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AbstractThis article explores how national judges' reasoning in the preliminary ruling procedure varies depending on the prescriptive clarity of European Union (EU) legal frameworks. Drawing on the logic of appropriateness and the logic of expected consequences, this article formulates hypotheses regarding judges' motivational patterns. Interviews with Swedish judges generate findings that partly corroborate these hypotheses. The findings show that when EU legal frameworks are clear, judges express a mix of considerations, including references to EU rules, expected politico‐strategic outcomes and professional norms. When the clarity of the frameworks is low, judges mainly motivate their decisions by invoking professional norms. In light of these findings, the article proposes a revision of the compliance pull explanation that takes into account how not only formal EU rules but also informal norms of appropriate professional conduct may influence the actions of national judges.

This article sheds new light on the role of national courts in the preliminary ruling procedure and European integration by examining: (1) whether national courts allow the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to decide politically sensitive cases and (2) whether national courts frame the cases by expressing support for an integration-friendly interpretation of EU law or by voicing an opinion in defence of the challenged national law. This study shows that the single most common court behaviour is to support legal integration by referring politically sensitive cases and expressing support for EU law. However, by examining the two choices together, this article also uncovers previously untheorised patterns of behaviour. These findings show that the national courts' behaviour is not limited to either supporting or resisting integration. Instead, it is suggested that national courts may regularly contribute to striking a balance between EU integration and member state autonomy.

What motivates national judges to be either active in the preliminary reference procedure by expressing opinions in the requests they send to the Court of Justice or passive by not voicing their views? This Article sheds light on how national judges perceive the possibility of framing the cases they refer to the Court, for instance, by expressing an opinion in defence of the challenged national law. Based on interviews with Swedish judges, this Article shows that the respondents express opinions to provide the Court with information and to influence the development of EU law. The Article also uncovers what motivates national judges not to express opinions. These three previously untheorised motivations are: 1) protecting one's reputation, 2) respecting the division of competences between the Court and national courts and 3) upholding the impartiality of the courts. Furthermore, the findings indicate that high court judges in particular are opposed to the inclusion of opinions in a request. In contrast, most of the interviewed lower court judges view the inclusion of opinions in the requests as practically mandatory. This Article proposes that this difference in attitudes towards opinions between high and low court judges originate from variations in professional norms regarding what constitutes appropriate behaviour.

This article explores why national judges remain passive on EU legal integration by examining judges' reasons for not requesting preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The article combines insights from social psychology and literature on the role of national courts in European integration to formulate expectations regarding what type of motives guide national judges' behaviours. Drawing on interviews held with Croatian, Slovenian and Swedish judges, our results reveal three shared reasons judges remain passive: referrals are not required by the formal rules (procedural normative motivation), referrals are not made to protect the parties to the case (substantive normative motivation) and referrals are not made to protect judges' reputations (instrumental motivation). In addition, we unveil motives that are shared by only judges from one or two Member States, such as not referring cases to uphold the capacity of the preliminary ruling procedure (Swedish judges) and not referring cases due to a fear of sanctions and a lack of knowledge and resources (Croatian and Slovenian judges). We discuss these similarities and divergences in light of the theoretical discussion on the role of courts as active or passive actors in EU legal integration.

AbstractThis article analyzes whether, and if so, why, national inspectorates adopt different enforcement strategies when controlling the provision of welfare services, such as health care, eldercare, and the compulsory school. The findings show that the Swedish Schools Inspectorate uses a predominantly strict strategy, while the Health and Social Care Inspectorate relies on a more situational strategy. To explain this variation in enforcement strategy, the article tests four hypotheses derived from the literature on regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that the variation between the agencies is not primarily the result of differences in resources or the authority to issue punitive decisions, as suggested by previous research. Instead, we find support for the hypothesis that the definition of quality can explain variation in adopted strategies, and partial support for the hypothesis that differences in regulatory mission can account for a variation in the agencies' formal enforcement strategies.

