Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Executive Summary -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Market Structure -- Two Types of Carbon Transactions -- Segments of the Carbon Market -- 3. Methodology -- 4. Project-Based Transactions-Volumes and Flows -- Project-Based Transactions: A Market in Rapid Growth -- Who's Buying? -- Who's Selling? -- Balance among Asset Classes -- The Retail Market -- 5. Project-Based Transactions: Contracts and Prices -- Structure of Transactions -- Observed Prices -- Other Determinants of Prices -- Total Value of Project-Based Transactions -- 6. Allowance Markets -- The UK Emission Trading Scheme -- The EU Trading Scheme -- The Chicago Climate Exchange -- The New South Wales GHG Abatement Scheme -- 7. Market Outlook -- Regulatory Drivers -- Market Outlook -- 8. Conclusion -- LIST OF TABLES -- Table 1. Completeness of Data on Project-Based Transactions -- Table 2. Volumes Exchanged and Number of Transactions per Market Segment -- LIST OF FIGURES -- Figure 1. Annual Volumes (million tCO2e) of project-based emission reductions traded (up to 2012 vintages) -- Figure 2. Market Buyers (share of volume of ERs purchased) -- Figure 3. Location of Emission Reduction Projects (in share of volume supplied) -- Figure 4. Location of Projects by type of Buyer January 2003-May 2004 (in million tCO2e) -- Figure 5. Technology Share of Emission Reduction Projects 2003-2004 (in percent of total volume contracted) -- Figure 6. Prices for Non-Retail Project-Based ERs 2003-2004 (in U.S. per tCO2e) -- Figure 7. Total Market Value (estimate) per year in million U.S. dollars (nominal).
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Due to the combined inertia of the climatic and socio-economic systems, policymakers cannot avoid making early decisions on climate mitigation "in a sea of uncertainties", even though the very legitimacy of economic analysis to address equity issues (who pays for climate mitigation, and when) faces widespread skepticism. This thesis aims at demonstrating that public economics remains a powerful tool to (i) assess the consistency of the various discourses relative to climate mitigation, (ii) provide robust insights into climate decisions, and thus (iii) try and put some rationale into the debate. We use a set of compact integrated climate policy optimization models to articulate and numerically assess the prominent issues at stake. Our analysis yields three main results. We first demonstrate that the trade-off between present and future efforts cannot be reduced to the controversy over the value of the discount rate. Under uncertainty, in fact, the margins of freedom we bequeath to future generations—notably the technical and institutional systems we transmit to them—prove more important for short-term decision than the value of the discount rate. Secondly, we model various quota allocation rules proposed in the literature to enlarge Annex B to developing economies, and show that their distributive outcome critically depends on ex ante assumptions about future economic and emissions growth. A careful design of the institutions surrounding the tradable permits market to smooth out sensitivity to economic and emissions paths is thus a necessary condition to enhance the system's negotiability and robustness. Last, this thesis illustrates the complementarity between ethics and economics: though economists do not have any particular legitimacy to say what is fair or just, their toolbox is powerful enough to show how intuitively appealing ideas—such as a zero discount rate to take care of both present and future generations alike, or an equal per capita allocation of emissions quota—may sometimes lead to very ...
Due to the combined inertia of the climatic and socio-economic systems, policymakers cannot avoid making early decisions on climate mitigation "in a sea of uncertainties", even though the very legitimacy of economic analysis to address equity issues (who pays for climate mitigation, and when) faces widespread skepticism. This thesis aims at demonstrating that public economics remains a powerful tool to (i) assess the consistency of the various discourses relative to climate mitigation, (ii) provide robust insights into climate decisions, and thus (iii) try and put some rationale into the debate. We use a set of compact integrated climate policy optimization models to articulate and numerically assess the prominent issues at stake. Our analysis yields three main results. We first demonstrate that the trade-off between present and future efforts cannot be reduced to the controversy over the value of the discount rate. Under uncertainty, in fact, the margins of freedom we bequeath to future generations—notably the technical and institutional systems we transmit to them—prove more important for short-term decision than the value of the discount rate. Secondly, we model various quota allocation rules proposed in the literature to enlarge Annex B to developing economies, and show that their distributive outcome critically depends on ex ante assumptions about future economic and emissions growth. A careful design of the institutions surrounding the tradable permits market to smooth out sensitivity to economic and emissions paths is thus a necessary condition to enhance the system's negotiability and robustness. Last, this thesis illustrates the complementarity between ethics and economics: though economists do not have any particular legitimacy to say what is fair or just, their toolbox is powerful enough to show how intuitively appealing ideas—such as a zero discount rate to take care of both present and future generations alike, or an equal per capita allocation of emissions quota—may sometimes lead to very questionable outcomes. ; Alors même que les incertitudes sur l'effet de serre sont loin d'être résolues, l'inertie du système climatique nous interdit d'attendre