Drawing on the civic community literature, this article explicates a theoretical model to explain variation in rates of violence across rural communities. It is hypothesized that rural communities with a stable population base that is locally invested, a vibrant participatory civic culture with a well‐developed noneconomic institutional base, and a robust economically independent middle class will have lower rates of violent crime. Results from the analysis of data for more than 1,000 rural counties reveal that the 11 variables used to operationalize the theory are empirically distinguishable from indicators of resource disadvantage and form three well‐defined indices: a residential stability/local investment factor, a local capitalism/independent middle class factor, and a civic engagement factor. Negative binomial regression models confirm that violent crime rates are generally much lower in communities that score high on these dimensions. Implications of these findings for future macrolevel criminological research are discussed.
Studies of social control most often focus on the deterrent effects of informal or formal social control mechanisms. In this study I draw on theory designed to explain variation in the form of social control itself. Arguing that most social control is exercised in the context of interpersonal disputes, I attempt to explain variation in the form of social control used to resolve disputes. The theoretical model posits that both the social reality of the conflict and the social location of the aggrieved party will condition the social control response. I test propositions drawn from this model with individual‐level survey data on a sample of respondents from a metropolitan parish in the south central United States. The results for the empirical test of the theoretical model are mixed. I conclude with suggestions for future research.
This study advances research on the mental health impacts of disasters by examining how a mainstay of the sociological literature, community attachment, influences negative affective states such as anxiety and fear stimulated by a technological disaster. Survey data were collected in three coastal Louisiana parishes (counties) geographically proximate to the BP oil spill of 2010 while the oil was still flowing. The data reveal that community attachment is associated with higher levels of negative affect. This finding holds for those tied to the fishing and seafood industry, those tied to the oil industry, and those having no immediate links to either industry. These results highlight that although community attachment is essential for community resilience, it can also be disruptive to individual well-being when technological disasters occur in communities dependent on renewable and natural resources.
Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory is grounded in the assumption that relatively higher crime rates in the United States are due to (1) the overwhelming influence of economic motives and institutions in society, and (2) the subjugation of all other social institutions to cultural economic interests (e.g., the American Dream). Our analysis is designed to extend the limited body of empirical research on this theory in several ways. First, we seek to test the utility of institutional anomie theory for predicting crime rates across aggregate units within the United States (counties). Second, we draw out the theory's emphasis on instrumental crime and suggest that measures of noneconomic social, political, familial, religious, and educational institutions will be particularly relevant for explaining instrumental as opposed to expressive violence. Third, in contrast to prior research, we develop conceptual reasons to expect that these factors will primarily mediate (as opposed to moderate) the relationship between economically motivating pressures and instrumental violence. Our negative binomial regression analyses of data from the Supplementary Homicide Reports and various censuses indicate that the measures of noneconomic institutions perform well in explaining both instrumental and expressive homicides, but that these measures mediate the impact of economic pressures (as measured by the Gini coefficient of family income inequality) to commit instrumental violence most strongly. Further, we find only very limited support for the more popular moderation hypothesis.