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The New Economic Policy (NEP) has scripted Malaysia's development for 50 years, with the 30% Bumiputera equity target as the main protagonist. The NEP's imprint remains deep; its legacy endures long beyond the initial 1971-1990 timeline. While followed by a raft of other long-term plans, the NEP reigns supreme, its successors consigned to historical footnotes. The draft of the Shared Prosperity Vision (SPV) 2030, Malaysia's next grand plan, makes the most substantive reference to the NEP, while cursorily acknowledging the National Development Plan (1991-2000) and the National Vision Policy (2001-2010). Bumiputeras have steadily progressed toward policy targets in education and employment, but the persistence of Bumiputera equity holdings below the 30% threshold, according to the official estimations, is continuously reiterated as the NEP's defining – but elusive – quest (Lee 2019). Perpetuation of this target is problematic, from historical, empirical and strategic perspectives. In 1971, the NEP originally aspired to a complex mix(?) of Bumiputera development objectives, but 30% equity ownership was placed on a pedestal from the mid-1970s. This has allowed quick gains and political patronage to prevail over longer gestation pursuits focused on building capability and competitiveness. In recent years, policy emphasis has principally shifted toward productivity-driven, bottom-up Bumiputera enterprise development, deepening the disconnect between these broad priorities and the narrow 30% target. Empirical flaws also mar the target setting and progress monitoring processes. A sub-target within the overall 30% has been surpassed, without acknowledgement. The official accounts, which include foreign ownership and opaque nominee companies while excluding Malaysian government ownership, have continuously provided a partial picture that demands more clarity and completeness. From strategic standpoints, persisting with a single macro equity target detracts from the more crucial attention needed in dynamic and competitive Bumiputera enterprise. This calls for a thorough policy revisit of priorities and targets, and a reset that coherently and effectively aligns policy actions with those priorities and targets.

The first rendition of Malaysia's Shared Prosperity Vision (SPV) 2030 was presented by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad on 5 October 2019. The past year witnessed propagation of shared prosperity as the nation's new development banner, featured in a few landmark Prime Ministerial speeches1 and increasingly referenced by Cabinet members on an array of issues. Those brief mentions foreshadowed the fuller version – a 30-page summary and 190-page report – now in the public domain. This policy document signals priorities and goals for the coming decade. Its official launch next year, as part of the 12th Malaysia Plan, succeeds the iconic Vision 2020 promulgated by Mahathir in 1991. On the heels of this draft SPV launch, Malaysia's 2020 Budget speech by Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng projected the theme "Driving Growth and Equitable Outcomes Towards Shared Prosperity". National policy expectedly reflects the interests and priorities of the parties in power, but there are exceptional political contexts and partisan dynamics to the SPV. The Mahathir administration seeks to seize on an unprecedented opportunity to capture the public imagination, given that it will be Malaysia's first long-term plan under a non-Barisan Nasional federal government. The SPV is also distinguished by the lead role that a political party-linked think tank has played in its drafting, even while the released document bears the Ministry of Economic Affairs' (MEA) seal and will eventually be fully owned by MEA.

Reforming the education system is arguably Malaysia's most paramount development challenge, and also one of the most daunting and difficult for the still fledgling Pakatan Harapan (PH) government. The menu of areas earmarked for reform is comprehensive, encompassing early (pre-primary), primary, secondary and higher levels of education, and covers policy questions from lofty philosophical heights down to ground-level operational concerns. A non-exhaustive list includes the enjoyment of education, quality of public schools, multiple secondary school certification and university entry systems, teachers' bureaucratic workload and other morale- and efficacy-inhibiting issues, diffused and underperforming technical and vocational institutions, financing of the system and financial aid for students, serious allegations of misconduct and fraudulent practices in higher education institutions, and quotidian matters such as the weight of school bags and the colour of school shoes. Adding a further layer of complexity, PH inherited from its predecessors an ambitious education agenda, and has yet to clarify which plans will be continued, altered, or jettisoned. PH has repeatedly committed to modify, not overhaul, ongoing reforms, and to focus on more effective implementation. Hence, it is pertinent for us to review the Malaysian Education Blueprint (MEB) to set the context for this article.

