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Introduction -- Revisiting the theories of welfare states in developing countries -- Theoretical discussion: the structures of associational networks and labor politics -- The origin of top-down solidarity in South Korea -- Embeddedness, cohesiveness, and the politics of social policy expansion in South Korea: universal vs. selective reforms -- The survival and decline of embeddedness under retrenchment drives: the politics of retrenchment under market reforms -- Comparative case studies I: market-oriented reforms of welfare states and union responses in Argentina and Brazil -- Comparative case studies II: market-oriented reforms of welfare states and union responses in South Korea and Taiwan -- Comparative case studies III: associational networks and welfare states in Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan -- Conclusion.

This article tests the linkage between institutional configuration and social trust, highlighting the role of the welfare states in coordinating interests among different labor market actors. This study initially builds a theoretical framework distinguishing training-supplemented welfare regimes from transfer-based welfare regimes. Evidence from descriptive and multivariate analyses of World Values Survey based on 17 advanced industrial democracies supports my argument that public investment in skill provision prevalent in training-supplemented welfare states leads to higher accumulation of social trust, whereas passive social transfers result in lower social trust. Especially, high investment in public skill provision leads to a decreased gap in social trust between employers and low-skilled workers, as well as among different occupational groups. In addition, the negative effect of passive social transfers on trust is greatly ameliorated when it is jointly configured with high active labor market policies. The findings lend credibility to my claim that specific social policies aiming to upgrade citizens' skill levels provide employees with better prospects for managing life chances (and risks) and therefore building higher social trust. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article tests the linkage between institutional configuration and social trust, highlighting the role of the welfare states in coordinating interests among different labor market actors. This study initially builds a theoretical framework distinguishing training-supplemented welfare regimes from transfer-based welfare regimes. Evidence from descriptive and multivariate analyses of World Values Survey based on 17 advanced industrial democracies supports my argument that public investment in skill provision prevalent in training-supplemented welfare states leads to higher accumulation of social trust, whereas passive social transfers result in lower social trust. Especially, high investment in public skill provision leads to a decreased gap in social trust between employers and low-skilled workers, as well as among different occupational groups. In addition, the negative effect of passive social transfers on trust is greatly ameliorated when it is jointly configured with high active labor market policies. The findings lend credibility to my claim that specific social policies aiming to upgrade citizens' skill levels provide employees with better prospects for managing life chances (and risks) and therefore building higher social trust.

This article investigates the structures of civic networks and their roles in steering the political choices of party and union elites regarding the retrenchment or expansion of welfare states in four recently democratized developing countries. Utilizing coaffiliation networks built upon two waves of World Values Surveys and evidence from comparative case studies for Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, the study develops two explanatory factors that account for variations in welfare politics: cohesiveness and embeddedness. In Argentina and, to a lesser degree, in Taiwan, party and union leaders' cohesive relationships, being disarticulated from the informal civic sphere, allowed them to conduct elite-driven social policy reforms from above, by launching radical neoliberal reforms (Argentina) or by developing a generous transfer-centered welfare state (Taiwan). In Brazil and South Korea, however, party and union leaders' durable solidarity embedded in wider civic communities enabled them to resist the retrenchment of welfare states (Brazil) or implement universal social policies (South Korea) based on bottom-up mobilization of welfare demands. This article demonstrates that elites in the formal sector make markedly different political choices when confronting economic crisis and democratic competition depending upon their organizational connections in formal and informal civic networks.

This article investigates the structures of civic networks and their roles in steering the political choices of party and union elites regarding the retrenchment or expansion of welfare states in four recently democratized developing countries. Utilizing coaffiliation networks built upon two waves of World Values Surveys and evidence from comparative case studies for Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan, the study develops two explanatory factors that account for variations in welfare politics: cohesiveness and embeddedness. In Argentina and, to a lesser degree, in Taiwan, party and union leaders' cohesive relationships, being disarticulated from the informal civic sphere, allowed them to conduct elite-driven social policy reforms from above, by launching radical neoliberal reforms (Argentina) or by developing a generous transfer-centered welfare state (Taiwan). In Brazil and South Korea, however, party and union leaders' durable solidarity embedded in wider civic communities enabled them to resist the retrenchment of welfare states (Brazil) or implement universal social policies (South Korea) based on bottom-up mobilization of welfare demands. This article demonstrates that elites in the formal sector make markedly different political choices when confronting economic crisis and democratic competition depending upon their organizational connections in formal and informal civic networks. (World Politics / SWP)

This article examines how different repertoires of women's activism influence gender earnings equality across countries. We develop a typology of three forms of mobilization—professionalized women's activism, labor women's activism, and women's activism in popular movements—emphasizing distinct actors, patterns of claims-making, and inter-organizational ties among women's organizations and other civil society groups in multi-organizational fields. Based on data on membership and co-membership ties built using World Values Surveys, we test the effects of different repertoires of women's activism on earnings equality between women and men in 51 countries. We also consider a gendered development model and the role of welfare states as main explanatory variables in accounting for the gap in earnings. Our findings suggest that even in the presence of these alternative explanations, women's activism matters. Furthermore, women's organizations with access to institutional politics, through either direct advocacy or ties to unions or professional associations, have had the most success in promoting gender earnings equality. Our research contributes to prior work on social movement outcomes by conceptualizing women's mobilization in the context of fields and further testing its effects on distributional outcomes in a comparative perspective.

In this study, the authors explore the ways that new forms of labor politics emerge in civil society in the era of flexible labor markets and fragmented workplaces (through outsourcing and subcontracting). First, a theoretical framework is developed that accounts for the formation processes of three modes of irregular, non-standard labor politics: politics of influence, politics of substitution, and politics of occupation. Each of these delineates positional politics of issue-specific threats and alliance, unions' functional replacement of local civic governance, and unions' takeover of the state's institutional space. Then, using unique qualitative field interviews of labor activists and union leaders, a comparative case study is conducted to examine three instances of non-standard workers' struggles against their employers in South Korean labor politics in the 2000s and the 2010s: the Hyundai Motors Irregular Workers' Union, the Hope Union, and the Youth Community Union. The study highlights grassroots-based community activism and the institutionalized civil-society space within the state as newly arising forms of labor politics, and discusses their implications in relation to the state, civil society, and partisan politics.

This study examines how firm-initiated clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts affect firms' investment efficiency. While existing the literature provides evidence on positive aspects of adopting clawback provisions, the potential impact of clawback adoption on firms' long-term investment efficiency remains unexplored. Using three investment proxies (i.e., capital expenditure, new investment, and total investment), we find that clawback adopters tend to reduce their long-term investments after the clawback provisions are put in place, compared to nonadopters. In particular, we find evidence that the adoption of clawback policies decreases the investment efficiency in the post-adoption period, especially for the firms whose ex ante probability of underinvestment is high. Our additional analyses reveal that observed reduction in the investment efficiency for the firms that are likely to underinvest is more evident for the firms with financial constraints and the firms that adopt risk-taking and performance-based clawback triggers. In contrast, the clawback adopters that are likely to overinvest do not change their investment behavior in the post-adoption period. Overall, our findings suggest that the impleme ntation of clawback provisions may lead to unintended consequences for firms' long-term investment practices, resulting in a decrease in the investment efficiency.