Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the effects of U.S. economic sanctions on UN General Assembly voting patterns. Using panel data for 123 developing countries from 1990 to 2014, and employing an instrumental variables approach to account for potential endogeneity, we find that U.S.-imposed sanctions generally lead to a decline in voting coincidence between the U.S. and target countries when the sanctioned country receives low U.S. aid. However, in instances where the U.S. sanctions countries dependent on U.S. foreign aid, we find targets are increasingly more likely to vote with the U.S. This is because sanctions send a credible signal of the U.S.'s willingness to carry out punishment and cancel future aid to countries that publicly oppose it. Our research shows how sanctions alone tend to pull countries apart while, together with aid dependence, have the potential to bring countries in line with the U.S.'s position on issues, adding nuance to the sanctions literature.

AbstractWhen states are targeted with sanctions, they may respond with alterations of their domestic economies meant to counter any negative effects of sanctions. In this article, we argue that these alterations tend to lead to increased state command of the economy and reduced economic freedom, as sanctions create opportunities and incentives that encourage target states and firms within them to pursue increased state control of the economy. These declines in economic freedom may come about through a number of causal mechanisms, several of which will be elaborated upon in this article. We use large‐N empirical analysis of all aspects of the Fraser Institute's Index of Economic Freedom and find that sanctions associate with reductions in most components of economic freedom.

Previous work in political science has looked to dyadic, international, and domestic factors in senders and targets of sanctions for explanations of why they sometimes succeed and frequently fail. In this paper, we present a case study of the sanctions imposed by the Soviet Union over Lithuania's declaration of independence in 1990. We examine the dyadic, international, and domestic factors that influenced the outcome of the sanctions and connect them to existing theoretical and empirical work in the literature. While dyadic and international factors played important roles, we find the strongest evidence for the role of domestic political factors in the Soviet Union and Lithuania in determining the outcome of the dispute.

We develop and test a theory, based on the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, of the effectiveness of sanctions. We treat sanctions as exogenously imposed changes in a country's exposure to international markets. In a country with an open-trade regime, owners and intensive users of the abundant factor of production hold economic and political power. In a country closed to trade, however, economic and political power rests with owners and intensive users of scarce factors. Thus, if real rates of return to the abundant factor decline during sanctions against a trade-open country, or real rates of return to the scarce factor decline during sanctions against a trade-closed country, we expect these economically and politically powerful segments of the targeted country to push hard for policy changes that would bring about an end to sanctions. Statistical analysis of sanctions episodes initiated between 1971 and 2000 provides support for the paper's expectations. Adapted from the source document.

Although the relationship between trade and the use and success of sanctions is frequently studied in international relations, researchers have generally failed to address the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) on sanctions despite global capital markets dwarfing the exchange of goods and services. Using panel data for 171 countries from 1971 to 2000, we test the effect of FDI on the use and success of sanctions imposed by the USA. We find evidence that a high level of economic engagement in the form of US FDI as a percentage of the recipient county's gross domestic product reduces the likelihood of the use of US sanctions. We also find that, when sanctions are imposed, declining US FDI generally has a positive and significant effect on sanctions success. However, if non-US firms offset lost US FDI, the probability of sanctions success decreases. The results show that investors may have an important influence on foreign policy outcomes. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

Although the relationship between trade and the use and success of sanctions is frequently studied in international relations, researchers have generally failed to address the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) on sanctions despite global capital markets dwarfing the exchange of goods and services. Using panel data for 171 countries from 1971 to 2000, we test the effect of FDI on the use and success of sanctions imposed by the USA. We find evidence that a high level of economic engagement in the form of US FDI as a percentage of the recipient county's gross domestic product reduces the likelihood of the use of US sanctions. We also find that, when sanctions are imposed, declining US FDI generally has a positive and significant effect on sanctions success. However, if non-US firms offset lost US FDI, the probability of sanctions success decreases. The results show that investors may have an important influence on foreign policy outcomes.

Complementing the effectiveness of US sanctions debate, the US government often prods US investors to disinvest from targeted countries, hoping to pressure sanctioned countries to back US foreign policy goals or face economic costs for their actions. Missing from the effectiveness of sanctions debate is the impact US sanctions have on third-party foreign direct investment (FDI). Using panel data for 171 countries from 1969 to 2000, we present the first empirical study on the effect of sanctions on global FDI. We find strong evidence that when US firms disinvest during US sanctions, global FDI significantly increases, providing the target country with a reliable source of capital replacement. The results suggest the limited effectiveness of sanctions for restricting capital flows to targeted countries and that US firms may ultimately bear the highest costs from US-imposed sanctions. Adapted from the source document.