Suchergebnisse

International audience ; Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering security‐differentiated water rights can make the market more efficient and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We conduct a laboratory experiment which compares two designs for water rights; one with a single security level and another with two security levels. We find that a two security level system increases overall profits when transactions costs are lower on the water rights market than on the water allocation market. It also improves risk allocation by allowing subjects to trade‐off profits variability against expected profits according to their risk type and this result is robust to the existence of transactions costs on either market.

International audience ; Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering security‐differentiated water rights can make the market more efficient and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We conduct a laboratory experiment which compares two designs for water rights; one with a single security level and another with two security levels. We find that a two security level system increases overall profits when transactions costs are lower on the water rights market than on the water allocation market. It also improves risk allocation by allowing subjects to trade‐off profits variability against expected profits according to their risk type and this result is robust to the existence of transactions costs on either market.

International audience ; Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering security‐differentiated water rights can make the market more efficient and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We conduct a laboratory experiment which compares two designs for water rights; one with a single security level and another with two security levels. We find that a two security level system increases overall profits when transactions costs are lower on the water rights market than on the water allocation market. It also improves risk allocation by allowing subjects to trade‐off profits variability against expected profits according to their risk type and this result is robust to the existence of transactions costs on either market.

International audience ; Most existing water markets combine water rights trading and water allocation trading. Offering security‐differentiated water rights can make the market more efficient and allow water users to manage the risks of supply uncertainty better. We conduct a laboratory experiment which compares two designs for water rights; one with a single security level and another with two security levels. We find that a two security level system increases overall profits when transactions costs are lower on the water rights market than on the water allocation market. It also improves risk allocation by allowing subjects to trade‐off profits variability against expected profits according to their risk type and this result is robust to the existence of transactions costs on either market.

L'interdiction de l'utilisation des pesticides dans les espaces verts urbains français à partir de janvier 2017 a modifié la gestion de ces espaces. Cet article explore les préférences des usagers pour les espaces verts dans ce nouveau contexte. La méthode des choix discrets a été appliquée à un échantillon représentatif de la population urbaine française pour analyser leurs préférences vis-à-vis de l'adaptation des espaces verts à une gestion sans pesticides. Nous estimons les préférences pour des caractéristiques des espaces verts présentant un intérêt direct pour les utilisateurs (aspect visuel, possibilités de loisirs et accès à des informations sur la gestion sans pesticides des espaces verts), mais aussi des caractéristiques moins visibles telles que l'abondance de la faune, les conditions de travail des agents d'entretien des espaces verts et la part du budget public dédié aux espaces verts. Nos résultats montrent que tous les citoyens dévaluent les options entraînant une augmentation importante du budget mais les préférences vis-à-vis d'autres attributs dépendent de la fréquence de visite des espaces verts. La plupart des habitants préfèrent un aspect visuel naturel à un aspect maîtrisé, mais cela est davantage vrai pour les personnes qui fréquentent souvent les espaces verts. La fréquence des visites a également un impact sur les préférences vis-à-vis de l'abondance de la faune (valorisée uniquement par les utilisateurs fréquents) et les campagnes d'information (valorisées uniquement par ceux qui fréquentent rarement les espaces verts). Classification JEL : Q24, Q26, C25.

International audience ; This study investigates the behavioral economic underpinnings of current policy approaches to integrate environmental objectives into the Common Agricultural Policy. We conduct an economic lab-in-the-field experiment with farmers in Germany. We analyze the impact of the following policy design features on farmers' decisions to adopt sustainable agricultural practices: (i) framing of the policy: whether farmers perceive themselves as being part of the problem or the solution, (ii) degree of control: mandatory vs. voluntary policy (iii) framing of incentives as either losses or gains. All policy designs tested result in a significant increase in hectares conserved compared to a baseline scenario without policy. Also behavioral factors do significantly affect farmers' behavior at the individual level. Only framing is found to significantly affect policy effectiveness.

International audience ; This study investigates the behavioral economic underpinnings of current policy approaches to integrate environmental objectives into the Common Agricultural Policy. We conduct an economic lab-in-the-field experiment with farmers in Germany. We analyze the impact of the following policy design features on farmers' decisions to adopt sustainable agricultural practices: (i) framing of the policy: whether farmers perceive themselves as being part of the problem or the solution, (ii) degree of control: mandatory vs. voluntary policy (iii) framing of incentives as either losses or gains. All policy designs tested result in a significant increase in hectares conserved compared to a baseline scenario without policy. Also behavioral factors do significantly affect farmers' behavior at the individual level. Only framing is found to significantly affect policy effectiveness.

International audience ; Integrated pest management and organic farming are alternatives for sustainable agriculture and less pesticide use in the European Union. All professional users of pesticides in the European Union should follow the general principles of integrated pest management from 2014. States should report to the European Commission on their national action plan for the effective application of those general principles through crop-specific guidelines. The major remaining issues are: (1) when guidelines are not already applied, what incentives would encourage European farmers to adopt those guidelines? (2) How and to what extent should public money be used to promote the adoption of guidelines? Here, we review the adoption of integrated pest management in Europe. We deliver a framework to understand the drivers of changes in farmers' pest management practices. This framework also helps to understand farmer reaction to different policy incentives.

