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ABSTRACTFrom a traditional rationalist principal-agent framework, the development of the European Community's competition policy could appear as a straightforward story of agency loss. However, the recent overhaul of competition policy, which the Community presented in terms of decentralisation, appears to have changed the story. We are confronted with the uncommon event of an agent (the European Commission) returning some of its powers to the principals (the member states). This paper resolves the puzzle by highlighting the role of the Commission and of European courts. It has become part of the Commission's strategy to pursue its objectives through legally non-binding instruments such as notices or guidelines or co-operation in networks. These instruments do not need the approval of the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. With the Commission's promotion of new modes of governance, the link between sectoral governance (in terms of regulation specific to competition policy) and the governmental shadow of hierarchy shifted to an increasing extent to judicial review by European courts. Alongside this shift, the character of judicial review has changed in the direction of judicial control, as European courts no longer restrict themselves to review of the legality of Commission actions, but also engage in assessing the facts themselves.

The article starts with the observation that there are overlaps in, so far, largely unrelated research programs concerned with the legalization in international relations, on the one hand, and transnational regulation and governance, on the other. The analysis of the literature at the interface between the "fourth strata of the geology of international law" and the "governance in the age of regulation" literatures reveals a substantial common interest in structures of transnational regulatory governance. At the same time, the theoretical toolkit of both strands of literature does not match the task of coping analytically with structures and processes in the overlapping realm. To sharpen the analytical edge, the article elaborates hierarchy, market, community, and design as four ideal types of control modes in transnational regulatory spaces. The application of this model to the empirical analysis of a number of regimes underpins the observation that control frequently occurs in hybrid regulatory constellations involving public and private actors across national and international levels. A key example concerns the prominence of domestic regulatory regimes in underpinning transnational governance processes, where national rules achieve extraterritorial effect as much through competitive as through hierarchical mechanisms.

Die Verkehrspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist gekennzeichnet durch einen Rückgang der staatlichen Regulierung. An die Stelle einer aktiven staatlichen Bereitstellung von Infrastruktur- und Transportleistungen ist ein Ansatz getreten, bei dem die Mechanismen des Wettbewerbs das Angebot von Verkehrsdienstleistungen bestimmen. Die Veränderungen sind in erster Linie auf die Politik der EU zurückzuführen. Mit dem Beschluss der europäischen Verkehrsminister Ende der 1980er Jahre, Transportbeschränkungen für ausländische Straßengüterunternehmen in nationalen Märkten schrittweise aufzuheben, wurden die Grundlagen der deutschen Verkehrsmarktordnung weitgehend hinfällig. Im Zuge der Wiedervereinigung wurde die kontrollierte Verkehrsmarktordnung auf nationaler Ebene überwunden. Derzeit sind die Art der Internalisierung der externen Kosten des Verkehrs sowie die verkehrsträgergerechte Anrechnung der Infrastrukturkosten Hauptthemen der politischen Auseinandersetzung. (GB)

"Bis heute herrscht Uneinigkeit darüber, wie sich die europäische Integration auf nationale Interessenorganisationen und auf die Beziehungsmuster zwischen öffentlichen und privaten Akteuren auf der nationalen Ebene auswirkt. Während von manchen eine Auflösung nationaler korporatistischer Arrangements vorhergesagt wird, halten andere eine Stärkung korporatistischer Beziehungen auf der nationalen Ebene für wahrscheinlich. In dem Aufsatz kommt ein konzeptioneller Ansatz zur Anwendung, der institutionentheoretische Erklärungsansätze mit organisationstheoretischen Elementen anreichert. Dieses Vorgehen ermöglicht eine theoriegeleitete Darstellung der Wirkung der europäischen Integration auf sozio-politische Strukturen in den Mitgliedstaaten. Interessenverbände, in den vorliegenden Fällen die Verbände im Straßengüterverkehr in Deutschland und in den Niederlanden, können als intermediäre Organisationen konzeptionalisiert werden, die die Dynamiken ihrer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Umwelten in organisationsstruktureller und strategischer Hinsicht aufnehmen. Die durch die europäische Integration verursachten Veränderungen in der Konfiguration von Interessenverbänden innerhalb eines Sektors können dabei verstanden werden als Versuche dieser intermediären Organisationen, ihr Weiterbestehen zu sichern und ihre Autonomie von beiden Umwelten zu erhalten." (Autorenreferat)

AbstractThis article raises the question of the link between new modes of governance and democratic accountability. Our definition of new modes of governance as modes refers to public policy-making that includes private actors and/or public policy-making by public actors that takes place outside legislative arenas, and which focuses on delimited sectoral or functional areas. We identify three different ways in which new modes of governance can be subjected to democratic control: parliamentary control, multi-stakeholder involvement and control through the public sphere and civil society at large. Building on a number of the illustrative insights from various empirical projects, we find that, in our cases at least, new modes of governance did not have a negative effect on existing patterns of democratic accountability. At the same time, neither multi-stakeholder policies nor the participation of civil society guarantee democratic accountability in the strict sense. We provide some evidence to the effect that, if institutionally linked to democratically elected governmental bodies – meaning, in this context, the European Parliament – it is more likely that negative externalities deriving from public policy-making in functionally segmented arenas of the European Union's multilevel polity will be dealt with in a more systematic way.

This article raises the question of the link between new modes of governance and democratic accountability. Our definition of new modes of governance as modes refers to public policy-making that includes private actors and/or public policy-making by public actors that takes place outside legislative arenas, and which focuses on delimited sectoral or functional areas. We identify three different ways in which new modes of governance can be subjected to democratic control: parliamentary control, multi-stakeholder involvement and control through the public sphere and civil society at large. Building on a number of the illustrative insights from various empirical projects, we find that, in our cases at least, new modes of governance did not have a negative effect on existing patterns of democratic accountability. At the same time, neither multi-stakeholder policies nor the participation of civil society guarantee democratic accountability in the strict sense. We provide some evidence to the effect that, if institutionally linked to democratically elected governmental bodies - meaning, in this context, the European Parliament - it is more likely that negative externalities deriving from public policy-making in functionally segmented arenas of the European Union's multilevel polity will be dealt with in a more systematic way. Adapted from the source document.