Suchergebnisse

Why does the European election fail to produce competition between European policy alternatives despite the increased politicization of European integration and efforts to connect election results to the Commission Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten process? In this article I theorize the European arena's incentive structure for political competition by synthesizing Strøm's (1990) behavioral theory of competitive parties (votes, office, policy) and Bartolini's (1999, 2000) four dimensions of electoral competition (contestability, availability, decidability, and incumbent vulnerability). I model EU decidability (party differentials on EU policy) and formulate specific expectations about party differentiation by considering parties' vote-, office-, and policy-seeking motives under the European arena's specific conditions. How parties behave under the specific incentive structure of the European arena matters for the EU's development as a polity.

A comment on Philippe Schmitter's Essay "The Vices and Virtues of 'Populisms" (Sociologica, 13(1), 2019) ; (VLID)5391768

Why does the European election fail to produce competition between European policy alternatives despite the increased politicization of European integration and efforts to connect election results to the Commission Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten process? In this article I theorize the European arenas incentive structure for political competition by synthesizing Strøms (1990) behavioral theory of competitive parties (votes, office, policy) and Bartolinis (1999, 2000) four dimensions of electoral competition (contestability, availability, decidability, and incumbent vulnerability). I model EU decidability (party differentials on EU policy) and formulate specific expectations about party differentiation by considering parties vote-, office-, and policy-seeking motives under the European arenas specific conditions. How parties behave under the specific incentive structure of the European arena matters for the EUs development as a polity. ; (VLID)4800111

Why does the European election fail to produce competition between European policy alternatives despite the increased politicization of European integration and efforts to connect election results to the Commission Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten process? In this article I theorize the European arena's incentive structure for political competition by synthesizing Strøm's (1990) behavioral theory of competitive parties (votes, office, policy) and Bartolini's (1999, 2000) four dimensions of electoral competition (contestability, availability, decidability, and incumbent vulnerability). I model EU decidability (party differentials on EU policy) and formulate specific expectations about party differentiation by considering parties' vote-, office-, and policy-seeking motives under the European arena's specific conditions. How parties behave under the specific incentive structure of the European arena matters for the EU's development as a polity.

"Welche Auswirkungen hatten die tief greifenden Maßnahmen, die seit Ausbruch der Krise in Griechenland eingeleitet wurden? In dem Essay werden die positiven und negativen Konsequenzen analysiert, und sodann wird diskutiert, was der Fall von Griechenland über die aktuelle politische Situation Griechenlands und Europas aussagt - und welche Gefahren für die Demokratie damit verbunden sind." (Autorenreferat)

What are the consequences of the radical measures taken in Greece since the beginning of the crisis? While discussing the positive and negative effects of the Troika therapy in Greece, this essay gives an overview of the political situation in Greece and Europe, and discusses the dangers for democracy in the EU. Adapted from the source document.

What are the consequences of the radical measures taken in Greece since the beginning of the crisis? While discussing the positive and negative effects of the Troika therapy in Greece, this essay gives an overview of the political situation in Greece and Europe, and discusses the dangers for democracy in the EU. ; Welche Auswirkungen hatten die tief greifenden Maßnahmen, die seit Ausbruch der Krise in Griechenland eingeleitet wurden? In dem Essay werden die positiven und negativen Konsequenzen analysiert, und sodann wird diskutiert, was der Fall von Griechenland über die aktuelle politische Situation Griechenlands und Europas aussagt - und welche Gefahren für die Demokratie damit verbunden sind.

This essay introduces a collection of papers dealing with the responsive–responsible dilemma of party government. The political developments surrounding the Eurozone crisis attest that the duties of government and the demands of political representation may at times be in sharp contrast with one another. In such contexts, it becomes hard for parties in government to combine responsiveness with responsible policy-making. Late Peter Mair theorized this phenomenon as the increasing bifurcation between the growing complexity of governing in a world of interdependence and the need to respond to often polarizing electoral demands. The key question is whether and how in such contexts parties find the balance between their representative and governing duties. The papers included in this special issue deal with this question in the context of the Eurozone crisis and present evidence about parties' behavior, rhetoric, and policy outputs. In introducing the contributions here, we illustrate how this collective endeavor helps advance the debate on the major challenges to contemporary representative democracy. More specifically, we first discuss how the framework of the responsive–responsible dilemma helps understanding contemporary political developments. We then critically reflect on the distinction between responsiveness and responsibility. Finally, we present how each individual contribution approaches the question of how parties manage the tension between electoral incentives and governmental duties.

In this study we examine the representation of income groups in two EU-level institutions, the Council and the European Parliament. We find that the political positions of these institutions, and especially of the Council, are always on the right compared to European citizens, though closer to the wealthy among them. However, a more systematic analysis of congruence between different income groups and the Council reveals that while the poor are systematically underrepresented, the rich are not systematically over-represented. This holds both when we examine the poor and the rich across the EU as a whole and when we cluster them according to their respective member states.

In this study we examine the representation of income groups in two EU-level institutions, the Council and the European Parliament. We find that the political positions of these institutions, and especially of the Council, are always on the right compared to European citizens, though closer to the wealthy among them. However, a more systematic analysis of congruence between different income groups and the Council reveals that while the poor are systematically underrepresented, the rich are not systematically over-represented. This holds both when we examine the poor and the rich across the EU as a whole and when we cluster them according to their respective member states. ; (VLID)4800129

This essay introduces a collection of papers dealing with the responsiveresponsible dilemma of party government. The political developments surrounding the Eurozone crisis attest that the duties of government and the demands of political representation may at times be in sharp contrast with one another. In such contexts, it becomes hard for parties in government to combine responsiveness with responsible policy-making. Late Peter Mair theorized this phenomenon as the increasing bifurcation between the growing complexity of governing in a world of interdependence and the need to respond to often polarizing electoral demands. The key question is whether and how in such contexts parties find the balance between their representative and governing duties. The papers included in this special issue deal with this question in the context of the Eurozone crisis and present evidence about parties behavior, rhetoric, and policy outputs. In introducing the contributions here, we illustrate how this collective endeavor helps advance the debate on the major challenges to contemporary representative democracy. More specifically, we first discuss how the framework of the responsiveresponsible dilemma helps understanding contemporary political developments. We then critically reflect on the distinction between responsiveness and responsibility. Finally, we present how each individual contribution approaches the question of how parties manage the tension between electoral incentives and governmental duties. ; (VLID)5100630