Suchergebnisse

The resource curse literature shows that natural resources, particularly oil, help regime or leadership survival, but it also suggests that resource-rich countries are prone to civil wars or political instability. This article argues that the ownership structure of the oil sector matters and influences leadership survival. Specifically, foreign ownership of the oil sector raises leaders' survival prospect and leads to more military interventions aimed to help the leader. Using data on oil ownership and leaders from 1962 to 2006 across 120 developing countries, this article finds that foreign involvement in the oil sector has a negative effect on leadership turnover. Countries with deeper foreign involvement in the oil sector are also more likely to experience military interventions on the side of the leaders. In other words, leaders of oil-producing countries do receive political support when they cooperate with and serve as 'petro-friends' to foreign powers.

Due to its rapid economic growth and increasing demand for energy, China has engaged in numerous efforts to sustain its energy supplies and enhance its energy security. While existing literature argues that access to energy is oftentimes the driving force behind Beijing's foreign policy behavior, little work has been done to systemically examine the bilateral relationship between China and energy-producing countries. This paper explores how China's foreign policy making is influenced by its energy security concern, focusing on three foreign policy instruments—partnerships, foreign aid, and leadership visits. Using a large-N, quantitative approach, this paper analyzes the effect of oil production on these three foreign policy indicators. The results show that Beijing is more likely to form partnerships with oil-producing countries. Top Chinese leaders are also more likely to travel to countries that produce a higher level of oil. China's aid allocation to Africa is driven by oil abundance as well, although the findings on aid are only valid in the cross-national analysis.

Is there an association between oil and terrorism? If so, how are they linked to each other? While there are literature and anecdotes about oil money financing terrorism, this article identifies three mechanisms through which oil is linked to terrorism: funding, targeting, and motivating. Oil-producing countries are prone to terrorism because they are important targets of terrorists who may attack oil facilities to cause greater impact and to harm powerful countries' overseas interests and also because oil often generates grievances or greed among local people who may in turn engage in terrorist activities. Using data on terrorist incidents and oil income, this article finds a strong, positive relationship between oil and terrorism. To test the mechanisms, this article uses both large-N and small-N data analyses, and the findings suggest that while all three mechanisms appear to explain the oil–terrorism linkage, the targeting and motivating mechanisms are more likely than the funding mechanism. Oil-producing countries have a higher tendency to sponsor terrorism, but no direct evidence indicates oil money flowing to terrorists except for money from kidnapping or extorting oil workers.

Is there an association between oil and terrorism? If so, how are they linked to each other? While there are literature and anecdotes about oil money financing terrorism, this article identifies three mechanisms through which oil is linked to terrorism: funding, targeting, and motivating. Oil-producing countries are prone to terrorism because they are important targets of terrorists who may attack oil facilities to cause greater impact and to harm powerful countries' overseas interests and also because oil often generates grievances or greed among local people who may in turn engage in terrorist activities. Using data on terrorist incidents and oil income, this article finds a strong, positive relationship between oil and terrorism. To test the mechanisms, this article uses both large- N and small- N data analyses, and the findings suggest that while all three mechanisms appear to explain the oil–terrorism linkage, the targeting and motivating mechanisms are more likely than the funding mechanism. Oil-producing countries have a higher tendency to sponsor terrorism, but no direct evidence indicates oil money flowing to terrorists except for money from kidnapping or extorting oil workers.

Due to the rising demand for oil, China has been actively investing abroad in oil producing countries. This paper examines the impact of Chinese oil investment, focusing on the economic and political effects in the recipient countries in the developing world. By building on the existing FDI literature, I argue that the presence of Chinese oil investment may be helpful to the recipient countries' economies but harmful to the quality of governance. The case studies of Sudan and Chad illustrate this dilemma. Using quantitative data on Chinese oil investment and on economic and political development, I find that in countries where Chinese oil investment is present, the economy is growing faster, but the level of corruption is heightened and the level of political accountability is reduced. Western oil investment also has a helpful economic effect, but does not carry a harmful political effect. (Issues Stud/GIGA)

