Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article argues that there is a need to modernise the law governing accountability of the UK security and intelligence agencies following changes in their work in the last decade. Since 9/11 the agencies have come increasingly into the spotlight, especially because of the adoption of controversial counter-terrorism policies by the government (in particular forms of executive detention) and by its international partners, notably the US. The article discusses the options for reform in three specific areas: the use in legal proceedings of evidence obtained by interception of communications; with regard to the increased importance and scle of collaboration with overseas agencies; and to safeguard the political independence of the agencies in the light of their substantially higher public profile. In each it is argued that protection of human rights and the need for public accountability requires a new balance to be struck with the imperatives of national security.

Protection of privacy is one of the areas most often claimed as having the potential for significant development as a result of incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"). As is well known, English law lacks a general remedy for infringement of privacyper se: although the courts have lamented the lack of protection for private individuals (notably from the press), they have hitherto left it to Parliament to intervene. After flirtation with introducing either a specific statutory code applicable to intrusive journalistic activities or a general statutory tort of infringement of privacy, the Conservative government abandoned the idea altogether.1Perhaps because of the lack of legislative concern (politicians, after all, have reasons of strong self-interest not to provoke the press), the judiciary has expressed renewed interest, at least through extra-judicial pronouncements2and broad hints in one recent House of Lords decision that the time for reconsideration may be fast approaching.3

National security and constitutionalism are often thought to be fundamentally incompatible. Recent reforms in Canada involve creative attempts to recognize constitutional rights to fair procedure within processes in which individuals' rights are in conflict with state security interests, such as security clearance, deportation, or access to information. The procedures examined in this article include in camera and ex parte review by Federal Court judges and the use of the Security Intelligence Review Committee. The analysis draws on interviews with participants and compares these procedures with other situations in which restrictions upon open justice have faced Charter challenge, especially under sections 2(b) and 11(d). It is concluded that the courts have had comparatively little direct influence but, nevertheless, there is respect for constitutional values in some surprising places.