This Perspective focuses on education, the centrepiece of the budget speech second and third thrusts, entitled "towards TN50 aspiration" and "empowering education, skills and training, and talent development". Education also appears in sections dealing with equitable distribution and Bumiputera economic transformation. The budget speech makes abundantly clear that education will feature prominently in Barisan Nasional 2018 re-election campaign and its crafting of a long-term vision under the TN50 banner. The budget sustains Malaysia's record of substantial financial support for primary and secondary schooling, and boosts funding for post-secondary education, while also affirming plans for reconfiguring technical and vocational education and increasing public university funding after a series of severe annual budget cuts.

Reforming Malaysia's education system poses one of the most important and daunting challenges for the new Pakatan Harapan (PH) government. While economic relief and financial recovery efforts – chiefly, abolishing GST, investigating corruption scandals, reviewing megaprojects, and the other "first 100 days" promises – headlined PH's manifesto, Buku Harapan, education discreetly pervaded the GE-14 campaign rhetoric and swiftly took centrestage in post-GE-14 Malaysia. PH's policy pledges, and Malaysian public expectations, span a complex range of issues, from quality of national schools to equitable education access, national integration, de-politicization of institutions, and academic freedom. The current prominence of immediate, tangible, and mostly operational measures are welcome and understandable, but PH must soon begin to lay the groundwork for fundamental reform. This Perspective proceeds with an overview of PH's education agenda. It then evaluates two broad aspects of post-GE-14 developments. First, Buku Harapan's education agenda largely targeted pledges at specific groups and popular concerns, but also expressed lofty principles and goals. This historical juncture, political milieu and leadership change hold out the potential for substantive reform, but PH will need to formulate a cohesive and comprehensive policy that clarifies continuities and changes ahead. Second, initial actions and commitments have focused on education access, electoral overtures, de-politicization of leadership appointments, institutional autonomy and academic freedom. These are welcome steps, but in doing so, PH must avoid institutionalizing practices that may detract from systematic reform, and strive to inculcate new norms, mindsets and practices in education that help bring Malaysia's education to the aspired next level.

Malaysia's Transformasi Nasional 2050 (TN50), a long-term development blueprint announced by Prime Minister Najib Razak in his 2017 Budget speech, is ushering in a bold new mode of policy making. An endeavour to compile people's ideas and aspirations for the nation leading up to 2050 kicked off in January 2017 with dialogue sessions on public university campuses. Surveys, expert consultations, and more roadshows are scheduled in the coming months, culminating in a grand plan to be delivered at year's end, outlining national aspirations, milestones and concrete targets heading toward 2050.

Malaysia's policy responses, launched under the various COVID-19 stimulus packages, have prioritized the retention of the existing workforce, with some attention to job creation, which benefits new labour market entrants, and a few programmes specifically targeted at fresh graduates and young workers, most of which have fallen short of the targeted number of beneficiaries. It is fair to say that the efforts have mitigated labour market woes, although the effects are difficult to quantify. What is clear is that Malaysia's youth have become restive, and more vocal about their pandemic-deepened plight. The incoming government will need to respond decisively and effectively on this matter.

