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"In the 1980s the performance of Japan's economy was an international success story, and led many economists suggest that the 1990s would be a Japanese decade. Today however, the dominant view today is that Japan is inescapably on a downward slope. Rather than focusing on the evolution of the performance of Japanese capitalism, this book reflects on the changes that it has experienced over the past 30 years, and presents a comprehensive analysis of the great transformation of Japanese capitalism from the heights of the 1980s, through the lost decades of the 1990s, and well into the 21st century. This book posits an alternative analysis of the Japanese economic trajectory since the early 1980s, and argues that whereas policies inspired by neo-liberalism have been presented as a solution to the Japanese crisis, these policies have in fact been one of the causes of the problems that Japan has faced over the past thirty years. Crucially, this book seeks to understand the institutional and organisational changes that have characterised Japanese capitalism since the 1980s, and to highlight in comparative perspective, with reference to the 'neo-liberal moment', the nature of the transformation of Japanese capitalism. Indeed, the arguments presented in this book go well beyond Japan itself, and examine the diversity of capitalism, notably in continental Europe, which has experienced problems which in many ways are also comparable to those of Japan. The Great Transformation of Japanese Capitalism will appeal to students and scholars of both Japanese politics and economics, as well as those interested in comparative political economy"--

This article has been published as the introduction of the special issue in Japan Forum ("Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change") and as an introduction to the book (Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change, Routledge) ; This introductory article to the special issue on "Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Diverse Corporate Change, Institutional Transformation, and Abenomics" starts with a short summaryof the changing perceptions of Japan's political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotiontoa problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan's political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan's current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributionsto a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades. Finally, this introductory article ends with a short outlineof a new research programme and four central research questions about the Japanese political economy.

This article has been published as the introduction of the special issue in Japan Forum ("Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change") and as an introduction to the book (Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Abenomics and Institutional Change, Routledge) ; This introductory article to the special issue on "Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Diverse Corporate Change, Institutional Transformation, and Abenomics" starts with a short summaryof the changing perceptions of Japan's political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotiontoa problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan's political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan's current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributionsto a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades. Finally, this introductory article ends with a short outlineof a new research programme and four central research questions about the Japanese political economy.

In calling for a visible and massive government intervention, the crisis of 2008 provided the leading role of the state in regulating the economy, or at least justified its intervention as a last resort. Give rise to surrender without structural cause of the neoliberal discourse, it has renewed interest in industrial policy in a kind of double movement Polanyi which oppose regulatory forces and pro-market forces. Since the questioning in the early 2000s, recommendations serinees far by international organizations (IMF and World Bank in the lead) under the triptych stabilization-liberalization-privatization, industrial policy has been a progressive rehabilitation in the development strategies of field. This is the 1997 Asian crisis and its repercussions in Russia and Latin America were the catalysts of this questioning of the 'Washington Consensus'. J. Stiglitz, president of the World Bank between 1997 and 2000, lambasted the said recommendations of financial liberalization and opening of the capital account countries largely responsible, he said, the Asian crisis. Remedies imposed to affected countries - restrictive fiscal and monetary policies pro-cyclical consequences - were equally criticized. Note that these policies also relevant since the OECD member countries. Adapted from the source document.

There are significant differences across countries in terms of redistribution by the government. This corresponds to underlying dissimilarities in preference for redistribution. Particularly, previous literature compared the US and Europe and proposed several explanations of these differences, from aggregation of individual determinants (e.g. one's income) to more holistic ones such as shared values at the national level (i.e. social beliefs). This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the impact of socio-demographic factors and social beliefs on preference for redistribution. First, we focused on two di_erent dimensions of preference —the government's role in reducing the difference in income and the approach of the tax system with high income. Secondly, we extended the comparison by including a developed Asian country, Japan. Based on the results, the following two attitudes are not fully compatible: many people support the governmental intervention, but not for more tax on the rich, especially in Japan. Furthermore, the di_erence in the attitude on the governmental intervention mainly comes from the variance in the role of social beliefs. On the other hand, the average income and wealth do not explain the difference in preference. Countries are characterized by different social beliefs, which affects the differences in sub-preferences. However, not only the distribution of social beliefs, but also their statistical relation to the sub-preferences explains the country level disparity. In addition, the US and Europe comparison under/over-estimates these statistical associations in the world, since an Asian country, such as Japan, may have a different structure.

There are significant differences across countries in terms of redistribution by the government. This corresponds to underlying dissimilarities in preference for redistribution. Particularly, previous literature compared the US and Europe and proposed several explanations of these differences, from aggregation of individual determinants (e.g. one's income) to more holistic ones such as shared values at the national level (i.e. social beliefs). This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the impact of socio-demographic factors and social beliefs on preference for redistribution. First, we focused on two di_erent dimensions of preference —the government's role in reducing the difference in income and the approach of the tax system with high income. Secondly, we extended the comparison by including a developed Asian country, Japan. Based on the results, the following two attitudes are not fully compatible: many people support the governmental intervention, but not for more tax on the rich, especially in Japan. Furthermore, the di_erence in the attitude on the governmental intervention mainly comes from the variance in the role of social beliefs. On the other hand, the average income and wealth do not explain the difference in preference. Countries are characterized by different social beliefs, which affects the differences in sub-preferences. However, not only the distribution of social beliefs, but also their statistical relation to the sub-preferences explains the country level disparity. In addition, the US and Europe comparison under/over-estimates these statistical associations in the world, since an Asian country, such as Japan, may have a different structure.

