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Eggert and Kolmar [Eggert, W., Kolmar, M., in press. Contests with size effects. European Journal of Political Economy.] examine the effects of group size on individual and aggregate payoffs in contests where prizes increase in the number of players. In a reconsideration of their paper, this note examines contests in which the unit cost of effort decreases in the number of players. In contests for fixed prizes, an increase in the number of players decreases individual and aggregate payoffs. In contests in which players face a trade-off between appropriative and productive investments, an increase in the number of players decreases individual payoffs while increasing aggregate payoffs. [Copyright 2007 Elsevier B.V.]

This note examines the social cost of rent seeking when firms seek rent by obtaining government subsidies as well as by securing a monopoly position. The social cost of rent seeking proves to be represented by the new Tullock rectangle. 1 Figure, 2 References. Adapted from the source document.

This note characterizes rent-seeking competition under the possibility of cooperation between rent seekers. Rational individuals are shown either to form a group to fight for the rent or not, depending upon costs and benefits of group formation. In the normative respect, group formation by rent seekers turns out to reduce social wastes resulting from rent-seeking competition.

The high indebtedness of Korean firms is viewed as one of major causes for the financial (currency) crisis of Korea in 1997. This paper examines empirically the political economy underlying the financial structure of Korean firms. Specifically, this paper estimates the size of rents generated in Korean financial markets through financial repression during 1971 – 1991. The size of the rent shared by politicians and business sectors proves to be in the range of three to eight percent of Gross Domestic Product of Korea during the period. This paper also shows that firm size has been an important determinant for the financial structure of Korean firms. However, the role of the firm size as the determinant for financial structure has decreased after the financial crisis, suggesting that the tie between politicians and business has been weakened.

This paper examines entry contests in oligopoly with regulatory barriers to entry when government seeks to issue additional licenses. The entry contests are modeled as a two-stage rent-seeking game between incumbents & potential entrants, with incumbents opposing issuance of additional licenses while the potential entrants try to obtain them. We derive conditions under which the resources expended in the entry contest exceed or fall short of the expected increase in social benefit. Entry deregulation is more likely to increase expected social benefit when incumbents employ a non-cooperative Nash strategy in rent seeking than when they collude. 21 References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]