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This book offers an exciting new take on the relationship between law and power. The 1856 Declaration of Paris marks the precise moment when international law became universal, and was an aggressive and successful British move to end privateering forever - then the United States'' main weapon in case of war with Britain

This book offers an exciting new take on the relationship between law and power, exposing the delicate balance between great powers and small states that is necessary to create and enforce norms across the globe. The 1856 Declaration of Paris marks the precise moment when international law became universal, and is the template for creating new norms until today. Moreover, the treaty was an aggressive and successful British move to end privateering forever -- then the United States' main weapon in case of war with Britain. Based on previously untapped archival sources, Jan Lemnitzer shows why Britain granted generous neutral rights in the Crimean War, how the Europeans forced the United States to respect international law during the American Civil War, and why Bismarck threatened violent redemption during the Franco-German War of 1870/71. The powerful conclusion exposes the 19th century roots of our present international system, and why it is as fragile as before the First World War.

Abstract
The question of whether the due diligence rule applies in cyberspace has become a key issue in the cyber norms debate. Yet there is no consensus whether the rule is binding, and states lack clear guidance on what the norm requires them to do. This is not just unfortunate but also dangerous since a crisis caused by a cyber attack routed through a third state where the victim state and the third state have fundamentally different views as to which duties apply carries a serious escalation risk. While scholars have suggested adapting legal approaches from other successful due diligence regimes, these rules are not a good match for the crucial issue in cyber due diligence: what do states need to do to ensure that no state is attacked using their networks? This article suggests going back to the roots and implementing principles derived from the laws of neutrality, the field that originally brought the due diligence principle into international law. Designed to manage escalation risk at the fringes of international conflict, it is our best guide through the grey zone of due diligence in cyberspace. The classic cases such as Alabama and Corfu Channel were disputes related to armed conflicts but between states that were at peace with each other. Read closely, they offer clear guidance on how to develop a flexible, but reliable, due diligence standard for cyberspace that will help states manage expectations of responsible behaviour and thereby defuse future potential conflicts before they arise, while avoiding the need to formally attribute the original attack. The final section will seek to consolidate the historical, legal as well as technological developments discussed here to lay out what the due diligence rule in cyberspace is likely to look like soon.

Thus far, political science has failed to answer a rather simple question: Why do some states provide high levels of airport security, while others fail to do so? Drawing on a rational choice institutionalist framework, we compare airport security regimes in the US & Europe (in particular Germany) & show that the performance gap before September 11 (2001) can be largely attributed to institutional factors. In the US, responsibility was assigned to airlines, whose cost-cutting efforts resulted in lax controls. In Germany, the government shielded the provision of airport security from market pressures. We claim that delegation of responsibility for airport security to the government is a necessary, yet not a sufficient condition for a high security performance. Systems in which responsibility lies with private airlines are doomed to fail, since private markets are ill-equipped to provide a high security performance. While airlines have a long-term interest in safeguarding civil aviation, there exists both a time inconsistency & a collective cost problem that prevents sufficient investment in security in the short run. Thus, US policymakers are well advised to resist the growing pressures for re-privatization & cost-cutting as well as to eliminate remaining flaws in the current federalized system. 4 Tables. Adapted from the source document.