Suchergebnisse

Changes in Japanese security policy and institutions over the past decade and a half nullify cultural and institutionalist views of Japan's postwar pacifism. The boundary of the Self-Defense Force (SDF)'s activity-which had been understood exclusively as defending Japan's own territorial integrity-was expanded to UN peacekeeping activities in the early 1990s, and through a series of policy and institutional changes was expanded further to rear support for U.S. troops in regional contingencies and antiterrorist actions. These changes have been accompanied by significant shifts in Japanese attitudes on defense and security issues. Despite the public's fear of entrapment in war through the alliance relationship with the United States, most Japanese believe that Japan needs to strengthen its defense capability through closer military ties with its alliance partner, and that it is better to revise the peace constitution in order to legitimize the SDF and provide it with military flexibility. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

Today's young Koreans were brought up under an affluent & democratized society. Proud of their Korean nationality, they embrace ethnic nationalism in two dimensions: on the one hand, assertive nationalism to the world & toward the United States in particular, & on the other hand, inter-Korean nationalism with the people of North Korea. With no memories of war & less fear of the communist North, younger Koreans prefer peaceful coexistence with North Korea. Although they recognize the importance of the alliance relationship with the United States, they are sensitive to social problems in hosting U.S. forces. Domestically, they are pressing for reforms to make the nation a consolidated democracy. Nevertheless, the political activism of this vibrant generation is limited, driven by selective events. Its immediate interests are largely cultural & pragmatic. Adapted from the source document.

This article identifies and analyzes economic and political factors behind the polarization of Korean civil society. Both the growing economic disparity between the rich and the poor and the tightened job market for the younger generation since the 1997-1998 financial crisis have contributed to a sharp divergence in views on how best to approach reforms. More importantly, political flux and instability deriving from the current "transitional politics" have aggravated the political polarization. The three major actors in this transitional politics-power elites, civic movement organizations, and the media-play a divisive rather than unifying role. Given that political institutions are still weak and a political culture for compromise remains largely absent, polarization of Korean society is likely to continue until the intense passions of the politicized civil society are dampened by successful institutionalization of conflict resolving mechanisms. (Asian Perspect/DÜI)

South Korea and Japan responded to their financial crisis of the late 1990s by restructuring financial institutions. Also, financial authorities were created to supervise financial institutions and lead financial restructuring. Financial restructuring focused on the resolution of non-performing loans that had been contributing to financial failures and on strengthening their equity capital bases for sound management. Huge amounts of public funds were mobilized to pursue these policy goals. The Korean government took more drastic measures by closing or merging many failing financial institutions. Financial restructuring also facilitated bank concentration in Korea — and Japan — giving births to several mega banks. Both governments of Korea and Japan encouraged bank concentration by allowing the establishment of a financial holding company. The Korean government was more actively involved in merging banks while Japanese bank mergers were taken by business initiatives.Financial restructuring is expected to bring more market oriented business practices among financial institutions and loosen cooperative ties among financial institutions, corporations, and financial bureaucracy in both countries. Close bank-corporation ties through main bank system and corporate networks within a business group are being loosened in Japan particularly since concerned parties have come to seek market rationality over loyalty. On the other hand, the intervention in financial sector and the mediation in bank-corporation relationship by financial bureaucracy are expected to be weakened in the case of Korea. Nevertheless, discretionary power of Korea's financial bureaucracy appears stronger for the time being since it took the helmsman of determining which financial institution is out of market.