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Es geht um dreierlei: Einmal ist Stellung zu beziehen gegen die Freiheit, gegen diese über jedes Ende hinwegsetzende Lebenslüge der Moderne, die es egradezu herausfordert, als Schlagwort mißbruacht zu werden. Zum wzeiten ist Stellung zu beziehen für die Freiheit, für eine andere Freiheit, für die über jedes Ende hinwegsetzende Freiheit, die menschliches Leben die Vergwaltigungen durch Geschichte und Zeit unversehrt überstehen läßt. Schließlich geht es um den Anspruch, dem sich die Arbeit, der Text selbst stellen muß, nämlich um die Frage, ob sich überhaupt etwas sagen läßt, oder ob man nicht im Gegenteil von Geburt an mundtot ist, also die Sprache einem einen Tod aufnötigt, dem gegenüber auch die eigene Physis zu Gehorsam verpflichtet ist. Diese dreifache Problematik wird im Zuge einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem tschechichen Phänomenologen Jan Patocka entwickelt. Als Denker der ausgehenden Moderne wie der Freiheit ist Patocka für die Auseinandersetzung beides, Oppononent und Partner

Abstract
This article will take Jan Patočka's concepts of care for the soul and sacrifice for nothing as a starting point to discuss the ontological premises of a renewed epimeleia heautou, or care of the self. I will argue that Patočka understands the ancient Good in terms of Heidegger's ontological difference. Care for the soul thus ends up with an empty transcendence. In contrast, I will advocate a hyperbolic concept of Being. All that exists is characterized by being beyond beingness, an inner transcendence of itself. This provides new ontocosmological as well as political perspectives.

In focusing on Jacques Rancière and Walter Benjamin, the main concern of this essay is to outline an alternative concept of the historical sub­ject. As I assume, subjectivity primarily forms itself in being oriented to that which is incommensurable, namely, the radical positivity of being itself. First, I show that Rancière's concept of 'equality' can be read in terms of this basic formative movement. Equality enables political claims and, accordingly, poli­tical subjecti cation while, ultimately, remaining irredeemable. Yet, I do not agree with the aporetic character of equality in Rancière, which, in my view, creates a perpetuation of injustice. In order to overcome it, I draw on Benjamin and demonstrate that, in implicitly referring to redemption, the irredeemable has a positive content. In a relative way, it can be restored when­ ever the remembrance of past suffering is incorporated into new claims of justice. Historical subjects originate in this merging of present and past. ; In focusing on Jacques Rancière and Walter Benjamin, the main concern of this essay is to outline an alternative concept of the historical sub­ject. As I assume, subjectivity primarily forms itself in being oriented to that which is incommensurable, namely, the radical positivity of being itself. First, I show that Rancière's concept of 'equality' can be read in terms of this basic formative movement. Equality enables political claims and, accordingly, poli­tical subjecti cation while, ultimately, remaining irredeemable. Yet, I do not agree with the aporetic character of equality in Rancière, which, in my view, creates a perpetuation of injustice. In order to overcome it, I draw on Benjamin and demonstrate that, in implicitly referring to redemption, the irredeemable has a positive content. In a relative way, it can be restored when­ ever the remembrance of past suffering is incorporated into new claims of justice. Historical subjects originate in this merging of present and past.