Information dissemination and investors' sensitivity
In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 74, S. 242-250
ISSN: 1062-9769
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In: The quarterly review of economics and finance, Band 74, S. 242-250
ISSN: 1062-9769
In: Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 1550008
ISSN: 1793-6705
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a CEOs stock-based compensation incentive, that is one of the main corporate governance dimensions, has different impacts on accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and real activities earnings management (REM) which have different economic costs. Empirical results show that CEOs stock-based compensation incentive has a positive impact on AEM but a negative impact on REM, implying stock-based compensation incentive leads executives to use more AEM but less REM. Given that the SOX places additional compensation risk on executives, the stock-based compensation is an incentive to significantly encourage managers for using more AEM during the pre-SOX period and less REM during the post-SOX period. The evidence implies that managers change their risk perceptions for AEM and REM after the enactment of SOX, and then their earnings management behaviors indeed change for avoiding wealth-destroying pitfalls. These results bring a new insight into the ability to prevent managers from increasing personal wealth at shareholders' expense.
In: Eastern European economics: EEE, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 42-59
ISSN: 1557-9298