The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government promised education reforms before getting elected in 2018, and presently grapples with the complexities of making good on those pledges while seeking to negotiate continuity and change with regard to the previous administration's Malaysian Education Blueprint launched in 2013. This article situates the education reforms in the context of Malaysia's highly centralized administration, embedded practices and policy initiatives of recent years. Discussion focuses on three areas-quality, equity, autonomy-where PH has more distinctly differentiated itself from its predecessor. On the quality of national schools, efforts to alleviate teachers' bureaucratic workload and enhance the schooling experience mark a positive start. However, transforming mindsets and practices will require more systemic changes, critical self-reflection, and sustained efforts on difficult matters, particularly in basic schooling and technical and vocational programmes. On equity, the government's consistent attention to Bottom 40 (B40) households progressively allocates opportunity, and continual need to address ethnic concerns poses steep challenges. However, policy responses tend to unfold in an ad hoc manner, and the balancing of ethnic interests lacks clarity and coherence. On autonomy, at the institutional level, legislative overhaul in higher education is in the works, while at the personal level, academic freedom clearly thrives more under PH administration. Meaningful and effective reform will hinge on devolution of power away from central government, institutionalization of autonomy, and depoliticization of the system.

The Pakatan Harapan (PH) government promised education reforms before getting elected in 2018, and presently grapples with the complexities of making good on those pledges while seeking to negotiate continuity and change with regard to the previous administration's Malaysian Education Blueprint launched in 2013. This article situates the education reforms in the context of Malaysia's highly centralized administration, embedded practices and policy initiatives of recent years. Discussion focuses on three areas-quality, equity, autonomy—where PH has more distinctly differentiated itself from its predecessor. On the quality of national schools, efforts to alleviate teachers' bureaucratic workload and enhance the schooling experience mark a positive start. However, transforming mindsets and practices will require more systemic changes, critical self-reflection, and sustained efforts on difficult matters, particularly in basic schooling and technical and vocational programmes. On equity, the government's consistent attention to Bottom 40 (B40) households progressively allocates opportunity, and continual need to address ethnic concerns poses steep challenges. However, policy responses tend to unfold in an ad hoc manner, and the balancing of ethnic interests lacks clarity and coherence. On autonomy, at the institutional level, legislative overhaul in higher education is in the works, while at the personal level, academic freedom clearly thrives more under PH administration. Meaningful and effective reform will hinge on devolution of power away from central government, institutionalization of autonomy, and depoliticization of the system.

Group‐based redistribution is extensive and embedded in Malaysia, and has comprehensively transformed the country since the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. The NEP established a "two‐pronged" framework of poverty reduction irrespective of race and social restructuring to redress racial inequalities primarily through preferential programmes targeting the disadvantaged Bumiputera majority. The debate surrounding the NEP has under‐appreciated its strengths and augmented its omissions and misconceptions, which in turn have shaped policy discourses and attitudes in two ways. First, there is marked polarization, largely along ethnic lines, with the majority group overwhelmingly predisposed in favour of Bumiputera policy and minority groups generally wary of its continuation. The polarization unduly reduces the debate to monolithic pro‐NEP vs anti‐NEP dispositions, and constricts the solutions to a false binary question of continuing vs terminating the NEP. Second, a broad but incoherent consensus has consolidated around the notion that "need‐based" policies should comprehensively replace "race‐based" policies. While "need‐based" policies are widely embraced, they emphatically do not constitute a substitute for "race‐based" policies, or group‐based redistribution more generally. Surveys have captured the ethnic polarization surrounding "Malay privileges," but also show that Malaysians unanimously support universal basic assistance. A systematic policy reformulation with universal basic needs and group‐based interventions as enduring and distinct domains might hold out possibilities for new and constructive compromise.

This paper examines affirmative action in Malaysia and South Africa, two regimes that favor majorities. Malaysia's highly centralized and discretionary programme is in contrasts with South Africa's more democratized, decentralized and statutory structure. With regard to affirmative action outcomes, both countries have made quantitative gains in increasing representation of Bumiputeras in Malaysia and blacks in South Africa, in tertiary education and high-level occupations. However, there is also evidence to suggest continuing, primarily qualitative, shortfalls, in terms of graduate capability, dependence on public sector employment, and persistent difficulty in cultivating private enterprise. The results reported here emphasize the importance of implementing affirmative action effectively in education, while exercising restraint in employment and enterprise development.