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AbstractThis paper examines the methods which international courts and tribunals (ICTs) employ when using ILC outputs for the purpose of determining rules of international law and their content. Specifically, it identifies common patterns in the ways in which ICTs, first, justify their reliance on ILC outputs and, second, deal with their ambiguities. The paper argues in favour of a consistent methodology for the treatment of ILC outputs in international adjudication. Such a framework is based on the distinction between the identification of the status of a normative proposition contained in these texts and the determination of its content or its interpretation. The identification of the status of a normative proposition requires a critical assessment and reconstruction of the evidence leading up to its development taking also into account that these instruments are not a monolith from the perspective of sources. However, the interpretation of a proposition whose status is uncontested follows a line of inquiry akin to treaty interpretation. This observation has broader implications for the process of interpretation in international law. Specifically, apart from the context of treaty interpretation, international courts or tribunals interpret the normative propositions contained in ILC outputs as a methodological shortcut for the interpretation of rules of customary international law or general principles of law. Conversely, the employment of methods akin to treaty interpretation in this context can constitute evidence of the emergence of common rules, principles, or good practices of interpretation that are also applicable to unwritten international law.

On February 9, 2022, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its judgment on the reparations phase of the Armed Activities (DRC v. Uganda) case which related to the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) claims against Uganda arising from the Second Congo War.1 The judgment concluded a case which had all the hallmarks of a landmark: an exceptionally large-scale, protracted, and complex armed conflict, a key actor as the respondent, and virtually unfettered material jurisdiction of the Court. As a reminder, in 1999, the Court was seised with DRC's claims against Uganda arising from the (then ongoing) Second Congo War. Similar claims against Rwanda and Burundi failed before reaching the merits stage. In 2005, the Court rendered its judgment on the merits declaring Uganda responsible for violating the principle of non-use of force and non-intervention by the acts of its own forces and by supporting armed groups in the DRC.2 The Court also found Uganda responsible for breaches of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and for plundering DRC's natural resources.3 The Court concluded that Uganda had to make reparation to the DRC for the injury caused by its internationally wrongful acts and enjoined the parties to enter into negotiations for that purpose.4 After almost ten years of sporadic and fruitless discussions, in 2015, the DRC brought the case back to the Court for conclusive resolution.