Anarchy unbound: why self-governance works better than you think
In: Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society
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In: Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society
In: Princeton shorts
In: Princeton Shorts Ser
What can today's corporate raiders learn from the scourge of the high seas? A lot, as it turns out! Pirates have a surprising amount to teach about building better organizations, promoting diversity in the workplace, and creating powerful brands, among many other business lessons. Curious to hear more? Then sign up for Professor Blackbeard's Management 101 class. And don't be late. He's got a hell of a temper. Princeton Shorts are brief selections taken from influential Princeton University Press books and produced exclusively in ebook format. Providing unmatched insight into importan
Pack your cutlass and blunderbuss--it's time to go a-pirating! The Invisible Hook takes readers inside the wily world of late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century pirates. With swashbuckling irreverence and devilish wit, Peter Leeson uncovers the hidden economics behind pirates' notorious, entertaining, and sometimes downright shocking behavior. Why did pirates fly flags of Skull & Bones? Why did they create a "pirate code"? Were pirates really ferocious madmen? And what made them so successful? The Invisible Hook uses economics to examine these and other infamous aspects of piracy. Lees
In: Public choice, Band 198, Heft 1-2, S. 1-1
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 194, Heft 3-4, S. 231-231
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 16, Heft 4, S. 423-425
ISSN: 1744-1382
AbstractEconomic analysis is a theoretical approach, not an empirical one. It is a way of thinking, not a way of testing. An analysis that has an empirical component can be economic without being quantitative: economics is not statistics. An atheoretical analysis can never be economic, no matter how impressive its regressions: statistics is not economics.
In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 145-150
ISSN: 1744-1382
AbstractEvery economic explanation assumes maximization. How strange, then, that few economists accept one of maximization's most straightforward implications:every observed institution is efficient. My aim is to persuade economists of this fact and thus to dissuade them from making illogical claims about social welfare. To frame my argument, I consider the "property rights approach" to institutions developed by Yoram Barzel. I speculate that economists resist what maximization implies about institutional efficiency because they think that efficiency-always precludes them from improving the world, and hope of improving the world is what attracted them to economics in the first place. But, besides being inconsistent, resistance is unnecessary: efficiency-always does not preclude economists, or anyone else, from improving the world.
In: European journal of law and economics, Band 48, Heft 1, S. 29-42
ISSN: 1572-9990
In: Rationality and society, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 141-169
ISSN: 1461-7358
This article uses rational choice theory to analyze oracles: media for divining answers to questions about the unknown. I develop a simple theory of oracles with rational agents. My theory explains oracles as institutional solutions to "low-grade" interpersonal conflicts—petty grievances and frustrations resulting from perceptions or feelings of personal offense—that government is unable to resolve. Oracles secure correlated equilibrium in situations where, without them, individuals would be stuck in a suboptimal world of simple mixed-strategy equilibrium. By randomizing strategies about how to behave in situations of low-grade conflict and coordinating individuals' choices across that randomization, oracles resolve low-grade conflict efficiently. To investigate my theory I consider a society of persons who rely exclusively on oracles to decide how to behave in situations of low-grade conflict: the Azande of Africa. Using the equivalent of a "Magic 8 Ball" to resolve such conflict improves Zande welfare.
In: Public choice, Band 155, Heft 3-4
ISSN: 1573-7101
How do the members of societies that can't use government or simple ostracism produce social order? To investigate this question I use economics to analyze Gypsy law. Gypsy law leverages superstition to enforce desirable conduct in Gypsy societies where government is unavailable and simple ostracism is ineffective. According to Gypsy law, unguarded contact with the lower half of the human body is ritually polluting, ritual defilement is physically contagious, and non-Gypsies are in an extreme state of such defilement. These superstitions repair holes in simple ostracism among Gypsies, enabling them to secure social cooperation without government. Gypsies' belief system is an efficient institutional response to the constraints they face on their choice of mechanisms of social control. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 155, Heft 3-4, S. 273-292
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Journal of multicultural discourses, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 227-233
ISSN: 1747-6615
SSRN
Working paper
In: Organizational dynamics: a quarterly review of organizational behavior for professional managers, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 34-42
ISSN: 0090-2616