Suchergebnisse

Since 2017, the United States has blocked all appointments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), thereby threatening to destroy the WTO's dispute settlement system, one of the most active dispute settlement systems in international law and a central pillar of the multilateral trading system. The United States justifies its blockage with allegations of judicial overreach, claiming that the Appellate Body in its jurisprudence has not complied with the WTO treaties.

One of the primary functions of constitutional law is to bind the state, to prevent the abuse of power by the state. However, why should state agents comply with constitutional constraints, particularly if such compliance runs contrary to their self-interests? Trusting that state agents will always be guided by a moral duty to observe the law seems too naive a position. On the other hand, the ultimate means of ensuring compliance by force - police and military - are in the hands of the state, i.e. the very institution that is supposed to be checked by constitutional law. How, then, is constitutional compliance possible? This question is answered within a game-theoretic framework. Throughout, the focus is placed less on the technical side of game theory, but more on its underlying social logic, its plausibility and its practical implications. Moreover, insights from legal theory, especially on constitutional interpretation, are integrated into the analysis.

Since 2017, the United States has blocked all appointments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), thereby threatening to destroy the WTO's dispute settlement system, one of the most active dispute settlement systems in international law and a central pillar of the multilateral trading system. The United States justifies its blockage with allegations of judicial overreach, claiming that the Appellate Body in its jurisprudence has not complied with the WTO treaties