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AbstractHow does bureaucratic structure shape presidential strategy in managing top executive posts? The comparative literature on cabinet formation focuses heavily on presidential legislative strategy, largely overlooking the administrative dimension of cabinet management. This article fills this gap by examining how bureaucratic professionalization shapes the president's strategy in distributing and managing cabinet posts. We argue that as bureaucracies become more autonomous via professionalization, ministers from the bureaucracy are more likely to be central players in presidential cabinet management. Our analysis of original data on 1538 ministers' cabinet careers from 26 presidential administrations in four Asian democracies shows that bureaucrats are more likely to receive and retain cabinet posts in key policy areas as bureaucratic professionalization increases, whereas they are less likely to do so with decreasing bureaucratic professionalization. This finding suggests that presidential cabinet management follows a different set of rules according to the level of bureaucratic professionalization.

AbstractPublic administration and political science researchers have debated what constitutes effective ministerial leadership in presidential governments. Some argue that, looking at it from the chief executive's perspective, ministers ought to be capable of supporting her policy programs, but others, taking the bureaucrats' point of view, contend that ministers need to be experienced in managing agencies and executing policy correctly. However, there has been a lack of research on the public assessments of ministerial leadership, particularly in times of crisis. We contribute experimental evidence by analyzing original survey data on more than 1200 South Korean citizens collected during the COVID‐19 pandemic. We find that, overall, citizens are more likely to endorse ministers' technical expertise and management abilities than their political skills during a crisis. Moreover, as the impact of a national crisis becomes more severe, the levels of support enjoyed by ministers with technical expertise increase more than the support given to ministers with other skills.

Do agency heads' public profiles enhance the performance of bureaucratic agencies? Existing studies of public administration emphasize the role of public information in managing government performance. However, whether public attention to agency heads affects the performance of their agencies is largely understudied. Using a unique dataset of agency heads' public profiles in South Korea, we predict that such profiles have a positive impact on their agencies' performance. Although agency heads are not held accountable directly to citizens, close public attention to agency heads' activities may function as an indirect mechanism of accountability and of improving their organizations' performance. Our analysis supports our prediction and further suggests that an agency head's high public profile is a benefit, particularly in more salient policy areas where "going public" is more effective for their policy reforms. Our findings have clear implications: the importance of agency heads' unconventional roles for effective agency management, responding to rapidly changing external environments.

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.

AbstractThis article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence.

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive-legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade-off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis-à-vis the legislature.

This article examines the role of cabinet appointments in controlling the bureaucracy in presidential democracies. I demonstrate how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy shape presidential choice of ministers. Analyzing a sample of four East Asian cases from 1986 through 2013, I find that presidents are more likely to select ministers from the civil service as bureaucracies are more professionalized, controlling for several political factors. Further evidence from qualitative interviews and case studies suggests that, in professionalized systems equipped with a sizable pool of talent but lacking responsiveness, presidents tend to promote ideologically aligned senior civil servants. However, in politicized systems, where presidents easily obtain responsiveness but face a low level of competence, policy experts tend to be selected from outside the bureaucracy. My findings have important implications for the regulatory governance and state capacity of East Asia, demonstrating the value of balancing between responsiveness and competence.

How do the president's calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed. I argue that cabinet appointments are strongly affected not only by presidential incentives to effectively deliver their key policy commitments but also by their interest in having their administration maintain strong political leverage. Through an analysis of portfolio allocations in South Korea after democratization, I demonstrate that the posts wherein ministers can influence the government's overall reputation typically go to nonpartisan professionals ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein ministers can exert legislators' influence generally go to senior copartisans. My findings highlight a critical difference in presidential portfolio allocation from parliamentary democracies, where key posts tend to be reserved for senior parliamentarians from the ruling party.