There are significant differences across countries in terms of redistribution by the government. This corresponds to underlying dissimilarities in preference for redistribution. Particularly, previous literature compared the US and Europe and proposed several explanations of these differences, from aggregation of individual determinants (e.g. one's income) to more holistic ones such as shared values at the national level (i.e. social beliefs). This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the impact of socio-demographic factors and social beliefs on preference for redistribution. First, we focused on two di_erent dimensions of preference —the government's role in reducing the difference in income and the approach of the tax system with high income. Secondly, we extended the comparison by including a developed Asian country, Japan. Based on the results, the following two attitudes are not fully compatible: many people support the governmental intervention, but not for more tax on the rich, especially in Japan. Furthermore, the di_erence in the attitude on the governmental intervention mainly comes from the variance in the role of social beliefs. On the other hand, the average income and wealth do not explain the difference in preference. Countries are characterized by different social beliefs, which affects the differences in sub-preferences. However, not only the distribution of social beliefs, but also their statistical relation to the sub-preferences explains the country level disparity. In addition, the US and Europe comparison under/over-estimates these statistical associations in the world, since an Asian country, such as Japan, may have a different structure.

There are significant differences across countries in terms of redistribution by the government. This corresponds to underlying dissimilarities in preference for redistribution. Particularly, previous literature compared the US and Europe and proposed several explanations of these differences, from aggregation of individual determinants (e.g. one's income) to more holistic ones such as shared values at the national level (i.e. social beliefs). This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the impact of socio-demographic factors and social beliefs on preference for redistribution. First, we focused on two di_erent dimensions of preference —the government's role in reducing the difference in income and the approach of the tax system with high income. Secondly, we extended the comparison by including a developed Asian country, Japan. Based on the results, the following two attitudes are not fully compatible: many people support the governmental intervention, but not for more tax on the rich, especially in Japan. Furthermore, the di_erence in the attitude on the governmental intervention mainly comes from the variance in the role of social beliefs. On the other hand, the average income and wealth do not explain the difference in preference. Countries are characterized by different social beliefs, which affects the differences in sub-preferences. However, not only the distribution of social beliefs, but also their statistical relation to the sub-preferences explains the country level disparity. In addition, the US and Europe comparison under/over-estimates these statistical associations in the world, since an Asian country, such as Japan, may have a different structure.

There are significant differences across countries in terms of redistribution by the government. This corresponds to underlying dissimilarities in preference for redistribution. Particularly, previous literature compared the US and Europe and proposed several explanations of these differences, from aggregation of individual determinants (e.g. one's income) to more holistic ones such as shared values at the national level (i.e. social beliefs). This paper, therefore, aims to analyse the impact of socio-demographic factors and social beliefs on preference for redistribution. First, we focused on two di_erent dimensions of preference —the government's role in reducing the difference in income and the approach of the tax system with high income. Secondly, we extended the comparison by including a developed Asian country, Japan. Based on the results, the following two attitudes are not fully compatible: many people support the governmental intervention, but not for more tax on the rich, especially in Japan. Furthermore, the di_erence in the attitude on the governmental intervention mainly comes from the variance in the role of social beliefs. On the other hand, the average income and wealth do not explain the difference in preference. Countries are characterized by different social beliefs, which affects the differences in sub-preferences. However, not only the distribution of social beliefs, but also their statistical relation to the sub-preferences explains the country level disparity. In addition, the US and Europe comparison under/over-estimates these statistical associations in the world, since an Asian country, such as Japan, may have a different structure.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the revival of industrial policies from the late 2000 s in Japan and Korea and their limitations. Our approach has two major characteristics. First, we adopt the perspective of historical institutionalism to focus on the relation between IPs and financial systems and study their evolution over the last 40 years. Second, by mobilizing the concepts of institutional complementarities and hierarchy, we discuss the limits of this revival in a context of liberalized financial systems, to which government entities in charge of industrial policies have contributed. Our major result is that, in the context of financialization, past complementarities of the developmental state have weakened and contradictions have arisen. It resulted in a restructuration of state capabilities to design and implement industrial policies, and to its inability to subordinate finance to its goals, despite the discourses and ambitions of governments. However, and this is our second result, comparison between Japan and Korea also allows us to identify some significant differences in the initial institutional arrangements and in the process of institutional change, which are analyzed as sources of greater state capabilities in Korea than in Japan in the current period.