Power struggle in South-East Asia: With accompanying collection of 70 sel. documents on 11 microfiches
In: Bibliotheca Asiatica 13
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In: Bibliotheca Asiatica 13
The present military regime in Indonesia emerged from the womb of Guided Democracy (1959-66) which was generally associated with Sukarno, although it was in fact based on an unholy alliance between Sukarno and the army leadership. The political constellation of Guided Democracy began to disintegrate after the traumatic abortive coup of 1 October 1965 which led to the killing of six top army generals. In its aftermath General Suharto launched his own coup against Sukarno on 11 March 1966 which catapulted the former into power, although Sukarno was allowed to remain as a figure-head President up to March 1967. General Suharto banned the Communist Party (PKI) on 12 March 1966, the day after the coup. With the political demise of the PKI and the neutralization of Sukarno, two pillars of Guided Democracy had fallen away. Since then the military in Indonesia had been in the hegemonic position.
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In: Journal of Southeast Asian studies, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 483-485
ISSN: 1474-0680
In: The China quarterly, Band 78, S. 384-386
ISSN: 1468-2648
In: Journal of Southeast Asian studies, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 119-135
ISSN: 1474-0680
The action of the 30 September Movement on 1 October 1965 in Indonesia is sometimes described as an abortive coup d'état. In fact it would be more in accordance with reality to call it a pseudo-coup. It is true that in line with the technique of launching a coup, the movement led by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung from the palace guard quickly occupied strategic and vital points in Jakarta, the capital, such.as the telecommunications centre and the central radio broadcast station. It is also true that Untung on 1 October issued a decree dismissing the Sukarno Cabinet, i.e. the government of the day, and establishing the Revolution Council as 'the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia'. In reality, however, no action was taken against President Sukarno and his Ministers (apart from the Minister for Defence and Security, General Nasution, and the Minister/Commander of the Army, General Yani) in the form of arrest or other ways of political neutralization. As expressed by the former commander of the air force, Omar Dani, during his trial for his alleged involvement in the 30 September Movement: 'Why did they (Untung and his associates) act as if they were not serious? There was no concrete takeover of power. The President was still in power, and so were his Ministers and his military commanders'.
In: Asian affairs, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 35-53
ISSN: 1477-1500
In: Hull monographs on South-East Asia 5
In: Pacific affairs: an international review of Asia and the Pacific, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 328
ISSN: 1715-3379
In: Third world quarterly, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 133-169
ISSN: 1360-2241
In: Asian affairs, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 94-123
ISSN: 1477-1500
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 347-385
ISSN: 1467-9248
In: Asian affairs, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 203-239
ISSN: 1477-1500
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 514-571
ISSN: 1467-9248