While hostage-taking has been a common form of terrorism for decades, which types of governments are more prone to it remains unclear. Does democracy motivate terrorists to engage in hostage-taking acts because of how easy negotiating with a democratic government is? Or does democracy impose 'audience costs' on the government leaders, driving them never to negotiate with hostage-taking terrorists following the long-held principle of no negotiation? This article argues that hostage-taking terrorists are more inclined to target democratic governments because of the greater value given to human life and personal freedom in democracies. Additionally the helplessness of held hostages is more freely exposed by the media in democracies, which leads to the audience focusing on the hostages themselves rather than on the interests of the nation. This in turns compels decisionmakers to concede, especially near election time. It is only when institutional constraints on the executives are high that democratic leaders refuse to make concessions. Using data on hostage events from 1978 to 2005, this article finds strong evidence that supports this theory, showing that democracy has competing effects on hostage-taking terrorism – civil liberties and press freedom are positively associated with hostage-taking incidents, whereas executive constraints have a negative association.

Terrorist designation has increasingly become an important counterterrorism tool used by intergovernmental organizations and state governments. This article examines the determinants of terrorist listing and argues that terrorist listing is driven by security as well as political concerns. While countries tend to designate groups that pose a greater security threat, terrorist listing can also be influenced by interstate relationships including alliance ties and state rivalry. We test these arguments using a dataset on 35 countries that currently maintain their own lists of designated terrorist organizations. Our findings show that governments are more likely to list groups that have a record of attacking their domestic interests. Domestic groups are more likely to be designated than foreign groups. Moreover, countries are more likely to designate groups that are designated by their allies, even when these groups do not pose a direct threat. Our study contributes to the literature on terrorism and more broadly international security by systematically examining the determinants of terrorist designation and explaining the heterogeneity of terrorist lists across countries.

Terrorist designation has increasingly become an important counterterrorism tool used by intergovernmental organizations and state governments. This article examines the determinants of terrorist listing and argues that terrorist listing is driven by security as well as political concerns. While countries tend to designate groups that pose a greater security threat, terrorist listing can also be influenced by interstate relationships including alliance ties and state rivalry. We test these arguments using a dataset on 35 countries that currently maintain their own lists of designated terrorist organizations. Our findings show that governments are more likely to list groups that have a record of attacking their domestic interests. Domestic groups are more likely to be designated than foreign groups. Moreover, countries are more likely to designate groups that are designated by their allies, even when these groups do not pose a direct threat. Our study contributes to the literature on terrorism and more broadly international security by systematically examining the determinants of terrorist designation and explaining the heterogeneity of terrorist lists across countries.

Existing literature on the relationship between natural disasters and conflicts provides mixed findings. In this article, we argue that whether natural disasters hurt rebel group resilience depends on their funding source and the mode of resource extraction. Rebel groups that obtain their funding from natural resources are more susceptible to natural disasters because this funding source could be easily disrupted by rapid-onset disasters. How rebel groups exploit natural resource wealth also conditions the effect of natural disasters on rebel group resilience. Rebel groups that depend on extorting resource production, despite having a seemingly stable revenue stream, are more likely to face funding cuts after a severe natural disaster. In contrast, rebel groups that rely on smuggling natural resources, due to a higher level of flexibility and mobility, are more likely to survive natural disasters. We test our arguments using data on armed groups, natural disasters, and rebel contraband, and the results of the logit models with interaction terms support our hypotheses. Our findings bridge the environmental conflict literature and the resource curse literature, and offer important policy implications.

AbstractAlthough some studies show that women are more likely to oppose free trade than men, others demonstrate that economic globalization empowers women. Given this paradox, we examine whether gender shapes individual preferences with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. We hypothesize that women do not disfavor FDI more than men because multinational corporations (MNCs) bring more jobs for women, provide better working conditions and higher wages than domestic firms, and spread norms and values that favor gender equality. Moreover, this gender gap will be wider in more globalized countries because women can observe such benefits of MNCs. To test our arguments, we used survey data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project. Overall, women view FDI more positively than men, and this effect is stronger in economically more globalized countries and countries that are less dependent on agriculture. Women have a different view on FDI than that on trade.