Cet article s'intéresse aux politiques et dispositifs de gestion du manque d'eau et des sécheresses en France. La première partie décrit les politiques et dispositifs existants, en distinguant la gestion quantitative des volumes d'eau et la gestion par les prix ainsi que les politiques structurelles et les politiques conjoncturelles. La seconde partie discute des politiques et dispositifs envisageables en France. Cela inclut des politiques incitant aux adaptations au niveau des exploitations, une réforme de la gestion de crise et des dispositifs de tarification et d'échange de droits qui pourraient être différenciés selon les utilisateurs, l'état de la ressource et la situation météorologique. Ces nouveaux dispositifs sont par ailleurs compatibles avec la réforme en cours et la mise en place des organismes uniques de gestion collective (OUGC) à l'échelle locale. / This article deals with policies and management measures addressing water scarcity and droughts in France. The first part describes existing practices, differentiating between quota and pricing instruments and between structural and temporary measures. The second part discusses policies and measures that could be applied in France. It includes policies providing incitation to support farm-level adaptations, a reform of current crisis management and pricing and market measures that could be differentiated depending on the end-user, the state of the resource and the weather conditions. Moreover, these measures fit in the current policy reform and the introduction of local institutions for collective water management, called OUGC.

Cet article s'intéresse aux politiques et dispositifs de gestion du manque d'eau et des sécheresses en France. La première partie décrit les politiques et dispositifs existants, en distinguant la gestion quantitative des volumes d'eau et la gestion par les prix ainsi que les politiques structurelles et les politiques conjoncturelles. La seconde partie discute des politiques et dispositifs envisageables en France. Cela inclut des politiques incitant aux adaptations au niveau des exploitations, une réforme de la gestion de crise et des dispositifs de tarification et d'échange de droits qui pourraient être différenciés selon les utilisateurs, l'état de la ressource et la situation météorologique. Ces nouveaux dispositifs sont par ailleurs compatibles avec la réforme en cours et la mise en place des organismes uniques de gestion collective (OUGC) à l'échelle locale. / This article deals with policies and management measures addressing water scarcity and droughts in France. The first part describes existing practices, differentiating between quota and pricing instruments and between structural and temporary measures. The second part discusses policies and measures that could be applied in France. It includes policies providing incitation to support farm-level adaptations, a reform of current crisis management and pricing and market measures that could be differentiated depending on the end-user, the state of the resource and the weather conditions. Moreover, these measures fit in the current policy reform and the introduction of local institutions for collective water management, called OUGC.

Cet article s'intéresse aux politiques et dispositifs de gestion du manque d'eau et des sécheresses en France. La première partie décrit les politiques et dispositifs existants, en distinguant la gestion quantitative des volumes d'eau et la gestion par les prix ainsi que les politiques structurelles et les politiques conjoncturelles. La seconde partie discute des politiques et dispositifs envisageables en France. Cela inclut des politiques incitant aux adaptations au niveau des exploitations, une réforme de la gestion de crise et des dispositifs de tarification et d'échange de droits qui pourraient être différenciés selon les utilisateurs, l'état de la ressource et la situation météorologique. Ces nouveaux dispositifs sont par ailleurs compatibles avec la réforme en cours et la mise en place des organismes uniques de gestion collective (OUGC) à l'échelle locale. / This article deals with policies and management measures addressing water scarcity and droughts in France. The first part describes existing practices, differentiating between quota and pricing instruments and between structural and temporary measures. The second part discusses policies and measures that could be applied in France. It includes policies providing incitation to support farm-level adaptations, a reform of current crisis management and pricing and market measures that could be differentiated depending on the end-user, the state of the resource and the weather conditions. Moreover, these measures fit in the current policy reform and the introduction of local institutions for collective water management, called OUGC.

Cet article s'intéresse aux politiques et dispositifs de gestion du manque d'eau et des sécheresses en France. La première partie décrit les politiques et dispositifs existants, en distinguant la gestion quantitative des volumes d'eau et la gestion par les prix ainsi que les politiques structurelles et les politiques conjoncturelles. La seconde partie discute des politiques et dispositifs envisageables en France. Cela inclut des politiques incitant aux adaptations au niveau des exploitations, une réforme de la gestion de crise et des dispositifs de tarification et d'échange de droits qui pourraient être différenciés selon les utilisateurs, l'état de la ressource et la situation météorologique. Ces nouveaux dispositifs sont par ailleurs compatibles avec la réforme en cours et la mise en place des organismes uniques de gestion collective (OUGC) à l'échelle locale. / This article deals with policies and management measures addressing water scarcity and droughts in France. The first part describes existing practices, differentiating between quota and pricing instruments and between structural and temporary measures. The second part discusses policies and measures that could be applied in France. It includes policies providing incitation to support farm-level adaptations, a reform of current crisis management and pricing and market measures that could be differentiated depending on the end-user, the state of the resource and the weather conditions. Moreover, these measures fit in the current policy reform and the introduction of local institutions for collective water management, called OUGC.