Suchergebnisse

Which combinations of government structures and electoral systems create better frameworks for addressing ethnic violence? Is there any one-size-fits-all institutional solution to violent ethnic conflict? Why or why not? These questions are of substantial importance to scholars and policymakers alike, but the extant literature does not provide a systematic and thorough exploration. In this article, we argue that the effects of political institutions on ethnic violence are moderated by parameters of ethnic configurations. Through a large comparative study, we find that institutions are relevant when ethnic groups are not geographically dispersed, and whether ethnic minorities face a majority group also matters. For concentrated minorities facing a majority, semi-presidential-proportional and presidential-proportional systems are more effective in reducing violence. In cases involving concentrated minorities facing no majority, parliamentary-non-proportional systems are associated with the most intense violence. We conclude that states seeking to alleviate ethnic violence by institutional engineering must take contexts seriously.

This article argues that, like fashion, national identity may be influenced by "neighbors" in a broadly defined sense. Inspired by models of collective choice, we hypothesize that, in Taiwan, a subethnically divided society facing a dilemma in its relationship with China, township residents and occupational peers are subject to mutual influence in the formation of their national identity. Methodologically, we compare spatial regression with dummy variable regression and hierarchical linear models. Based on spatial regression with survey data, our findings show that the formation of national identity in Taiwan indeed exhibits strong neighborhood influence.

Ikeda, K.: Social and institutional trust in East and Southeast Asia. - S. 13-45