Suchergebnisse

We investigate how the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule is modified when taxpayers can evade taxation by emigrating. We consider two symmetric countries with Maximin governments. Workers choose their labor supply along the intensive margin. The skill distribution is continuous, and, for each skill level, the distribution of migration cost is also continuous. We show that optimal marginal tax rates are nonnegative at the symmetric Nash equilibrium when the semi-elasticity of migration is decreasing in the skill level. When the semi-elasticity of migration is increasing in the skill level, either optimal marginal tax rates are positive everywhere or they are positive for the lower part of the skill distribution and then negative. Numerical simulations are calibrated using plausible values of the semi-elasticity of migration for top income earners. We show that the shape of optimal tax schedule varies significantly, depending on the profile of the semi-elasticity of migration over the entire skill distribution - a profile over which we lack empirical evidence.

We characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. Average tax rates are increasing at the optimum. This shifts wages below their laissez faire value and distorts labor demand upwards. The marginal tax rate is positive at the top of the skill distribution even when the latter is bounded. These results are analytically shown under a Maximin objective when the elasticity of participation is decreasing in the skill level and are numerically confirmed under a more general objective.

Cet article se propose de discuter l'opportunité de réformer l'architecture de notre système de prélèvements obligatoires et de politiques de soutien aux bas revenus d'activité. Il milite pour une convergence à terme des différents dispositifs actuellement en vigueur vers un barème unique sur les revenus d'activité. On pense ici à l'Impôt sur le Revenu (IR), y compris sa décote et la Prime Pour l'Emploi (PPE) qu'il comprend, au « volet activité » du Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA), à la Prime d'Activité (PA) qui se substituera à la PPE et au RSA-activité à partir du 1er janvier 2016, à la Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG), à la Contribution au Remboursement de la Dette Sociales (CRDS) et même certaines cotisations sociales.

Cet article se propose de discuter l'opportunité de réformer l'architecture de notre système de prélèvements obligatoires et de politiques de soutien aux bas revenus d'activité. Il milite pour une convergence à terme des différents dispositifs actuellement en vigueur vers un barème unique sur les revenus d'activité. On pense ici à l'Impôt sur le Revenu (IR), y compris sa décote et la Prime Pour l'Emploi (PPE) qu'il comprend, au « volet activité » du Revenu de Solidarité Active (RSA), à la Prime d'Activité (PA) qui se substituera à la PPE et au RSA-activité à partir du 1er janvier 2016, à la Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG), à la Contribution au Remboursement de la Dette Sociales (CRDS) et même certaines cotisations sociales.

Because of Time Inconsistency considerations, policymakers underestimate the drawbacks of wage rigidity as a redistributive tool. Consequently, they redistribute inefficiently income from high to low skilled workers. They typically implement too much wage rigidity whereas other means (in particular fiscal transfers) could achieve the same redistributive goal with less perverse effect on unemployment. Time inconsistency is more likely due to lack of credibility than to the short-term horizon of policymakers. Hence, policymaking processes should be reformed towards more transparent and binding agreements between government and social partners.

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. The government does not observe workers' productivity but only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power.