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This paper provides a model of "social hysteresis", whereby long, deep recessions demotivate workers and thereby lead them to change their work ethic. In switching from a pro-work to an anti-work identity, their incentives to seek and retain work fall and consequently their employment chances fall. In this way, temporary recessions may come to have permanent effects on aggregate employment. We also show that these permanent effects, along with the underlying identity switches, can be avoided through stabilization policy. The size of the government expenditure multiplier can be shown to depend on the composition of identities in the workforce.

In this paper we propose a novel way to model the labor market in the context of a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model, incorporating labor market frictions in the form of hiring and firing costs. We show that such a model is able to replicate many important stylized facts of the business cycle. The reactions to monetary and real shocks become much more sluggish. Job creation and job destruction are negatively correlated. And the volatility of unemployment is much larger than in the standard search and matching model.

ABSTRACTThis paper analyses the effect of downwards wage rigidity on wage setting, wage compression and firm training. It is shown that downwards wage rigidity in future periods induces a wage penalty and increases wage compression in the present period. However, contrary to previous work this is not sufficient to increase firms' training investments. The reason lies in the endogeneity of separations, which become more frequent.

In a simple model, I demonstrate that the U-shaped relationship between income and income diversification typically found in developing countries can be explained without any risk considerations. It might be the result of pure income maximization in an environment with limited possibilities.

Even though economists keep on emphasising the benefits of international trade, protectionism is on the rise in many industrialised countries. The authors argue that a potential explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the short-run distributional effects of import tariffs: while protectionism hurts the economy from an aggregate perspective (i.e. GDP goes down), unskilled workers in import-competing sectors benefit in the short run and do not lose in the long run. They might therefore lend political support to protectionism.

The integration of China's huge workforce into the global trading system has had profound effects on economies worldwide. Trade with China has been shown to lead to wage losses and declining employment in developed countries. The integration of the Chinese economy into the world trade is also frequently blamed for rising inequality. This article analyses policy instruments that can remedy the rising levels of income inequality in industrialised countries, differentiating between the short-term causes, e.g. the slow reallocation of workers across sectors, and the long-term ones, e.g. the increased demand for skilled workers. Instruments considered include a general wage tax, sector-specific taxes on consumption and profit, tailored subsidies for firms, and training subsidies.

Abstract When the world economy was recently hit by a severe recession, governments all over the world reacted by initiating stimulus packages. Some countries (among them, most notably, China and the US) tried to put special emphasis on their home industries by including 'Buy National' clauses into the stimulus package. By analyzing the dynamics of transitory changes of trade barriers as a short‐run response to an economic downturn, we show that beggar‐thy‐neighbour policies do not work. We then come up with two rationales that help us understand why countries nevertheless consider protectionism to be a good response to a recession: (i) the lobbying of domestic, non‐exporting firms, and (ii) the relationship between vulnerability, the degree of openness and loss aversion of consumers.

Abstract
We introduce unemployment and endogenous selection of workers into different skill-classes in a trade model with two sectors and heterogeneous firms. This allows us to identify three different channels through which trade liberalization can affect unemployment: specialization, changes in productivity, and mobility. These three channels may work in opposite directions and their relative importance depends on the type of trade (intra-industry trade vs. inter-industry trade) and the skill-class of a worker.
We show that the gains from trade are distributed very unequally. When a skilled worker abundant country opens up to trade with a country that is unskilled worker abundant, the biggest losers are the skilled workers in the import sector in the skill abundant country. However, average unemployment among skilled workers goes down, while average unemployment among unskilled workers goes up.

Recently, the world economy has seen its greatest down turn since World War II. Although not as bad as during the Great Depression, there was still a worrisome increase in protectionist measures, in an attempt to mitigate the economic downturn. Protectionism can have many different faces. It can come in the form of Buy-American clauses of stimulus packages, as an increase in trade barriers or tariffs, or as an increase in export subsidies. In this paper, we show that none of these measures constitutes an effective response to economic downturns. Although Buy-American clauses and export subsidies stimulate output in the short run, they are less effective than general government spending impulses. Raising tariffs or trade barriers even decreases output.

Against the backdrop of the considerable increase in protectionist measures that could be observed during the recent financial crisis, this article investigates the following questions: Are 'Buy National' clauses a suitable instrument to internalise the externality that arises because the stimulating effect of 'general', non-discriminatory government spending is distributed among many countries, while the cost of the stimulus is borne by only one country? Are shortterm trade policies, like import tariffs, export subsidies and 'Buy National' policies, suitable policies to mitigate an economic downturn?

Why are empirically observed tariffs so much lower than theoretically calculated Nash-equilibrium tariffs? We argue that this gap can be narrowed by using a dynamic model instead of a static model. This approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a long planning horizon.

When the world economy was recently hit by a severe recession, governments all over the world reacted by initiating stimulus packages. Some countries (among them, most notably, China and the US) tried to put special emphasis on their home industries by including 'Buy local' clauses into the stimulus package. By analyzing the dynamics of transitory changes of trade barriers as a short-run response to an economic downturn, we show that beggar-thy-neighbor policies do not work. We then come up with two rationales that help to understand why countries nevertheless consider protectionism to be a good response to a recession: (i) the lobbying of domestic, non-exporting firms, and (ii) the relationship between vulnerability, the degree of openness and loss aversion of consumers.

When the world economy was recently hit by a severe recession, governments all over the world reacted by initiating stimulus packages. Some countries (among them, most notably, China and the US) tried to put special emphasis on their home industries by including Buy local'' clauses into the stimulus package. By analyzing the dynamics of transitory changes of trade barriers as a short-run response to an economic downturn, we show that beggar-thy-neighbor policy does not work. We then come up with two rationales that help to understand why countries nevertheless consider protectionism to be a good response to a recession: (i) the relationship between vulnerability and the degree of openness to trading partner countries, and (ii) the lobbying of domestic, non-exporting firms.