Prosocial Compensation Following a Service Failure: Fulfilling an Organization's Ethical and Philanthropic Responsibilities
In: Journal of business ethics: JBE, Band 162, Heft 1, S. 123-147
ISSN: 1573-0697
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In: Journal of business ethics: JBE, Band 162, Heft 1, S. 123-147
ISSN: 1573-0697
In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 95, Heft 4, S. 895-911
ISSN: 1467-9299
After a service failure, citizens expect a recovery strategy that restores perceived justice and places a reasonable value on their loss. Offering monetary compensation is a strategy commonly used in private settings, but less so in public settings. To date, compensation effects have not been researched in public settings. To investigate citizens' evaluations of perceived justice, negative emotions and post‐recovery satisfaction we used a 2 (sector: public, private) by 2 (compensation promised: yes, no) by 2 (compensation offered: yes, no) factorial between‐subjects experimental design (student sample), and replicated this in a second study (US citizens sample). Results showed that compensation leads to similar positive effects in public and private settings, confirming earlier private setting research that applied justice theory. Explicitly promising compensation prior to a service encounter had no effect. However, promising compensation and not offering it led to decreased citizens' evaluations, which confirms expectancy disconfirmation theory.
In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 505-514
"In this study we investigate how outcome valence affects the importance of self-interest and fairness in ultimatum bargaining. In three experiments we systematically study the effect of outcome valence on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Results on all three aspects show strong evidence for the hypothesis that fairness becomes more important and self-interest becomes less important in negative valence bargaining. Fairness accessibility was higher when bargaining involved negative payoffs than when it involved positive payoffs (Experiment 1), the fairness norm was stronger in negatively versus positively valenced bargaining when an identical unequal offer benefiting the allocators was evaluated (Experiment 2), and allocators allocated more to recipients in negative valence bargaining than in positive valence bargaining (Experiment 3). We relate our findings to insights derived from the do-no-harm principle." [author's abstract]