Intro -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1: What Does the Technological Shift Have in Store for the EU? Opportunities and Pitfalls for European Societies -- Introduction -- Technological Development in Historical Perspective -- The EU and the Technological Shift During the 2010s -- What Resources Does the EU Possess for Handling the Technological Shift? -- Dimensions of the Technological Challenge Facing the EU -- Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 2: Technological Megashift and the EU: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Fragmented Responsibilities -- Megashift -- Technology Is Neither Good, Bad or Neutral -- Antagonism in the Fully Wired Digital Society -- Surveillance Society -- Vulnerabilities, Crashes and System Collapse -- Public-Private Technology and Accountability -- Holistic, Responsible and Non-deterministic Care in Outsourcing -- References -- Chapter 3: Technological Discontinuities and the Climate Transition in Europe: The Role of Policy in Two Traditions of Economic Thinking -- Introduction -- The Development of Wind and Solar Power in Denmark and Germany -- Technological Discontinuities and Industrial Transformation: Weaknesses in the EU Commission's Analytical Perspective -- Technological Innovation Systems: An Alternative Analytical Perspective -- Lessons from the Two Partly Contradictory Ways of Economic Thinking -- A Demand for Carefully Designed, Directed, Coordinated and Adaptable Policies -- References -- Chapter 4: AI in the EU: Ethical Guidelines as a Governance Tool -- Introduction: Why Ethics Guidelines? -- From Area of Research to Regulatory Concept -- What Is It That Needs to Be Governed? -- What Does AI Governance Entail? Keeping Society-in-the-Loop -- Ethics Guidelines -- The EU and Trustworthy AI -- An Ecosystem of Trust? Risk and Transparency -- Levelled or Binary Risk-Approach?.

1. What Does the Technological Shift Have in Store for the EU? Opportunities and Pitfalls for European Societies, Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Karin Leijon, Anna Michalski, and Lars Oxelheim -- 2. Technological Megashift and the EU: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Fragmented Responsibilities, Lindy M. Newlove-Eriksson and Johan Eriksson -- 3. Technological Discontinuities and the Climate Transition in Europe: The Role of Policy in Two Traditions of Economic Thinking, Staffan Jacobsson and Björn Sandén -- 4. AI in the EU: Ethical Guidelines as a Governance Tool, Stefan Larsson -- 5. How Does the EU Protect Competition in the Digital Platform Economy?, Björn Lundqvist -- 6. Digitalisation, Productivity and Jobs: A European Perspective, Fredrik Heyman, Pehr-Johan Norbäck, and Lars Persson -- 7. Technological Shifts and the Social Partners: Is the European Semester Heading Towards a Social Europe?, Jenny Jansson, Olle Jansson, and Jan Ottosson -- 8.Money for Nothin': Digitalization and Fluid Tax Bases, Mårten Blix and Emil Bustos -- 9. New Tax on Digital Services: A Step Towards Fairer Taxation in the EU's Single Market?, Pernilla Rendahl -- 10. Digital Democracy and the European Union, Martin Karlsson.

1. The EU, the nation state and the perennial challenge to European integration (Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Karin Leijon, Anna Michalski and Lars Oxelheim) -- 2. The EU Hybrid – Incrementalism with democracy? (Torbjörn Bergman and Magnus Blomgren) -- 3. When the return of the nation-state undermines the rule of law: Poland, the EU, and Article 7 TEU (Andreas Moberg) -- 4. The refugee crisis and the reinvigoration of the nation-state: Does the European Union have a common asylum policy? (Magnus Henrekson, Tino Sanandaji and Özge Öner) -- 5. Brexit and the survival of the Union (Rikard Forslid and Sten Nyberg) -- 6. EU tax law and the return of the Nation State (Cécile Brokelind) -- 7. The euro and the nation state that never disappeared: Would Europe benefit from the return of national currencies? (Fredrik NG Andersson) -- 8. Sanctions against individuals and the rule of law: Can the member states let the EU decide? (Jane Reichel) -- 9. Europeanisation and the longevity of the nation-state: Survival by transformation? (Malin Stegemann McCallion) -- 10. The dream of the nation state: is regional secessionism a threat to European integration? (Niklas Bremberg).