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The category of anarchy is conventionally associated with the emergence of an autonomous discipline of International Relations (IR). Recently, Donnelly has argued that anarchy has never been central to IR (hierarchy is more weighty). His criticism targets not just concepts of anarchy but theories of anarchy and thereby expresses an anti-theory ethos tacitly accepted in the discipline. As a form of conceptual atomism, this ethos is hostile to structuralist and normative theories. This article aims to reinstate theoretical holism against conceptual atomism and to defend the enduring relevance of theories of international anarchy for IR. This is done by revisiting two classic, structuralist accounts of international anarchy articulated in Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (scientific structuralism) and Hedley Bull's Anarchical Society (normative structuralism). It will be shown that both represent coherent theoretical 'wholes' which reveal a more complex relationship between anarchy and hierarchy than supposed by critics and which recognise the important connection between the structure of international anarchy (whose key players are states) and the value of freedom. The conclusion examines the prospects of normative theories of international anarchy and 'anarchical' freedom in a globalising world where state agency is being challenged.

"Anarchy in International Relations" published on by Oxford University Press.

AbstractThe legal status of diplomats underwent a dramatic change between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries as a consequence of a transformed European states-system. Its transformation is linked to ius inter gentes, a 'law between nations' whose emergence not only created a Europe of sovereign states but simultaneously affected the scope, definition and justification of rights and duties held by diplomatic representatives. It is generally acknowledged that diplomacy as an institution exists by virtue of rules that are embodied in the modern system of states and defined as 'international society' or the 'society of states'. What needs to be better understood is that diplomatic rights and duties are made possible by this framework of an international society, which has discernible historical and analytical boundaries, and that the relationship between such a framework and its diplomatic institutions is not contingent but logical.

The concept of anarchy is seen as the cardinal organizing category of the discipline of International Relations (IR), which differentiates it from cognate disciplines such as Political Science or Political Philosophy. This entry provides an analytical review of the scholarly literature on anarchy in IR, on two levels—conceptual and theoretical. First, it distinguishes three senses of the concept of anarchy: (1) lack of a common superior in an interaction domain; (2) chaos or disorder; and (3) horizontal relation between nominally equal entities, sovereign states. The first and the third senses of "anarchy"' are central to IR. Second, it considers three broad families of IR theory where anarchy figures as a focal assumption—(1) realism and neorealism; (2) English School theory (international society approach); and (3) Kant's republican peace. Despite normative and conceptual differences otherwise, all three bodies of theory are ultimately based on Hobbes's argument for a "state of nature." The discussion concludes with a summary of the key challenges to the discourse of international anarchy posed by the methodology of economics and economics-based theories which favor the alternative discourse of global hierarchy.

The category of anarchy is conventionally associated with the emergence of an autonomous discipline of International Relations (IR). Recently Donnelly (2015) has argued that anarchy has never been central to IR (hierarchy is more weighty). His criticism targets not just concepts of anarchy but theories of anarchy and thereby expresses an anti-theory ethos tacitly accepted in the discipline. As a form of conceptual atomism, this ethos is hostile to structuralist and normative theories. This paper aims to reinstate theoretical holism against conceptual atomism and to defend the enduring relevance of theories of international anarchy for IR. This is done by revisiting two classic, structuralist accounts of international anarchy articulated in Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (scientific structuralism) and Hedley Bull's Anarchical Society (normative structuralism). It will be shown that both represent coherent theoretical 'wholes' which reveal a more complex relationship between anarchy and hierarchy than supposed by critics, and which recognise the important connection between the structure of international anarchy (whose key players are states) and the value of freedom. The conclusion examines the prospects of normative theories of international anarchy and 'anarchical' freedom in a globalising world where state agency is being challenged.

"Are social practices actions, or institutional frameworks of interaction structured by common rules? How do social practices such as signing a cheque differ from international practices such as signing a peace treaty? Traversing the fields of International Relations (IR) and philosophy, this book defends an institutionalist conception of practices as part of a general practice theory indebted to Oakeshott, Wittgenstein and Hegel. The proposed practice theory has two core aspects: practice internalism and normative descriptivism. In developing a philosophical analysis of social practices that has a special relevance for international relations, Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost depart from Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of practice that dominates the current 'practice turn' in IR. The authors show that the contemporary global realm is constituted by two distinct macro practices- the practice of sovereign states and that of global rights"--

The article is written in response to a recent flurry of studies on international practices. In investigating this theme, International Relations scholars have drawn on diverse traditions in sociology, philosophy and organisational theory such as Bourdieu's theory of practice, Dewey's and James' pragmatism, communities of practice approach and actor-network theory. One preliminary question presupposed by these investigations however is, what standpoint (if any) enables us to make sense of international practices? Our central thesis is that the proper understanding of practices – including international ones – requires the internal point of view (practice internalism). To make our case, we develop an analytic distinction between two basic standpoints: practice externalism, represented by Adler and Pouliot's approach to international practices, and practice internalism, represented by Wittgensteinian philosopher Peter Winch. Following Winch, we argue that the practice of social science is externalist, and point to the limitations of an analysis of international practices predicated on externalist, social scientific premises.