Understanding who behaves more ethically and how to boost one's ethical decision making are important but relatively neglected human resource management (HRM) questions. To fill this gap, we extend recent experimental research on the role of public service motivation (PSM) in enhancing ethical behavior by leveraging a unique setting of anti-corruption reform in South Korea. Building on the difference-in-differences design in a quasi-experimental setting with more than 10,000 civil servants, gathered as part of a representative survey, we find that not only do civil servants' higher levels of PSM lead to more ethical behavior but that their colleagues with higher levels of PSM are also perceived to be more ethical after policy implementation. As the first quasi-experimental research attempting to estimate PSM's causal effect on ethical behavioral change, with the largest survey samples to date, our analysis has important implications regarding the greater efficacy of anti-corruption policies and the role of PSM in this context.

How do bureaucrats respond to legislators' demands for change in policy implementation? We distinguish between unified and divided government, where the degree of legislative oversight over bureaucratic autonomy is likely to differ, and we argue that how bureaucrats actually respond in varying executive‐legislative relations depends on their incentives shaped by greater autonomy in implementation (unified government) versus closer monitoring by legislators (divided government). Analyzing two sets of original data from list and endorsement experiments with local bureaucrats in Korea (n = 4064)—one from the period of legislative auditing and the other from the nonauditing period—we find that bureaucrats are more likely to incorporate legislators' views into their decision‐making under unified than under divided government. Furthermore, bureaucrats are more responsive to legislatures when their political ideology is congruent with that of a legislative majority than when it is incongruent, regardless of unified or divided government. Our findings have a clear implication: the importance of bureaucratic autonomy and preferences rather than monitoring as an effective tool to increase bureaucratic responsiveness.

Scholars have debated the question of what influences bureaucrats' policy implementation in provincial government, some taking the top-down and some the bottom-up approaches. However, less well understood in this debate is the impact of governors' characteristics, particularly at a time of national political crisis. Given that their roles have been proven important for the performance of provincial governments, this is a significant oversight. To fill this gap, we examine the effect of governors' political characteristics on provincial bureaucrats' responses to the center by leveraging a unique setting, that of presidential impeachment in South Korea. Using original survey data on 655 civil servants from all 17 provincial governments, gathered as part of a representative survey, we find that bureaucrats are less responsive to the central government after impeachment. Our results show that this difference between pre- and post-impeachment is driven by several political characteristics, such as governors' political ideology and tenure in office. Our findings have implications for the role of governors in intergovernmental relations and the management of provincial governments' performance.

The aim of this article is to explore the motivations of street-level bureaucrats when implementing change initiated by elected politicians. We analyse experimental data on more than 1,800 local civil servants from all 243 local governments in South Korea and find that street-level bureaucrats are more likely to implement change instigated by local elected politicians when their own policy positions are reflected in the reforms. Moreover, the degree to which street-level bureaucrats are likely to execute reforms instigated by local politicians is greater when bureaucrats perceive themselves as having more freedom to exercise discretion. These findings reveal a behavioural insight into the conditions in which bureaucrats are more likely to respond to change championed by elected politicians versus conditions where they are more likely to follow existing rules in the policy implementation process.

AbstractThe question of who controls the bureaucracy has been widely debated in the political science and public administration literatures. However, to whom bureaucrats are responsive and to what extent are relatively unknown, particularly outside the US. To understand how organizational behaviour changes according to external political environments, we leverage a unique setting, that of the 2016 presidential impeachment in South Korea. We analyse original experimental data from more than 1,000 civil servants, gathered as part of a nationally representative survey, in order to estimate the degree to which civil servants chose to incorporate the president's preferences into their policy decisions before and after her impeachment. We find that presidential impeachment has a differential impact on the responsiveness of civil servants across the formal ranks of the personnel, controlling for their political views and several other individual characteristics. While bureaucrats were similarly responsive to the President before impeachment regardless of their grades, senior civil servants were significantly more responsive to the President after impeachment than were lower‐ranking bureaucrats. Our study contributes to the literature on organizational theory and public management the evidence that civil servants' attitudes are shaped by the structure of bureaucratic organizations and change with external settings involving elected principals.