Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy
In: Journal of peace research, Band 42, Heft 6, S. 761-762
ISSN: 0022-3433
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In: Journal of peace research, Band 42, Heft 6, S. 761-762
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: Journal of peace research, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 121-135
ISSN: 1460-3578
Economic sanctions have been referred to as a blunt instrument that the international community has often wielded without full consideration of the impact that these measures will have on the population of the targeted countries, particularly the weakest elements of society. Case studies of sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, and Yugoslavia have demonstrated the impact that sanctions can have on the availability of food, clean water, and medicine, causing many to conclude that all sanctions have extensive public health consequences. In this article, we examine the generalizability of these conclusions in a quantitative cross-national study of sanctions and their public health effects. Additionally, we compare these effects to those associated with both civil and interstate conflicts as critics have recently suggested that sanctions are not a humane alternative to armed warfare. We find that when sanctions have a large economic effect on the target they can have severe public health consequences. These consequences are substantively similar to those associated with major military conflicts. However, when sanctions have little or no economic effect on the target, they also have no substantive effect on public health. Building on recent work to explore the human consequences of war, this work also helps to demonstrate the importance of smart sanctions and humanitarian exemptions in sanctions policy.
In: Journal of peace research, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 121-135
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of political science, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 415-431
ISSN: 1540-5907
Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy, described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 415
ISSN: 0092-5853