avant de prendre une décision en matière d'effet de serre: il nous faut décider " sous controverses ". Dans un tel contexte, la légitimité même de l'économiste à examiner une double question d'équité spatiale (qui paye pour le climat ?) et temporelle (quand ?) est remise en cause. L'objet de cette thèse est de montrer que le calcul économique reste néanmoins un outil opératoire pour révéler des éléments de cohérence robustes face à l'incertitude, et aider ainsi à mettre un peu de rationalité dans le débat public. Une série de modèles d'optimisation des politiques climatiques nous permet d'introduire progressivement, d'articuler et d'évaluer numériquement ces différentes questions. Nous obtenons trois résultats principaux. En premier lieu, nous montrons que l'arbitrage entre court terme et long terme ne saurait se réduire au seul débat sur la valeur du taux d'actualisation. Sous incertitudes, les marges de manoeuvre que nous offrons à nos descendants, via les systèmes techniques ou institutionnels que nous leur laissons en héritage, se révèlent en effet tout aussi importantes. Ensuite, négocier l'entrée des pays du sud dans les politiques climatiques avec des règles d'allocation des quotas d'émissions apparaît difficile tant leurs conséquences dépendent des anticipations sur la croissance économique future. Rendre le système robuste impose un encadrement institutionnel du marché de permis d'émissions négociables. Enfin, cette thèse illustre la complémentarité entre éthique et économie: si l'économie n'a pas à définir ce qui est équitable, le calcul économique permet de montrer comment des raisonnements intuitivement justes, comme annuler le taux d'actualisation pour ne pas pénaliser les générations futures, ou allouer les quotas d'émissions au prorata de la population, peuvent en fait avoir des implications particulièrement discutables.
Due to the combined inertia of the climatic and socio-economic systems, policymakers cannot avoid making early decisions on climate mitigation "in a sea of uncertainties", even though the very legitimacy of economic analysis to address equity issues (who pays for climate mitigation, and when) faces widespread skepticism. This thesis aims at demonstrating that public economics remains a powerful tool to (i) assess the consistency of the various discourses relative to climate mitigation, (ii) provide robust insights into climate decisions, and thus (iii) try and put some rationale into the debate. We use a set of compact integrated climate policy optimization models to articulate and numerically assess the prominent issues at stake. Our analysis yields three main results. We first demonstrate that the trade-off between present and future efforts cannot be reduced to the controversy over the value of the discount rate. Under uncertainty, in fact, the margins of freedom we bequeath to future generations—notably the technical and institutional systems we transmit to them—prove more important for short-term decision than the value of the discount rate. Secondly, we model various quota allocation rules proposed in the literature to enlarge Annex B to developing economies, and show that their distributive outcome critically depends on ex ante assumptions about future economic and emissions growth. A careful design of the institutions surrounding the tradable permits market to smooth out sensitivity to economic and emissions paths is thus a necessary condition to enhance the system's negotiability and robustness. Last, this thesis illustrates the complementarity between ethics and economics: though economists do not have any particular legitimacy to say what is fair or just, their toolbox is powerful enough to show how intuitively appealing ideas—such as a zero discount rate to take care of both present and future generations alike, or an equal per capita allocation of emissions quota—may sometimes lead to very questionable outcomes. ; Alors même que les incertitudes sur l'effet de serre sont loin d'être résolues, l'inertie du système climatique nous interdit d'attendre avant de prendre une décision en matière d'effet de serre: il nous faut décider " sous controverses ". Dans un tel contexte, la légitimité même de l'économiste à examiner une double question d'équité spatiale (qui paye pour le climat ?) et temporelle (quand ?) est remise en cause. L'objet de cette thèse est de montrer que le calcul économique reste néanmoins un outil opératoire pour révéler des éléments de cohérence robustes face à l'incertitude, et aider ainsi à mettre un peu de rationalité dans le débat public. Une série de modèles d'optimisation des politiques climatiques nous permet d'introduire progressivement, d'articuler et d'évaluer numériquement ces différentes questions. Nous obtenons trois résultats principaux. En premier lieu, nous montrons que l'arbitrage entre court terme et long terme ne saurait se réduire au seul débat sur la valeur du taux d'actualisation. Sous incertitudes, les marges de manoeuvre que nous offrons à nos descendants, via les systèmes techniques ou institutionnels que nous leur laissons en héritage, se révèlent en effet tout aussi importantes. Ensuite, négocier l'entrée des pays du sud dans les politiques climatiques avec des règles d'allocation des quotas d'émissions apparaît difficile tant leurs conséquences dépendent des anticipations sur la croissance économique future. Rendre le système robuste impose un encadrement institutionnel du marché de permis d'émissions négociables. Enfin, cette thèse illustre la complémentarité entre éthique et économie: si l'économie n'a pas à définir ce qui est équitable, le calcul économique permet de montrer comment des raisonnements intuitivement justes, comme annuler le taux d'actualisation pour ne pas pénaliser les générations futures, ou allouer les quotas d'émissions au prorata de la population, peuvent en fait avoir des implications particulièrement discutables.
