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Despite the frequent use of economic sanctions by states, there are insufficient analyses of the collateral effects of these measures on target states. Under the sanctions, targeted leaders who pursue the longevity of their regimes adjust domestic policies to mitigate the costs associated with sanctions. Specifically, this article analyzes the effects of sanctions on capital account liberalization in target states. Economic sanctions trigger changes in the capital account openness of target states. However, the direction of the reform is dependent on the political institutions in target states, which characterize the behavioral incentive structure of the leaders. Specifically, economic sanctions lower capital account openness, albeit only in autocracies. Democracies, which are sensitive to the benefits of capital account openness, are less likely to tighten the restrictions. Instead, they are likely to open their markets. I employ the two-way fixed approach to test my argument, using time-series cross-sectional data spanning 145 countries for the period 1965–2005. In this regard, I find evidence in favor of my argument, with the findings suggesting the indirect impact of economic sanctions on target states' financial policies on which the decisions are primarily driven by the political incentives of the targeted leaders.

AbstractCentral bank independence (CBI) has been widely advocated as a means to address the time‐inconsistency problem of controlling inflation. Consequently, many countries have embraced central bank reforms since the 1990s. While extant research in political science has sought to unveil the consequences of CBI, there remains an unexplained variation in the response of countries with regard to capital account openness. Notably, a positive association exists between CBI and capital account openness due to the constraints CBI places on leaders' discretionary monetary and fiscal policies, thereby fostering reliance on financial policy to boost their economies. However, this relationship is contingent on the domestic political contexts of countries. CBI leads to capital account liberalization only when the rule of law is guaranteed, given that CBI is often stipulated by laws. Therefore, in countries where political leaders can easily override formal rules, CBI shows no discernible impact on capital account openness. Employing two‐way fixed‐effects and error‐correction models, the study reveals that CBI increases capital account openness only in democracies, in the presence of multiple veto players, and a high level of transparency. The findings underscore the pivotal role of the domestic political environment in analyzing how CBI constrains political leaders.

We explore the fit between a firm's product portfolio strategy and its governance mode with respect to complementary activities that underlie its product offering. We view firm's governance choice through the lens of orchestrating complementary activities that entail multiple interrelated and often simultaneously occurring transactions. Our key premise is that a broader product portfolio, while offering benefits through the bundle of complementary activities, raises the coordination costs for firms, making integration of complementary activities a preferred mode of governance. We find strong support for our arguments in the context of the U.S. healthcare industry. Hospitals with a narrow service portfolio are more likely to have contracts with physicians as external service providers, and hospitals with a broad service portfolio are more likely to employ their own physicians. Moreover, hospitals that deviate from this fit-based relationship suffer a significant penalty in terms of their financial performance as measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). Our findings allow us to shed new light on the linkage between strategy and governance mode and enable us to illustrate that performance differences across multiproduct firms may be better understood by considering the fit between their strategy and their governance mode instead of simply focusing either on their strategy or on their governance mode per se.

The structure‐conduct‐performance paradigm is tested using 4‐digit SIC Korean industry data for 1981 and 1986. The study investigates whether the observed institutional differences between developed and developing countries affects the performance hypothesis. The results suggest that structure and conduct variables influence price‐cost margins in much the same way as they do in developed countries. Nevertheless, the Korean government's credit rationing policies, by creating entry barriers, have the most important effects on industry performance.

This study examines how individual differences in the consumption of computer games intersect with gender and how games and gender mutually constitute each other. The study focused on adult women with particular attention to differences in level of play, as well as genre preferences. Three levels of game consumption were identified. For power gamers, technology and gender are most highly integrated. These women enjoy multiple pleasures from the gaming experience, including mastery of game-based skills and competition. Moderate gamers play games in order to cope with their real lives. These women reported taking pleasure in controlling the gaming environment, or alternately that games provide a needed distraction from the pressures of their daily lives. Finally, the non-gamers who participated in the study expressed strong criticisms about game-playing and gaming culture. For these women, games are a waste of time, a limited commodity better spent on other activities.