Brian Leiter draws on empirical psychology to defend a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts play almost no significant role in our actions. Nietzsche emerges as not just a great philosopher but a prescient psychologist.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Brian Leiter draws on empirical psychology to defend a set of radical ideas from Nietzsche: there is no objectively true morality, there is no free will, no one is ever morally responsible, and our conscious thoughts play almost no significant role in our actions. Nietzsche emerges as not just a great philosopher but a prescient psychologist.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
1. Introduction : Nietzsche, naturalist or postmodernist? -- 2. Intellectual history and background -- 3. Nietzsche's critique of morality I : the scope of the critique and the critique of moral agency -- 4. Nietzsche's critique of morality II : the critique of moral norms -- 5. What is "genealogy" and what is the Genealogy? -- 6. A commentary on the first essay -- 7. A commentary on the second essay -- 8. A commentary on the third essay -- 9. Nietzsche since 1900 : critical questions -- Postscript : Nietzsche's naturalism revisited.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
This provocative book addresses one of the most enduring puzzles in political philosophy and constitutional theory-why is religion singled out for preferential treatment in both law and public discourse? Why are religious obligations that conflict with the law accorded special toleration while other obligations of conscience are not? In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter shows why our reasons for tolerating religion are not specific to religion but apply to all claims of conscience, and why a government committed to liberty of conscience is not required by the principle of toleration to gra
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Introduction: From legal realism to naturalized jurisprudence -- A note on legal indeterminacy -- Part I. American legal realism and its critics -- Rethinking legal realism: toward a naturalized jurisprudence (1997) -- Legal realism and legal positivism reconsidered (2001) -- Is there an "American" jurisprudence? (1997) -- Postscript to Part I: Interpreting legal realism -- Part II. Ways of naturalizing jurisprudence -- Legal realism, hard positivism, and the limits of conceptual analysis (1998, 2001) -- Why Quine is not a postmodernist (1997) -- Beyond the Hart/Dworkin debate: the methodology problem in jurisprudence (2003) -- Part III. Naturalism, morality, and objectivity -- Moral facts and best explanations (2001) -- Objectivity, morality, and adjudication (2001) -- Law and objectivity (2002)
Gathering together Brian Leiter's most influential essays on the subject of American legal realism, this book provides an overview of his redefinition of legal realism and its relationship with other models of legal and philosophical thought, from naturalism in philosophy to critical legal studies.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
The seven original essays included in this volume from 2000, written by some of the world's most distinguished moral and legal philosophers, offer a sophisticated perspective on issues about the objectivity of legal interpretation and judicial decision-making. They examine objectivity from both metaphysical and epistemological perspectives and develop a variety of approaches, constructive and critical, to the fundamental problems of objectivity in morality. One of the key issues explored is that of the alleged 'domain-specificity' of conceptions of objectivity, i.e. whether there is a conception of objectivity appropriate for ethics that is different in kind from the conception of objectivity appropriate for other areas of study. This volume considers the intersection between objectivity in ethics and objectivity in law. It presents a survey of live issues in metaethics, and examines their relevance to theorizing about law and adjudication
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Una "teoría jurídica realista" tiene dos elementos: "realismo" y "naturalismo". El realismo, en la tradición asociada a Tucídides, Maquiavelo y Nietzsche, pretende describir cómo son realmente las cosas sin ilusiones románticas o moralizantes; en el caso jurídico, queremos saber cómo son el derecho y las instituciones jurídicas en la realidad, no cómo desearíamos que fueran. Los realistas no suponen que el modo en que las cosas son tenga un "sentido moral" o resulte moralmente defendible. Los naturalistas ofrecen explicaciones de los fenómenos jurídicos que solo invocan entidades o mecanismos que figuran en las ciencias empíricas exitosas; y, sobre todo, los naturalistas no son fisicalistas. El realismo y el naturalismo sobre el derecho, en el sentido anteriormente descrito, nos llevan al positivismo jurídico de Hart sobre la validez jurídica; a la tesis de que el razonamiento jurídico infradetermina la decisión judicial en una serie de casos; el reconocimiento de que el derecho opera principalmente fuera de los tribunales; y al escepticismo sobre las teorías del derecho natural como quimeras ideológicas.