Due to the combined inertia of the climatic and socio-economic systems, policymakers cannot avoid making early decisions on climate mitigation "in a sea of uncertainties", even though the very legitimacy of economic analysis to address equity issues (who pays for climate mitigation, and when) faces widespread skepticism. This thesis aims at demonstrating that public economics remains a powerful tool to (i) assess the consistency of the various discourses relative to climate mitigation, (ii) provide robust insights into climate decisions, and thus (iii) try and put some rationale into the debate. We use a set of compact integrated climate policy optimization models to articulate and numerically assess the prominent issues at stake. Our analysis yields three main results. We first demonstrate that the trade-off between present and future efforts cannot be reduced to the controversy over the value of the discount rate. Under uncertainty, in fact, the margins of freedom we bequeath to future generations—notably the technical and institutional systems we transmit to them—prove more important for short-term decision than the value of the discount rate. Secondly, we model various quota allocation rules proposed in the literature to enlarge Annex B to developing economies, and show that their distributive outcome critically depends on ex ante assumptions about future economic and emissions growth. A careful design of the institutions surrounding the tradable permits market to smooth out sensitivity to economic and emissions paths is thus a necessary condition to enhance the system's negotiability and robustness. Last, this thesis illustrates the complementarity between ethics and economics: though economists do not have any particular legitimacy to say what is fair or just, their toolbox is powerful enough to show how intuitively appealing ideas—such as a zero discount rate to take care of both present and future generations alike, or an equal per capita allocation of emissions quota—may sometimes lead to very questionable outcomes. ; Alors même que les incertitudes sur l'effet de serre sont loin d'être résolues, l'inertie du système climatique nous interdit d'attendre avant de prendre une décision en matière d'effet de serre: il nous faut décider " sous controverses ". Dans un tel contexte, la légitimité même de l'économiste à examiner une double question d'équité spatiale (qui paye pour le climat ?) et temporelle (quand ?) est remise en cause. L'objet de cette thèse est de montrer que le calcul économique reste néanmoins un outil opératoire pour révéler des éléments de cohérence robustes face à l'incertitude, et aider ainsi à mettre un peu de rationalité dans le débat public. Une série de modèles d'optimisation des politiques climatiques nous permet d'introduire progressivement, d'articuler et d'évaluer numériquement ces différentes questions. Nous obtenons trois résultats principaux. En premier lieu, nous montrons que l'arbitrage entre court terme et long terme ne saurait se réduire au seul débat sur la valeur du taux d'actualisation. Sous incertitudes, les marges de manoeuvre que nous offrons à nos descendants, via les systèmes techniques ou institutionnels que nous leur laissons en héritage, se révèlent en effet tout aussi importantes. Ensuite, négocier l'entrée des pays du sud dans les politiques climatiques avec des règles d'allocation des quotas d'émissions apparaît difficile tant leurs conséquences dépendent des anticipations sur la croissance économique future. Rendre le système robuste impose un encadrement institutionnel du marché de permis d'émissions négociables. Enfin, cette thèse illustre la complémentarité entre éthique et économie: si l'économie n'a pas à définir ce qui est équitable, le calcul économique permet de montrer comment des raisonnements intuitivement justes, comme annuler le taux d'actualisation pour ne pas pénaliser les générations futures, ou allouer les quotas d'émissions au prorata de la population, peuvent en fait avoir des implications particulièrement discutables.
The aim of this article is to lay out a series of issues of current concern to researchers in the social sciences, regarding the impact of climate change on the vine and wine sector. The challenge lies in evaluating the cost of transition from one system to another through an integration of the direct and indirect effects of climate change. This adaptation, whether reactive or anticipatory, combines technical and organisational innovations with localisation strategies and institutional changes. Such actions could either try to maintain the existing situation as much as possible or could try to bifurcate towards deep changes, entailing very different costs. Given the multitude of uncertainties at play, not to mention the necessity for continuous adaptation to an ever-changing climate, these costs are hard to quantify. This article will illustrate two sets of measures for wine cultivation adaptation: "no regrets" measures, which offer immediate benefits, and "reversible and flexible" measures, which limit the inertia of wine-cultivating systems. In spite of the challenges, what stands out is the evident re-enforcement resulting from the collaboration between researchers and political and economic actors. In the field of wine cultivation, these collaborations can follow two paths: the study of the diversity of existing wine-growing systems and genetic resources or the possibility of more radical technological and social experimentation.
