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AbstractWhat is the function of modal judgment? Why do we (need to be able to) make judgments of possibility and necessity? Or are such judgments, in fact, dispensable? This paper introduces and develops an answer to these questions based on Kant's remarks in section 76 of theCritique of Judgment.Here, Kant appears to argue the following: that a capacity to make modal judgments using (categorial) modal concepts is required for a capacity for objective representation, in light of our split cognitive architecture. This split cognitive architecture leaves room for a mismatch between our concepts and intuitions and, Kant argues, that is why we need modal concepts and modal judgments. In this paper, I develop this account of the function of modal judgment and to explore the extent to which it may improve upon contemporary alternatives. I focus on one particularly important challenge for the account: to explain why a distinction between the actual and thepossible,rather than merely a distinction between the actual and thenon-actual, is required. In order to answer this question, I supplement the account with a particular way of thinking about objectivity.

'Existence and Essence' presents a series of writings - including several previously unpublished - by Bob Hale on the topics of ontology and modality. The essays develop and elucidate Hale's work on essence, truthmakers and several other topics. Also included are an introduction by Kit Fine and a bibliography of Hale's work.

In Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's Analysis of Existence and its Relation to Proclamation (1950), Løgstrup offers an original critique of these key thinkers. Arguing against their idea that 'life in the crowd' threatens individuality, he proposes an ethic beyond social rules: a requirement to care for a person whose life is placed in your hands.