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This article continues the elaboration of a multiple factor model for predicting the political systems that emerge in specific economic, environmental and relational contexts. While anthropologists have long sought to describe the emergence of 'the state' or of modern bureaucracies, only recently have predictive models of political systems begun to emerge. Political scientists have long upheld the ideology that 'democratic' political systems can simply be exported or created, independent of the economic and environmental context as well as the realities of military power of one's neighbors, or that systems where the contexts have changed can still be called 'democratic' even though none of the conditions or attributes of such systems continue to exist. The causal arrow for predicting political systems appears to be in reverse of the ideological dogma of contemporary social sciences that generally seeks to deny the principles of evolutionary adaptation. Political systems appear to arise historically as a function of contextual variables and not independent of them, though technologies that today can refashion eco-systems and economies can also establish some types of (mostly authoritarian) political systems. The science of politics in this piece presents an alternative to the ideological (and theological, anti-evolutionary) approaches of contemporary 'political science'.

Language, itself, as a source of communication, can also be a form of establishing an identity and setting barriers to communication. This article presents one example of such barriers in a major national language; that of the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese language is one of the markers of identity that Vietnamese often claim as the distinguishing feature of their culture, particularly its use of tone. As an assimilative culture changing rapidly with absorption into the global, urban economy, the Vietnamese language is now one of the only fixed identity markers of the Vietnamese. This may be why the Vietnamese now seek to establish it as a symbol and a barrier. This piece, by an American anthropologist, critically examines the Vietnamese perception of their language and its role among other identity markers in creating boundaries between Vietnamese and outsiders.

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The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure whether NGOs, international organizations, and government policies and projects meet the criteria for design and implementation of "capacity building" projects that have been established by various international organizations and that are recognized by experts in the field. The indicator can be used directly to address failures that are routinely reported in this key and growing development intervention. Use of this indicator on more than a dozen standard interventions funded today by international development banks, UN organizations, country donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reveals that while many smaller organizations are working to change institutions and society in ways that effectively build long-term capacity, most of the major actors in the field of development have failed to follow their own guidelines. Many appear to be using "capacity building" as a cover for lobbying foreign governments to promote international agendas ("purchasing foreign officials") and/or to increase the power of particular officials at the expense of democracy, with the public lacking simple accountability tools. The indicator points to specific areas for holding development actors accountable in order to promote development goals of sustainability and good governance. The breadth of the field of "capacity building" also allows this indicator to be used, with some modifications, for a large variety of development interventions. This article also offers several examples of where current capacity building projects fail, along with a sample test of the indicator using UNCDF as a case study.

[Abstract] The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure whether NGOs, international organizations, and government policies and projects meet the criteria for design and implementation of "capacity building" projects that have been established by various international organizations and that are recognized by experts in the field. The indicator can be used directly to address failures that are routinely reported in this key and growing development intervention. Use of this indicator on more than a dozen standard interventions funded today by international development banks, UN organizations, country donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reveals that while many smaller organizations are working to change institutions and society in ways that effectively build long-term capacity, most of the major actors in the field of development have failed to follow their own guidelines. Many appear to be using "capacity building" as a cover for lobbying foreign governments to promote international agendas ("purchasing foreign officials") and/or to increase the power of particular officials at the expense of democracy, with the public lacking simple accountability tools. The indicator points to specific areas for holding development actors accountable in order to promote development goals of sustainability and good governance. The breadth of the field of "capacity building" also allows this indicator to be used, with some modifications, for a large variety of development interventions. This article also offers several examples of where current capacity building projects fail, along with a sample test of the indicator using UNCDF as a case study.

This is an article in two parts. Part i offers a new way of looking at progressivism and progressive politics by defining different typologies of progressivism and by looking for these approaches in the cultural strategies of specific ethnic groups. The study offers a theory of how these progressive cultural strategies are maintained and distinguishes these strategies from apparent "progress" that may simply be a phenomenon of temporary accommodation of different ethnic groups in more complex systems. Part ii examines the ideology of "progress" as part of the cultural strategy of Jews and whether this strategy, which appears stronger when Jews are minorities in the Diaspora, is consistent with Jewish culture once Jews have a territorial boundary where they are a "majority." This article touches upon the political choices that Jewish "political progressives" and Jews, overall, have made recently in the U.S.; modifying their support for "progress" in return for political representation, with parallels to the historical situations of other minorities. While "identity based" political choice that slows the overall "progress" of civilization appears to have protected Jewish interests in the short term, historical comparisons suggest that this choice will endanger Jews if the U.S. economy and U.S. global influence collapse, in a direct historical parallel to the European Holocaust; offering an opportunity to test theories on how (and whether) "progress" occurs. In short, this study examines the choice that Jews made in the 20th century to define themselves as "European" rather than "Middle Eastern" (or "Eastern") and how a rethinking of this choice could be fundamental to protecting Jews in Israel and to restarting a global impetus for both social and political "progress." ; Este artículo consta de dos partes. En la primera parte se ofrece un nuevo enfoque sobre el progresismo y las políticas progresistas mediante la definición de diversas tipologías de progresismo y buscando estas aproximaciones en las estrategias culturales de grupos étnicos específicos. Este trabajo teoriza sobre la forma en que estas estrategias se mantienen y las distingue del «progreso» aparente que puede ser simplemente un fenómeno efímero de adaptación de dichos grupos étnicos en sistemas más complejos. En la segunda parte se examina la ideología del «progreso» como componente en la estrategia cultural de los judíos y si esta estrategia, que se muestra más fuerte cuando los judíos son minorías en diáspora, es coherente con la cultura judía una vez los judíos han conseguido un límite territorial en el que son ya «mayoría». Este artículo alude a las opciones políticas que los judíos «políticamente progresistas» y los judíos, en general, han tomado recientemente en los Estados Unidos de América; modificando su apoyo al «progreso» a cambio de más representación política de forma paralela a las situaciones históricas de otras minorías. Aunque la opción política «basada en la identidad» que ha ralentizado el «progreso» general de la civilización parece haber protegido los intereses judíos a corto plazo, las comparaciones históricas sugieren que esta elección puede poner en peligro a los judíos si la economía estadounidense y su influencia mundial se colapsan, de manera paralela a lo que ocurrió durante el Holocausto europeo; ofreciendo una oportunidad para poner a prueba las teorías sobre cómo (y si) se produce un «progreso». En resumen, este estudio examina las elecciones tomadas por los judíos durante el siglo xx para definirse a sí mismos como «europeos» en vez de «orientales de Levante» (o «del Este») y como un replanteamiento de esta elección podría ser fundamental para la protección de los judíos en Israel reiniciando de manera global el «progreso» tanto a nivel social como político.

