, James H. Lebovic argues that the policy approach to maintain nuclear superiority did not make sense during the Cold War and makes even less sense now. As he shows, the idea that nuclear superiority is an imperative still serves as the foundation for too much strategic policy in an era where utility of such weapons is highly questionable. Moreover, continuing to rely on them as coercive tools rests on deficient logic and is dangerous. Not only explaining why we remain stuck with a nuclear stance that is largely irrelevant to the era, this book also offers a way out of the type of thinking that keeps such policies in place.

The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.

With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Soviet threat, the United States is reevaluating its defense policy and its acquisition of weapons. James Lebovic shows that, although current military missions are adapted to post-Cold War realities, the self-defeating bias of bureaucrats and military services toward Cold War weaponry is still prevalent. He examines the impact of this bias on the armed services as they assess threat, generate requirements, develop and change weapon concepts, set production rates, and engage in testing. The author asserts that bias compromises service interests and broader military objectives and he offers general policy recommendations to put U.S. weapons acquisition on a more effective track.

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: Arms Control and the Power of Belief -- 1 Initial U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Initiatives: The Truman through Eisenhower Years -- 2 Early Success at Arms Control: The Kennedy Administration and the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- 3 The Era of Bilateral Nuclear Arms Limitations: The Johnson through Carter Years -- 4 Nuclear Arms Reductions in the Final Cold War Decade: The Reagan Years -- 5 Nuclear Arms Reductions after the Cold War: The George H. W. Bush through Obama Years -- 6 The United States and Strategic Nuclear Arms Control: Assessing Intentions, Constraining Capabilities -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

"Lebovic thoroughly reviews the critical role of ideas and assumptions in U.S. arms control debates, tying them to controversies over U.S. nuclear strategy from the birth of the atomic age to the present. Each nuclear arms treaty--from the Truman to the Obama administration--is assessed in depth and the positions of proponents and opponents are systematically presented, discussed, and critiqued. Lebovic concludes that the terms of these treaties with the Russians were never as good as U.S. proponents claimed nor as bad as opponents feared. The comprehensive analysis in Flawed Logics is objective and balanced, challenging the logic of hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, and theorists of all schools with equal vigor. Lebovic's controversial argument will promote debate as to the very plausibility of arms control." -- Publisher website.

Challenges the widely held view that many current US adversaries cannot be deterred, maintaining that deterrence is not a relic of the Cold War period and that it should shape US policies toward so-called 'rogue states' and terror groups.

Abstract
A study of the daily briefings of US presidents by the intelligence community offers a useful test of whether governments can surmount intragovernmental influences in the acquisition and processing of information. A finding that the briefs somehow anticipate events would suggest that governments—their leaders and organizations—rise above political incentives and institutional practices to approach the rationality that realist and liberal scholars attribute to states. This study, thus, examines which countries appear in (the now declassified) daily intelligence briefs of the 1961–(January)1977 period, covering the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford years. It not only finds evidence that the selection of countries for the briefs favors countries referenced in prior briefs (per the foreign-policy literature) but also finds significant evidence that the appearance of countries, in the briefs, anticipates their increased activity in the period to follow (per a rational model).

With the aid of a new data set, this study tracks the travels of the U.S. secretary of state in the Cold War and post–Cold War periods. Drawing from realist arguments, it maintains that U.S. diplomacy eventually bows to U.S. strategic interests, whatever the aspirations and beliefs that U.S. presidents bring to office. The findings, which show a second‐term shift in the secretarial travel schedule favoring countries of security importance to the United States, lend support to realist arguments that states prioritize interests. They also reveal, however, that administrations have acted with significant latitude, especially in a presidential first term.

"Unipolarity: The Shaky Foundation of a Fashionable Concept" published on by Oxford University Press.