Negotiating sustainable trade: explaining the difference in social standards in US and EU preferential trade agreements
In: Contemporary politics, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 398-417
ISSN: 1469-3631
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In: Contemporary politics, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 398-417
ISSN: 1469-3631
In: Political studies review, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 577-578
ISSN: 1478-9302
In: Political studies review, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 255-256
ISSN: 1478-9302
In: Political studies review, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 581-582
ISSN: 1478-9302
In: Political studies review, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 455-456
ISSN: 1478-9302
In: Cambridge review of international affairs, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 313-316
ISSN: 1474-449X
In: Cambridge review of international affairs, Band 28, Heft 2
ISSN: 1474-449X
A review essay covering books by: (1) Daniel W Drezner, The system worked: how the world stopped another Great Depression, (2014), (2) Eric Helleiner, The status quo crisis: global financial governance after the 2008 financial meltdown (2014).
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 335-355
ISSN: 1875-8223
This article examines the European Union (EU) as an actor in international trade negotiations and calls into question constructivist notions of the European Union as a 'Normative Power'. The article argues out of an institutionalist perspective that the distribution of competences between Commission, Council and European Parliament (EP) in EU trade policy systematically privileges strategic and economic interests over normative objectives. Drawing on a principal-agent approach, it analyses the case of the EU-India negotiations on a free trade agreement. Results suggest that the close cooperation between Council and Commission before and during the negotiations prevent EU trade policy to be more guided by normative objectives. The European Parliament, as the voice of normative concerns, could influence negotiations, due to the EP's new powers in the ratification process. However, since the EP is institutionally excluded from the agenda-setting-process and can hardly control the Commission during the bargaining process, it capacities to set the negotiation goals ex ante are very constrained. Only when negotiations are in full play can the EP try to kick questionable demands off the EU's trade agenda and strive for normative aims. Therefore, issues like the inclusion of human rights and labour and environmental clauses seemed to have gained some importance, while economic development concerns hardly seem to influence the EU's trade negotiations.
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 335-355
ISSN: 1384-6299
World Affairs Online
In: Internationale politische Ökonomie 17
In: Internationale Politische Ökonomie Band 17
In: Nomos eLibrary
In: Wirtschaft
Die präferentiellen Handelsabkommen der USA und der EU enthalten heutzutage durchgehend Sozialstandards zum Schutz von Arbeitern und der Umwelt. Doch während die USA einen sanktionsbasierten Ansatz verfolgen, vertraut die EU allein auf Dialog- und Kooperationsmechanismen.Dieses Buch unternimmt den Versuch zu erklären, warum die USA und die EU solch unterschiedliche Ansätze gewählt haben. Die Arbeit vergleicht dazu die Verhandlungen der USA und der EU mit Zentralamerika, Peru und Kolumbien sowie Südkorea. Die empirischen Befunde legen nahe, dass die gesellschaftlichen Präferenzen in den USA und Europa weitgehend deckungsgleich waren. Der unterschiedliche institutionelle Rahmen in den USA und der EU wandelten diese gesellschaftlichen Forderungen jedoch in unterschiedliche Politikergebnisse um. So haben die Charakteristika des politischen Systems der USA die Herausbildung sanktions-basierter Sozialstandards stärker begünstigt als das konsensorientierte System der EU.
In: Springer texts in political science and international relations
World Affairs Online