The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure whether NGOs, international organizations, and government policies and projects meet the criteria for design and implementation of "capacity building" projects that have been established by various international organizations and that are recognized by experts in the field. The indicator can be used directly to address failures that are routinely reported in this key and growing development intervention. Use of this indicator on more than a dozen standard interventions funded today by international development banks, UN organizations, country donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reveals that while many smaller organizations are working to change institutions and society in ways that effectively build long-term capacity, most of the major actors in the field of development have failed to follow their own guidelines. Many appear to be using "capacity building" as a cover for lobbying foreign governments to promote international agendas ("purchasing foreign officials") and/or to increase the power of particular officials at the expense of democracy, with the public lacking simple accountability tools. The indicator points to specific areas for holding development actors accountable in order to promote development goals of sustainability and good governance. The breadth of the field of "capacity building" also allows this indicator to be used, with some modifications, for a large variety of development interventions. This article also offers several examples of where current capacity building projects fail, along with a sample test of the indicator using UNCDF as a case study.

The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure whether NGOs, international organizations, and government policies and projects meet the criteria for design and implementation of "capacity building" projects that have been established by various international organizations and that are recognized by experts in the field. The indicator can be used directly to address failures that are routinely reported in this key and growing development intervention. Use of this indicator on more than a dozen standard interventions funded today by international development banks, UN organizations, country donors, and (Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reveals that while many smaller organizations are working to change institutions and society in ways that effectively build long-term capacity, most of the major actors in the field of development have failed to follow their own guidelines. Many appear to be using "capacity building" as a cover for lobbying foreign governments to promote international agendas ("purchasing foreign officials") and/or to increase the power of particular officials at the expense of democracy, with the public lacking simple accountability tools. The indicator points to specific areas for holding development actors accountable in order to promote development goals of sustainability and good governance. The breadth of the field of "capacity building" also allows this indicator to be used, with some modifications, for a large variety of development interventions. This article also offers several examples of where current capacity building projects fail, along with a sample test of the indicator using UNCDF as a case study.

The process of "modernization" or "development" in contemporary globalization has included an assault on imagination, such that the very idea of offering alternative visions seems to be taboo. This article advocates for a constructive return to alternative models of human and social development based on realistic assumptions, human hopes, and measures of progress in both social sciences and humanities, to rejuvenate what has become a dying, impoverished, and stultifying, if not useless area of study. The article uses two relatively recent books with alternative examinations of utopia – one on early Russian science fiction and one from the literature of architecture and gender – as springboards for a discussion of what is wrong and what can be changed in the field of development studies.

This essay uses established United Nations treaties and agreements on human "development" and progress, that were part of the post World War II consensus, as a basis for rediscovering and reaffirming those "universal development goals" that were intended to be the measure of "development" success within all of the world's countries and that can be recognized again as the U.N. sets its agenda and measures for post-2015 "development goals". The author notes how the U.N.'s "Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" established for 2001 to 2015, abandoned the earlier global consensus to substitute a narrower vision duplicating the "civilizing mission" of European colonialism. This approach undermined global aspirations and substituted a vision of homogeneity and basic needs with no possibility for progress. Current attempts to "fix" the failures of the MDGs with "Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)" continue to subvert the earlier agreements. The 13 principles for development that the international community outlined as the basis of humanity's development vision after World War II can serve as the basis for contemporary "Universal Development Goals."

The essay uses two recent works of fiction as a takeoff for a critique of Development Studies, suggesting that what is presented in the form of fiction is often closer to reality than what the discipline offers as fact. The review of two novels by former US Peace Corps volunteers offers clear examples of how fiction in the field of "development" can offer truths that are not presented in academic work. This essay suggests how fiction can help invigorate the discipline of Development Studies, offers a list of examples, and also suggests how fiction should not be used. This essay challenges scholars in the field to draw upon insights from fiction and to review fiction works while encouraging publishers to widen their perspectives and present works in new genres in the field of "development." The essay also notes how related genres like development "diaries" can also be used as a reality check on the discipline and as a way to infuse new ideas into this field.